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“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, 
which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it”. 
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) 
Preface 
This dissertation contributes to a growing literature that analyses how real-world contexts 
affect behavior. It consists of five independent research papers, shedding light on different 
aspects of individual and social preferences in the contexts of donations, migration, religious 
worship, and insurance. The introductory Chapter I discusses underlying theories and 
concepts of the different types of social preferences analyzed in the research papers as well as 
strengths and limitations of the methodologies applied. Chapters II and III both present survey 
experiments conducted with University students, which shed light on preferences regarding 
charitable giving and acceptance of different types of migrants. Chapters IV and V provide 
novel lab-in-the-field experiments based on original data collections in Ethiopia and the 
Philippines. While Chapter IV investigates social preferences related to the attendance of a 
religious ceremony, Chapter V deals with the effect of insurance on solidarity. Finally, 
Chapter VI yields empirical evidence from Indonesia on remittances as informal insurance 
mechanism to cushion rainfall-shocks by means of an instrumental variable design. 
 Subsequently, this preface will provide a short overview of the major findings of the 
five research papers and some general information about the data collections conducted in the 
framework of this dissertation. 
Chapter II: Do campaigns featuring impact evaluations increase donations? Evidence 
from a survey experiment 
Published in: Journal of Development Effectiveness, 2017, 9:4, 500-518. 
This paper examines preferences regarding the marketing of charitable giving. We analyze, 
whether advertising the scientific soundness of an aid project or the quality of an aid 
organization influences donation behavior compared to a standard emotional appeal. Based on 
survey experiments at three Universities in Austria and Germany (n = 578), we find a 
significant increase of donations for the treatment group that received the information that the 
project was positively evaluated using a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT). The study does 
not reveal any significant effect regarding a seal of quality. Our results highlight that charity 
organizations can benefit from backing their credibility and raise their external funding by 






Chapter III: What Determines Public Acceptance of Migrants? Evidence from a Survey 
Experiment 
This paper examines the acceptance levels of hypothetical migrants, i.e. asylum seekers with 
different motivations underlying their decision to migrate to Austria. In a survey-experiment 
conducted with students at the University of Innsbruck (n=686) in 2015 – at the peak period 
of the proclaimed “refugee crisis”- we tested different treatments covering political, economic 
and environmental reasons for migration. Among environmental migrants, a further 
differentiation regarding the causes is made: environmental degradation due to climate 
change, on the one hand and rather self-inflicted causes as a consequence of unsustainable use 
of resources, on the other hand. The major finding shows the highest acceptance rates for 
political migrants, closely succeeded by externally-induced environmental migrants. This 
finding is coherent with the publicly often used terminology referring to climate migrants as 
climate refugees and feeds into the ongoing political debate about the restriction of permission 
for legal asylum to refugees covered by the Geneva Convention. The analysis of further 
respondent characteristics and perceptions inquired in an appendant survey, reveals some 
interesting further aspects that can inform policies addressing migration. Determining 
characteristics shaping the decisions are gender, political party affiliation and expectations as 
well as perceptions about the migrants’ behavior, integration and impact on the hosting 
society.     
 
Chapter IV: Worship and Religiously Motivated Discrimination 
This study investigates how attendance at public religious worship affects certain aspects of 
pro-social and anti-social behavior. Our study provides a novel methodology to identify a 
“worship effect”, by comparing behavior before and after attendance of a religious service, 
measured in different samples in a field experiment. We conducted our experiment with 371 
Orthodox Christian participants in two cities in Ethiopia, providing an appropriate setting for 
a study on religion given the religious diversity prevalent in that country. We show that 
religiously motivated discrimination exists, but participation in religious rituals promotes 
equal treatment of religious in-group (Christian) and out-group (Muslim) members, in terms 
of the amount donated in a simple experimental game that measures pro-social behavior. 
Moreover, we identify several factors such as perceived religious tensions, frequency of 
attending religious services and strength of moral convictions moderating the effect of 






Chapter V: Crowding-out or Crowding-in? Heterogeneous Effects of Insurance on 
Solidarity 
This paper tests the impact of insurance on solidarity transfers in two behavioral experiments 
in rural parts of the Philippines. Our investigation is led by the hypothesis that informal 
transfers of solidarity might be crowded out with the introduction of formal insurance 
products. The first lab-in-the-field experiment was initially designed to mimic reality as much 
as possible and allowed for communication, non-anonymity and unrestricted transfers. The 
second experiment uses a laboratory setting without communication and preservation of 
anonymity, in order to minimize strategic concerns. We only find crowding-out effects in the 
first setting, suggesting that only strategic, while there are even crowding-in effects in the 
second setting, focusing on intrinsic pro-social motives. An additional variation of the first 
setting shows results in line with these findings. Overall, the findings of this paper suggest 
that only strategic, non-intrinsic motives are crowded-out by insurance.   
Chapter VI: Remittances as Weather Insurance: Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in 
Indonesia 
This paper provides causal evidence that formal insurance competes with already existing 
informal mechanisms in the form of remittance networks. Given the widespread availability 
of remittances this helps to explain low take-up rates of formal insurance. Our analysis 
consists of two parts using a four wave panel dataset covering 14 years from 1993 until 2007. 
Data comes from rural Indonesia, regularly experiencing disastrous tropical storms. In an 
instrumental variable design that allows household income and remittances to be jointly 
determined, we show that remittances are used as informal insurance mechanism. The second 
part of the analysis simulates income flows of household with and without access to 
remittances during weather shocks. It is shown that rainfall insurance does not yield much 
benefit to the majority of households because they are already informally insured. Exceptions 
are households headed by widows and unmarried (or divorced) women with only limited 
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Social Preferences in the Contexts of Donations, Migration, 
Religious Worship, Insurance and Methods Applied 
 
1. An Introduction to Social Preferences 
The underlying drivers for individual and social preferences have been of interest to 
various scientific disciplines in the last decades, predominately (social-) psychology and 
social science. Typical concepts studied include altruism, trust, fairness, reciprocity, risk 
aversion, cooperation, patience and many more. Since the 1970s, these concepts increasingly 
started to blend into microeconomics with the emerging field of behavioral economics, 
challenging the concept of perfect rationality of the homo oeconomius (Kahnemann and 
Tversky, 1979). Fundamental research has been conducted since, for example on the potential 
of social capital to reduce transaction costs and on overcoming obstacles of collective action 
(Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Güth et al., 1982). Numerous studies hypothesized individual 
and social preferences to be significant determinants of welfare on the individual level and 
economic growth on the aggregate level. In this context, studies have found for instance that 
societies with higher levels of trust achieve higher levels of income (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack 
and Keefer, 1997). Furthermore, risk aversion has been shown to be inversely linked with 
investment in physical and human capital (Levhari and Weiss, 1974; Shaw, 1996; Cassar et 
al., 2017); while time preferences, specifically focused on patience and self-control, are 
shown to be fundamental factors regarding decision-making about savings and investments in 
education (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Cassar et al., 2017). Beyond these prominent studies, 
there exists immense evidence on the importance of pro-social preferences for a variety of 
further economic and environmental outcomes ranging from fairness at the workplace, paying 
taxes, voting, helping others in need, donating to charities, volunteering, co-operating for 
public goods or implementation of policies, management of common-pool resources or 
appeasement of conflict. Pro-social behavior expressed i.a. as trust, cooperation, solidarity or 
altruism is often categorized as beneficial effects of ‘social capital’. On the other side, there 
are numerous social traits, which are mostly perceived in a rather negative light and as 






envy. Many authors working on concepts of social preferences draw a clear distinction 
between generalized concepts of pro-sociality (Bjørnskov, 2006; Uslaner, 2002) or 
conditional concepts with people adjusting their pro-social behavior according to their 
expectation or experience of reciprocity or based on their relationship or associations with the 
person they are confronted with (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998). This argument underlines the 
strategic motives that may drive the exertion of social-preferences in contrast to intrinsic 
motives.           
 According to several experimental studies, pro-social preferences are not fixed over 
the whole lifespan but largely develop in the phase between early childhood and adolescence 
(Fehr et al. 2008; 2013) and seem to remain stable over time for adults (Carlsson et al. 2014; 
Chuang and Schechter 2013). Nevertheless, there is a broad strand of research arguing that 
social-preferences can still shift with advanced age and maturity. In this context, there is a 
steadily growing number of studies in the field of behavioral economics approaching the 
relationship between lifetime-events or broader contextual factors and the evolution of 
preferences with the use of economic lab-in-the-field experiments in different settings. This 
strand of literature covers numerous phenomena, which are partly also research objects of this 
dissertation such as religion (Henrich et al., 2010), production and market integration 
(Leibbrandt et al., 2013; Henrich et al., 2010a), charity (List, 2008; Benz and Meier, 2008); 
conflict and war (Bauer et al. 2016; Voors et al. 2013; Gilligan et al., 2011), political systems 
(Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999; Brosig-Koch et al., 2011), social networks (Binzel and Fehr, 
2013; Grossman, 2015), risk-sharing and insurance (Attanasio, 2012) or natural disasters 
(Cassar et al. 2017; Andrabi and Das 2010; Eckel et al., 2009). In the following, the concepts 
and theories of the preferences and behavior approached as part of this dissertation are discussed 
in more detail. 
1.1. Social Preferences and Donations 
Individual donations represent the largest bulk of revenue source for the non-profit sector 
(Ozdemir et al., 2010; Neumayr et al., 2007; Chen, 2009; Chang and Lee, 2010), rendering 
fundraising campaigns a core activity and necessity. Emotionalized marketing methods are 
highly prevalent in contemporary fundraising, aimed at evoking compassion and mercy by 
potential donors, which is also proven by several studies (Brennan and Binney, 2010). The 
losses and gains of others significantly bear the potential to affect individual behaviour and 
trigger feelings in a similar direction (Chou and Murnighan, 2013). Interestingly, there is 






campaigns focused on suffering and helplessness (Breeze and Dean, 2012; Chou and 
Murnighan, 2013; Merchant et al., 2010). In particular, fear, guilt, and pity have been shown 
to promote higher donations (Sargeant et al., 2000). Donors are rather reluctant to seek for 
further objective evidence on the efficiency of the organization they support as shown by as 
study of (Krasteva and Yildirim (2013) identifying only 35% of individual donors, who seek 
out additional information, as part of their contribution decision. In a similar vein, The Wise 
Giving Alliance Study (Sloan, 2009) finds that 70% of individual donors rely on information 
provided by the non-profit organizations only, despite the belief of 50% that organizations do 
not publish objective data. Likewise, in a study conducted in the UK donors believe that 67 
pence of every pound are actually distributed to charitable causes, while the rest is channelled 
into fundraising and administrative expenses. (Sargeant et al., 2000). Other experimental 
research shows a higher rate of contribution to public goods if the recipient is perceived as an 
expert in the field (Silverman et al., 2014). Landry et al. (2010) find that donors who were 
initially attracted by mechanisms that signal charitable credibility (in their case, a lottery) turn 
out to be more loyal in the long run. Studies in the field of marketing emphasize positive 
effects of eco-labeling, fair-trade labels, and other quality standard demonstrating 
accountability, reliability, and trustworthiness to the public (Bekkers, 2003; Zainon et al., 
2011; Chen, 2009).          
 Chapter II contributes to this literature by shedding light on donor preferences 
regarding the marketing and presentation of donation pledges in an incentivised survey-
experiment. The paper comprises valuable messages and insights for organizations depending 
on fundraising and public donations. Our results show that rigorous and credible research in 
the form of RCTs increases the trustworthiness of organisations and may be worth the 
investment. The common applied emotional marketing, aimed at feelings of compassion 
driving donations show rather low donation results, which may be due to the fact that these 
approaches are rather worn-out in marketing, while RCTs are still quite novel tools for quality 
assessment for the broad public. A limitation of this study is certainly the subject pool, 
limiting external validity of our findings to a specific and quite homogenous group. This 
limitation is further discussed in more detail in sub-chapter 2 below. Nevertheless, the paper 
provides some important insights for organizations depending largely on charitable giving.  
1.2. Social Preferences and Public Acceptance of Migrants 
Since the proclaimed “refugee-crisis” in Europe, with its peak in 2015, acceptance of 






society. While the international legislation is clear and quite restrictive on the question who 
counts as a legitimate asylum seeker, boundaries are much more blurred in the discussion and 
reality. Bansak et al. (2016) show in their experiment conducted in 15 European countries that 
asylum seekers with a high employability and education status, more consistent asylum 
testimonies, who are perceived as vulnerable, and are rather Christian than Muslim have the 
highest probability of public acceptance. These results suggest that public acceptance levels 
are shaped by potential of future economic contributions, humanitarian concerns, and 
trustworthiness of asylum claims as well as an anti-Muslim bias. In a similar vein, Böhm et 
al., investigate economic and psychological determinants of citizens’ pro-social behavior 
towards refugees and find that behavior in favor of refugees becomes less likely if costs for 
the citizens are incurred and more likely the higher the neediness of the refugee is assessed. 
Studies with a psychological background focus on how personality traits and personal values 
of people influence acceptance of migrants. Among those factors are stereotypes, expectations 
towards behavior of the other and the outcome for the citizens in the host country, as well as a 
perceived threat to cultural and religious values or even an increase in terrorism (Fiske et al., 
2002; Brown and Zagefka, 2011; Piontkowski et al., 2002; Pew Research Center, 2016; 
Brader et al., 2008). Beyond these rather psychological factors there is also evidence that 
people assess migration from a rather economic cost-benefit perspective. This perspective is 
very often framed in the context of the migrants’ participation in social welfare systems, 
displaying parts of citizens who reject to share these collective goods financed by taxed with 
migrants (Kauf and Wagner, 2012; Faccini and Mayda, 2009, Citrin et al., 1997, Card et al., 
2012).  For example Vecchione et al. (2012) find high correlations between values and 
personality traits and that these are more important than socio-demographic characteristics 
when explaining people’s perception towards immigration. The effect on immigration 
perceptions of personality traits such as openness and agreeableness is channeled through 
values of universalism and security. Vecchione et al.’s (2012) findings are also supported by 
Hainmüller & Hiscox (2007), who used ESS (European Social Survey) data and came to the 
conclusion that people with a higher educational background are more likely to favor 
immigration, regardless of their educational- or skill level. Furthermore, they claim that 
immigration has little or at least equivocal effects on employment and unemployment for 
native workers and their real income. Evidence also suggests that negative attitude towards 
immigration appears more powerful correlated with cultural values such as tradition and a 
high advocacy of concepts of national identity.       






two major aspects of the discussion about acceptance of migrants: On the one hand, 
characteristics determining acceptance levels from the perspective of the “decision taker” or 
citizen and, on the other hand, acceptance levels for different types of migrants, respectively 
motives to migrate. While it is not very surprising that political migrants, who also count as 
legitimate asylum seekers according to the Geneva-Convention display the highest acceptance 
levels, we find that migrants, who move due to environmental reasons they could not 
influence directly are almost equally accepted. With this finding our research challenges the 
existing categories of legally accepted migration and feeds into the increasing discussion 
about future approaches to migration management in the face of climate change and 
environmental degradation. Besides these aspects, the paper also provides some interesting 
insights for the heated debates in Europe about success factors for integration. Our study 
shows that acceptance levels are also largely driven by perceptions about potential societal 
contributions, projected behaviour and skills of the migrants. Perceptions which are largely 
formed by the degree of actual exposure to people of different cultural and ethnic 
backgrounds. Furthermore, this factor shows how much acceptance is also determined by 
insecurities due to information gaps. Both are factors, which can be approached by sensitive 
social and education policies. Limitations of the study are also given by the subject pool, as in 
the previous paper on donations. Here as well the subjects pool is quite homogenous and 
respondents showed a high overall acceptance level of migrants, which may be due to the fact, 
that political and social attitudes of student populations are usually more on the left side of the 
political spectrum than the average population. A further limitation is the framing of the study 
in a way that the hypothetical migrant has not yet left his country of origin. It would be 
interesting to compare our results with a further study picturing a hypothetical migrant, who 
already made the effort to move, which is associated with lots of incurred costs and risks and 
may exert a promoting effect for acceptance levels.  
1.3. Social Preferences and Religious Worship 
The relationship between religion and various aspects of social behavior has been studied 
extensively in the social sciences and psychology but rarely with methods from experimental 
economics. One stream of this literature focuses on self-reported religiosity and how this 
correlates with higher charitable donations, volunteerism and an increased honesty. There also 
exists evidence that societies belonging to one of the big world religions or to religions with a 
more moralistic, knowledgeable and punishing god are more pro-social than other societies 






increases with greater societal size. Yet, although insightful to the relationship between 
religion and social behavior, these studies do not reveal causal mechanisms. Religiosity may 
be correlated with unobserved factors that promote pro-sociality or the relationship may be 
reverse and pro-social dispositions cause people to become religious. A second strand of the 
literature uses experimental priming methods to make subjects think about religion. The 
cumulated evidence supports the non-experimental findings. There seems to be causal effects 
of religiosity on honesty (Roes and Raymond, 2003; Mazar et. al. 2008), generosity (Bering, 
2006; Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007; Bargh and Chartrand, 1999) and an increase in 
cooperation (Ahemd and Salas, 2011). Much of the evidence on pro-sociality and religion has 
focused on behavior towards religious in-group members and neglected possible effects on 
behavior towards the religious outgroup. However, religion has also often been cited as a 
reason for between-group conflicts among societies and organizations with different faith-
based beliefs. Today’s global realities constitute a veritable breeding ground for conflict and 
abuse of ethnic or religious faultlines for power purposes given the ever more complex 
societies and increasing competition for scarce resources due to environmental changes and 
economic imbalances (Atran and Henrich, 2010; Horton et al., 2011). A religious dimension 
has been prevalent in many large scale and long enduring conflicts in the past as well as over 
the last decades and in recent years. At a first glance, the role of religion in conflict may seem 
at odds with the teachings of the dominant world religions. Frequently cited passages in the 
Bible and the Koran make this evident: “Love your neighbor as yourself. There is no 
commandment greater than these” (The New Testament, The Great Commandment, Mark 
12:31); “Humankind shall pursue the highest good for self and others, and thereby fulfills the 
purpose of creation in service and worship of God” (The Qur'an, 51:56). Besides the essential 
beliefs of honesty, solidarity and pro-sociality, the teachings also feature more ambiguous 
passages that discriminate against non-believers. Thus, one cannot deny a history of deliberate 
misinterpretations that have fostered extremism and aggressive behavior.   
 Within the context of a religiously motivated conflict, there is evidence that regular 
attendance at religious services indeed predicts out-group hostility and even willing 
martyrdom (Ginges, et al., 2009)  and religious ideology of a group substantially increases the 
number of fatalities due to a suicide attack (Johnson et al., 2010; Henne, 2012). Interestingly, 
similar findings exists for a very diverse range of samples with religious people in India, 
Russia, Mexico, Great Britan or Indonesia, showing that intense attendance at rituals is 
correlated to a declared willingness to die for religious purposes and for the belief that other 






2009; Atran and Henrich, 2010). Similarly, religious priming can promote discrimination and 
prejudice (La Bouff, 2012) or increase aggressive behavior towards strangers (Bushman et al. 
2007). In general, religion - just as any group – is likely to enhance commitment to coalitional 
identities, even independent from the religious belief per se (Ramsay, 2014). In that sense, 
religious priming may affect behavior by increasing the salience of group identity 
(Norenzayan and Shariff, 2008; Henne, 2012 and Bushman, 2007). There is also a strand of 
literature arguing that commitment to a religious community can be characterized as a 
“mutual insurance club” (Berman, 2000). In this context Auriol et al. (2017) even find that 
enrollment in a formal insurance scheme causes church members to donate less money in a 
dictator game to the church and to other recipient, who are not directly linked to the church. 
These findings demonstrate that belonging to a religious in-group is not for free. Religious 
rituals are often very costly and act as a signaling device to other members as it is more costly 
for free loaders to perform these costly acts (Atran and Henrich, 2010). Thus, a positive effect 
of participation in religious rituals has further been documented with respect to donations 
(Forsythe et al., 1994).          
 The paper presented in Chapter IV contributes to this literature, as it is the first study 
to examine the effect of religious worship on pro-social behavior and discrimination using a 
controlled experiment in a real-world context. Our method circumvents several 
methodological issues that impede identification of causal relationships in the existing 
literature described above. Moreover, it combines the advantages of the experimental 
approach with realism and the opportunity to study behavior in the field (Levitt & List, 2009; 
List, 2011). Our approach measures short-term effects of religious worship on social behavior, 
which we consider particularly salient given that episodes of conflict often start directly in the 
aftermath of religious gatherings. Our results show that the effect of worship is largely 
determined by the characteristics of the conflict predisposition of the context and existing 
perception and associations with members of other religious groups. A major limitation of the 
study is certainly the limited external validity as it is embedded in the context of Ethiopia, 
which is a quite unique context with Christianity and Islam arising at a similar point in time, 
leaving none of the two religions as the “foreign” or “immigrated” religion, as it is the case in 
many other countries around the world. Replication if this study in different country contexts 
and with different religious groups in the focus would certainly be interesting as well as a 
replication in a classical “club-context” such as a sports club, in order to address the potential 
critique that the effects we show are mostly driven by an enhancement of in-group identity 







1.4. Social Preferences and Insurance 
Financial products such as credits, savings and insurances, which are fundamentals of 
risk-management in most industrial countries are not an overall global reality. Many 
developing countries have very low supply of these kind of financial products or 
malfunctioning regulatory frameworks, making it inaccessible or less attractive for people to 
sign up for such a product.  
Nevertheless, risk is omnipresent with, among others, natural disasters, illnesses and 
epidemics, economic crises, unemployment or conflict threatening households and shaping 
their decisions. The two papers, which as part of this dissertation analyze interlinkages 
between (informal)insurance and social preferences examine the contexts of the Philippines 
and Indonesia. Both countries are highly susceptible to natural disasters and are at the same 
time known for their strong social networks and risk-sharing ties among communities and 
even expats in the diasporas abroad. In recent years, a growing literature emerged on the 
impact of natural disasters on behavior, decisions and preferences (Cassar et al., 2017; 
Castillo and Carter, 2011; Chong et al., 2011; Magomedova, 2015; Andrabi and Das 2010; 
Eckel et al., 2009). Yet, these studies produce diverging results regarding the question 
whether people become more or less cooperative, possibly because of difficulties in 
establishing causalities, in defining the interaction partner (within versus outside the close 
geographic or social context) and using the right measurement instrument. Chong et al. (2011) 
investigate the impact of the earthquake that struck Chile in 2010 on trust and trustworthiness 
in a short-term time horizon. Surprisingly, they do not find any differences of the level trust 
between affected and non-affected people but a lower level of trustworthiness for affected 
people. Cassar et al. (2017) find almost contradictory evidence, showing in their study that 
people, who had been affected by the 2004 Tsunami display significantly different 
preferences. People, who had been hit by the Tsunami are more risk-averse, more trusting and 
also considered as more trustworthy. Both findings can be interpreted in a contextual 
framework of a high degree of inter-community solidarity and agency support after the 
catastrophic events shaping trust and trustworthiness.     
 Such solidarity transfers within social networks of a wider span of community or 
family or households are very prominent in many developing countries, as mentioned above 
and offer the possibility to manage unexpected income shocks in the absence of functioning 






Morduch, 2002; Townsend, 1994). Besides the above discussed shapes of trust, solidarity, 
which can be defined as the “willingness to help people in need who are similar to oneself but 
victims of outside influences” (Selten and Ockenfels 1998, p. 518) is a further fundamental 
corner stone of informal risk-sharing. Several studies addressed in this context the question if 
solidarity transfers are linked to the expectation of reciprocal behavior and, thus, function as a 
kind of mutual insurance with a considerable degree of self-interest (Coate and Ravallion, 
1993; Attanasio and Rios-Rull, 2000) or if they persists also without future interaction or any 
other kind of mutual commitment, rather seen from an altruistic angle (Barr and Genicot, 
2008; Leider et al., 2009; Comola and Fafchamps, 2010). Perceiving solidarity transfers and 
informal risk-sharing as substitutes for credit and insurance in the absence of a sufficient 
market supply, leads to the further question if the introduction of formal insurance will exhibit 
a crowding-out effect on these informal mechanisms within social networks. In this context, 
for instance Bowles (2008) demonstrated the crowding -out of pro-social behavior by market-
based products as they offer more security and predictability. A higher degree of self-reliance 
and individualistic risk-sharing behavior in contrast to reliance on social networks is the 
consequence.            
 Paper V contributes to this literature by analyzing potential crowding effects of 
insurance in the context of both strategic reciprocal and intrinsic motives. We conducted two 
waves of lab-in-the-field experiments, one with a setting that allowed communication to 
mimic the reality of informal risk-sharing as closely as possible and one anonymous variant, 
exhibiting a higher degree of control. The Philippines are an ideal setting as people are 
exposed to numerous nature and climate related risks in this environment and are routinely 
engaged in informal risk-sharing. Our major finding is that the introduction of insurance only 
seems to affect strategic motives without threatening truly pro-social motivation.  
 Paper VI contributes to the existing literature by uniting the strands of empirical 
research separately working on rainfall insurance and remittances. There are only few studies 
focusing on causal relationships between both. The paper has methodological limitations, 
using publicly available data but still provides some interesting insights, that would be worth 
of further in-depth study. In this frame, the paper demonstrates the insurance effect of 
remittances for Indonesia. By simulating the effects of a typical rainfall insurance contract, it 
provides country wide evidence that formal insurance may be crowded out by existing 
informal mechanisms. It is, however, important to note, that the crowding-out effect found has 
a significant size but is only covering about 20% of the damage expected. The demand for a 






major conclusion that derives from this work is related to the target group of insurances. 
Instead of working with medium-sized farms who are more likely to have a migrant family 
member who sends remittances, insurance is potentially in highest demand by households 
without remittance income and should be targeted to such groups. Furthermore, the paper 
reveals that migrants remitting to their family bear a considerable financial burden, which is 
hard to calculate, making them more vulnerable to shocks as well. This might imply that 
insurance demand which can be subscribed by migrants for their families is high and this type 
of family insurance would provide more income security for both the migrant and the 
receivers of the remittances.  
2. Review of Methods: Lab-in-the-Field and Survey Experiments 
Common to Chapters II-V is the use of experimental methods. While Chapters II and III use a 
survey-experiment implemented at three different European Universities, Chapters IV and V 
are based on novel controlled lab-in-the field experiments.   
 Experimental research provides numerous benefits and avoids some major pitfalls of 
self-reported evidence on social preferences. In contrast to the measurement of self-reported 
attitudes as part of surveys, experiments observe behaviour in concrete decision scenarios 
(Putnam, 1995; Chan et al., 2006). Using self-reported evidence on social preferences may 
lead to the problem that people interpret the meaning of questions in a different way or 
respond in a socially desirable manner, referred to in the literature as “impression 
management“  and may, thus, not report preferences and behaviour they classify as 
undesirable. As the different social preferences in the two papers, especially cooperation, 
trust, solidarity and altruism are in most cultural context clearly socially desirable, self-
reported evidence could lead to distorted results (Norenzayan and Shariff, 2008; Paulhus, 
1984). By incentivizing the participants of the lab-in-the-field experiments monetarily, 
participants have to give-up real money to exhibit pro-social behaviour.    
 Despite these quite strong benefits of experiments in general and lab-in-the-field 
experiments in particular, the method is obviously not without criticism in the academic 
literature. Despite the argument of providing research in a more naturalistic setting, 
experiments, both in the lab or in the field, may exhibit a high degree of abstraction, which is 
useful to avoid the impact of unobserved heterogeneity, but may lead to situations which are 
carried out in a natural setting or context, while remaining rather distant to reality.  
 Lab experiments are typically conducted at Universities, with students as subjects, 






homogenous subject pool with similar education, income, age and cognitive abilities. Henrich, 
Heine and Norenzayan (2010) argue in this vein, that lab experiments are usually based on 
decisions of western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD) societies and 
criticize that these results are then often generalized on very different populations and 
contexts. Nonetheless, these kinds of experiments offer a particularly high degree of 
experimental control and make replicability rather easy. There are diverging opinions among 
behavioural economists what makes a lab-in-the-field experiment. Harrison and List (2004) 
define these experiments as “the same as a conventional lab experiments but with a 
nonstandard subject pool”. According to this definition, an experiment conducted in a lab with 
for instance a representative population would already count as a lab-in-the-field experiment. 
Charness, Gneezy and Imas (2013) see this from a different perspective and perceive the 
advantage of lab-in-the-field experiments compared to lab experiments in the fact that the 
subjects are actually directly relevant to the economic theory that is analysed. This may 
increase the applicability and policy relevance of the results. This comes with a lower degree 
of control and replicability as classical lab experiments. A proper design and a clear 
implementation strategy can, however, minimize this disadvantage.  As a downside of the 
high context-sensitivity, lab-in-the field-experiments are often also criticized for their low 
degree of external validity, providing credible policy recommendations for a specific context 
and population but remaining hardly generalizable at the same time. Gneezy and Imas (2016) 
argue in this vein, that a combination of lab and lab-in-the-field experiments would be ideal to 
combine the benefits of both and cancel out the disadvantages. Due to a limited research 
budget, this was unfortunately not feasible in the framework if this dissertation. However, 
design and implementation were conducted in a way that aimed at maximizing experimental 
control and applicability to the context and subject pool in terms of policy recommendations 
and findings. Both lab-in-the-field experiments were complemented by individual surveys, 
including sections on socio-demographic information but also on moods and general 
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Most scientists consider randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to be the “gold standard” when 
it comes to estimating the causal effect of a policy program (c.f. Duflo and Kremer, 2003; 
Duflo et al., 2007). Following the long tradition of randomized trials in medicine, RCTs have 
been widely used among development economists and political scientists. While not all aid 
programs can be rigorously tested, a wide range of development-related questions have been 
analyzed, including the impact of education and health programs, labor market interventions, 
financial products for the poor, and agricultural innovations. Since the introduction of RCTs 
in scientific experimentation in the 1960s, they have been increasingly adopted, especially 
over the last decade. For example, in 2003, a leading organizational network for impact 
evaluation, the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), launched 33 evaluations; in 
2015, the network had 686 randomized trials in progress (Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action 
Lab, 2015a). Thanks to the increasing number of RCTs, it has become possible to compare 
different studies and to assess the cost-effectiveness of policies within a certain contextual 
situation (Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, 2012). We understand cost-effectiveness 
analysis as measuring the cost required to achieve a given impact. The comparison of the 
costs of various aid policies that seek to achieve a specific development goal is especially 
important to policy-makers and practitioners. For example, using RCTs, scientists can 
determine whether a budget of 1 million USD intended to increase the school participation of 
pupils in developing countries would be best spent on supplying school uniforms, providing 
textbooks and whiteboards, de-worming children, or on informational campaigns directed 
towards parents. Thus, if agencies were to follow the advice derived from RCTs, they could 
help more people with a given amount and thereby increase overall welfare. 
Using a survey experiment, we uncover one additional benefit of RCTs – namely, their 
fundraising capacity. A large part of the financial resources of aid agencies is derived from 
individual donors via fundraising. Individual donors can therefore have an important 
influence on increasing social welfare by directing their funds to more effective organizations. 
However, there has been little research on the question of whether individual donors use this 
knowledge to support effective aid projects. To help remedy this gap, we test whether results 
from actual RCTs on cost-effectiveness lead to higher donations from individual donors. 
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We further study whether disclosing quality signals in the form of a seal of approval promoted 
in the fundraising request leads to higher donations. Negative publicity is highly detrimental 
to confidence in non-profit organizations. The media coverage in 2005 exposing the more 
than 2,000 fake internet sites soliciting help for victims of Hurricane Katrina is just one 
example of many (National White Collar Crime Center, 2009; Greenlee et al., 2007). 
Although charities are the most trusted sector globally (Pickering, 2014), the non-profit 
market is characterized by high information asymmetry and growing competition;
a
 as a result, 
charities face an increasing demand to provide feedback about their organizational 
performance in order to substantiate their claims of economic and ethical conduct. In general, 
transparency within the non-profit market is limited, and donations represent credence goods: 
The consumer cannot assess the actual quality of a product and must therefore rely upon the 
expert seller’s good will (Dulleck and Kerschbaumer, 2006). Consequently, watchdog 
institutions have been established to obtain and interpret data in order to analyze 
organizational performance in terms of the quality, value, and effectiveness of charitable 
goods and services. An example is GiveWell, an American non-profit charity evaluator 
focusing primarily on the cost-effectiveness of the organizations. This evidence-based 
approach to charities is an emerging international movement, meeting the demands of 
individual donors and has been labelled as “effective altruism”. According to the founders of 
GiveWell Karnofsky and Hassfeld, however, many charities are rather reluctant to provide the 
information and data needed for evaluations due to the time effort or to engage in rigorous 
impact evaluations due to the high costs involved. Singer (2016), however, argues if donors, 
started to follow the recommendations of such platforms, a high ranking could induce a 
significant increase in donations, thus, in return raising the incentive for the organizations to 
comply with the evaluators’ request for information. Obviously, fraud within the non-profit 
sector has a negative impact on donation inflows. Scams may be easier to perpetrate in an 
atmosphere of trust, since it can be difficult to verify revenue streams when only weak 
internal controls apply and there is a general lack of business or financial expertise (Greenlee 
et al., 2007). An average of 5% of a typical non-profit organization’s annual revenues may be 
lost to scams (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012).  
To our knowledge, this study is the first to assess individual donations dependent on 
additional information that either highlights  
a) the program’s effectiveness as tested by a rigorous impact evaluation or  
b) organizational performance as guaranteed through a quality seal.  
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We compare these two treatments to a control group that only receives a purely emotional 
fundraising request that is otherwise identical to the two treatments. The control group, 
representing the basic scenario used for comparison, is presented with a detailed fundraising 
scenario including emotional elements. This is followed by a request to indicate one's 
personal willingness to donate to a specific information campaign being conducted by the 
fictitious charity “Initiative Help4Children”. The underlying topic of our fundraising request 
is school absenteeism in Sub-Saharan regions. There has been significant research on this 
topic, and impact evaluations from J-PAL suggest that one of the most cost-effective remedies 
for school absenteeism in Africa involves informing parents about the benefits of increased 
school participation. The policy is implemented by organizing informational sessions for 
parents in which they are shown statistics on the average monthly earnings of local people 
with various educational backgrounds (Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, 2015b).
b
 This 
finding may be surprising for many donors, who might otherwise believe that money should 
be invested in the construction of new school buildings or more tangible items. We 
additionally chose education for our fundraising request because the concept that more 
education is beneficial is uncontroversial. Education is also included in the UN Millennium 
Goals and Sustainable Development Goals, and many fundraising campaigns have been 
conducted on this issue. Respondents may therefore already have an opinion or experience 
regarding the topic; this increases the familiarity of the good to be valued and thereby the 
likelihood of stating a realistic donation amount even in a hypothetical setting. To elicit 
donations, we use the contingent valuation method, which provides reliable estimates, 
especially for goods that are familiar to the respondents (Schläpfer and Fischhoff, 2012). 
Importantly, however, the aim of our study is not to measure the true level of donation but to 
compare the three different treatments. We do not have any reason to believe that any 
hypothetical bias would differ between treatments. For example, we do not find that students 
who are more familiar with development issues or randomization techniques were more likely 
to donate higher amounts in the impact treatment. 
Our study utilized an online survey at three German-speaking universities (Innsbruck, 
Marburg, and Mannheim), with a total sample of 578 completed surveys. About 50% of our 
participants donated a positive amount to the information campaign. The average donation 
amount was 14 Euros. These figures are not unrealistic, given that students in Austria and 
Germany donate 20.70 Euros per year on average, compared to an average of 65 Euros in the 
general population (median = 25.50 Euros) (Neumayr and Schober, 2009, p. 14), and 
respondents in our sample claimed to have donated 50 Euros on average over the past year. In 
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line with our ex-ante hypothesis, we find evidence for a positive relationship between impact 
evaluation and donation. Using impact evaluation in the fundraising request increased 
donations by 8 Euros. We find no effect for the quality seal treatment. A further analysis of 
the influence of socio-demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal variables determines that 
voting for social-democratic (“left-wing”) parties, a higher frequency of attending a house of 
worship, being female, being single, and expressing interest in the topic all increase donation 
levels. We also asked respondents about their perception of aid effectiveness and the specific 
information campaign. We observe that those who were assigned to the impact evaluation 
treatment but had negative perceptions nevertheless donated high amounts. 
Our paper contributes to the economic fundraising literature, which has mainly 
focused on financial mechanisms such as seed money, matching grants, lotteries, gifts, and 
rebate rules (see the reviews of Andreoni and Payne, 2013; List, 2011), but it is also intended 
to inform fundraising practitioners in the development sector, who could directly benefit from 
increasing their donation inflows.
c
 Given that charitable organizations spend an average of 
nearly 100,000 USD per year on fundraising and that the average fundraising-to-donation 
ratio is about 12% (List, 2011), any improvement in fundraising effectiveness seems highly 
valuable.  
Although we only test our hypothesis on individual donors, the effect of conducting RCTs 
may also lead to more donations from businesses or other institutions that sponsor aid 
agencies at much higher levels. Disclosing organizational quality signals and evoking 
emotions in fundraising campaigns are common practices, but we are not aware of any non-
profit organizations that promote their aid effectiveness as determined by randomized 
controlled trials or even effectiveness in general. The positive valuation of scientific 
information might further encourage aid agencies and governments to fund RCTs (which 
constitute a global public good, as noted above) and ultimately to invest their money in aid 
campaigns that are proven to have a significant impact on people’s lives. 
2. Hypotheses 
Fundraising represents the “most significant revenue source within the non-profit sector” 
(Ozdemir et al., 2010, p. 214). Whereas international aid organizations and agencies primarily 
depend on budgets funded by various governments, non-profit organizations rely on private 
contributions from individuals (Chen, 2009). Individual donations account for over 75% of 
total global charitable giving (Neumayr et al., 2007; Chang and Lee, 2010). There are 
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enormous differences in giving behavior: According to the World Giving Index (2012), on a 
country level, the donation of money to charities is highest in Ireland (79%), closely followed 
by Australia (76%) and the Netherlands (73%). In the US, 57% of the population donates 
money to charities; in Austria and Germany, 57% and 50% of residents donate to charities, 
respectively (Charities Aid Foundation, 2012, p.15; List and Price, 2012). We find that about 
50% of our respondents donated positive amounts. 
In the current state of fundraising and non-profit marketing methods, emotional 
advertisements are prevalent. Brennan and Binney (2010) conclude that individuals do indeed 
respond to emotional appeals. The losses and gains of others significantly affect personal 
behavior and feelings in the same way that one’s own losses and gains would (Chou and 
Murnighan, 2013, p. 6). However, people are more likely to respond to negatively framed 
advertisements showing individuals who are suffering (Breeze and Dean, 2012; Chou and 
Murnighan, 2013; Merchant et al., 2010). In particular, fear, guilt, and pity have been shown 
to promote giving (Sargeant et al., 2000). The strong focus on emotional aspects is 
highlighted by the fact that only 35% of individual donors seek out additional information 
before contributing money to a charity (Krasteva and Yildirim, 2013, p. 14). The Wise Giving 
Alliance Study (Sloan, 2009, p. 223) finds that 70% of individual donors do not know 
whether their charity support is justified, as their only information comes from the non-profit 
organizations themselves, even though only 50% of donors believe that organizations publish 
objective data. 
Against this backdrop of emotional campaigns and asymmetric information in the non-
profit sector, we test two information treatments that emphasize two key aspects for rational 
donors: Whether aid agencies do things right (i.e., are they efficient and transparent) and 
whether they do the right things (i.e., are they effective). Evidence from behavioral economics 
shows that individuals value measures that decrease information asymmetry. Vesterlund 
(2003) and Andreoni (2006) propose that positive seed money effects arise due to the first-
mover’s potential to credibly convey information. In their models, a first-mover acquires 
superior information about the quality of the charity; by making large gifts, such informed 
players convey that the charity is worth supporting. Similarly, Landry et al. (2010) find that 
donors who were initially attracted by mechanisms that signal charitable credibility (in their 
case, a lottery) turn out to be more loyal in the long run. This suggests that both of the 
information treatments we implement should lead to an increase in the willingness to donate. 
However, inducing rational consideration of the donation decision might also reduce the 
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positive effects of the emotional component. Thus, it is a priori not straightforward whether 
including more rational information will necessarily increase donations. 
Our first main research question is whether including a quality seal within a 
fundraising request increases participants’ willingness to donate (WTD). We expect such a 
seal to increase WTD in comparison to a purely emotional fundraising campaign, as measures 
that decrease information asymmetry are generally valued. Such information asymmetries 
exist even for committed donors. In the UK, donors are convinced that only 67 pence of every 
pound are actually distributed to charitable causes; the rest is believed to be directed toward 
fundraising and administrative expenses. In reality, however, most charities spend 80 pence of 
every pound on implementing charitable programs (Sargeant et al., 2000). Other experimental 
research shows, that people are more willing to contribute to public goods if they are 
convinced that the recipient is an expert and thereby perceived as a legitimate authority in 
their field able to comprehensibly explain their cause. (Silverman et al, 2014). Analogously, 
Sonntag and Zizzo (2015) show that compliance is considerably higher if a perspicuous 
explanation is provided why a particular behavior would be beneficial for the decision-maker 
(e.g. donate for the more cost-effective development project). Demonstrating the advantages 
of a certain option by means of an RCT, thus, combines these aspects of authority by 
expertise and compelling evidence and explanation of the underlying reasons. The marketing 
literature has further emphasized the positive effects of eco-labeling, fair-trade labels, and 
other quality standards that demonstrate accountability, reliability, and trustworthiness to the 
public (Bekkers, 2003; Zainon et al., 2011; Chen, 2009). According to Chen (2009, p. 360, p. 
363) watchdog institutions such as the BBB (the Better Business Bureau’s Wise Giving 
Alliance) are associated with an increase in giving of up to 30%.
d
 Confidence in non-profit 
organizational performance and internal efficiency correlates with higher contributions 
(Sargeant et. al., 2000). 
  
Hypothesis 1: Prominent mention of a quality seal has a positive effect on  
  respondents’ willingness to donate compared to the control group. 
Adding information within fundraising requests about effectiveness of the aid project for 
which funds are being raised should also increase giving. Intuitively, individuals receive a 
higher personal utility when they contribute to worthwhile causes. However, without 
additional information, it is difficult for donors to assess which aid projects are worthwhile of 
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funding. Providing information from an independent and trusted organization that indicates 
that the aid project is the most cost-effective program should thus increase donation levels. 
Note that this requires that donors believe the information and that they actually value cost-
effectiveness. Impact evaluation results are usually not included within fundraising requests, 
further ensuring a potential competitive advantage. Szper and Prakash (2011, p. 117) find that 
Charity Navigator (U.S. Charity Watchdog) does not provide information valued by donors: 
The current emphasis is on financial information only, and although it is easy to “apply 
quantifiable metrics to financial figures, it is more difficult to do the same for programmatic 
content and quality, which arguably should be the more important criteria for assessing 
nonprofits” (Szper and Prakash, 2011, p. 119). 
Hypothesis 2: Prominent mention of the program’s effectiveness as determined by 
impact evaluations has a positive effect on respondents' willingness to donate 




We use a combination of a survey experiment and the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), 
which is a stated-preference technique primarily used to elicit individuals‘ valuations of non-
marketed goods (Carson, 2000). To this end, participants are presented with a hypothetical but 
realistic scenario and then asked about their individual willingness to pay – or, as in our case, 
their willingness to donate (WTD). The reference level for respondents’ maximum WTD is 
based on their current disposable income, or “after tax income minus all fixed obligations and 
all the necessary expenditures in food, clothing, interests and so on” (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 
134). If respondents are willing to donate, they specify the amount of a one-time fixed 
payment. The elicitation format is designed to be open-ended.
e
 
Hypothetical bias is a common critique of stated-preference methods. Such a bias may 
occur if real donations and hypothetical donations differ significantly. One reason underlying 
this divergence could be the lack of economic motivation on the part of respondents to 
consider and express their true preferences or to act strategically. As this study incorporates 
two treatments and a control group for purposes of comparison, it is assumed that any 
hypothetical bias, should it occur, would affect all three groups in the same way. This would 
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lead to upwards-biased average donation amounts. To control for this, we carry out robustness 
tests excluding donations of more than 100 Euros. Furthermore, we opt to use an anonymous 
online elicitation design that allows participants to respond freely, thereby avoiding an 
interviewer bias. In the introduction to the donation experiment, we also stress that 
hypothetical bias may arise and should be purposefully avoided. This standard approach used 
by Bulte et al. (2005), among others, significantly decreases hypothetical bias. Most 
importantly, however, our aim is not to elicit the actual Euro amount of donations, unlike 
many other studies using contingent valuation. We merely use this amount as a means to 
study the effects of our treatments, similar to laboratory experiments that rely on the public 
goods game to study cooperation. Finally, our obtained donation amounts (average 14 Euro) 
are very realistic for a student’s yearly contribution to charities in Austria and Germany also 
comparing them to the field experiment by Huck and Rasul (2011) among opera attendees in 
Munich who on average donate 80 Euros.  
After the contingent valuation section of the survey, participants were asked several socio-
demographic and attitudinal questions.  
 
3.2. Experimental Treatments 
Individuals were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions: control, impact, or seal. 
Each individual was presented with a fundraising scenario followed by a request to indicate 
their personal donation. The aim was to provide enough information without overloading the 
participants. The control group represented the basic scenario used for comparison, which 
consisted exclusively of emotional fundraising elements. The impact and seal group scenarios 
were identical to the control treatment but extended with additional informative elements. 
With regard to the marketing techniques implemented within the three treatments, certain very 
basic instruments were employed. A photo was included, as this medium fosters emotions 
very effectively; the emotional impact was further enhanced by displaying a (sad-looking) 
child. The image was selected to trigger negatively framed emotions such as guilt and pity, 
which are known to have a positive effect on donation likelihood. The singularity effect was 
also considered. The scenario described the situation of children in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Respondents were then given the opportunity to resolve their “emotional imbalance” through 
a donation. However, the marketing aspect was not the major focus of the study; it was 





The fundraising request for the control group began with an introduction explaining the 
general context and describing the widespread problem of school absenteeism in the region of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where many parents regard education as unimportant.  
The Sub-Saharan African region has seen a remarkable rise in school enrolment over 
the past decade. However, more than 21.6 million children of lower secondary school 
age in the region still do not attend school, and many are expected never to have 
access to formal education. Children from very poor families, orphans, and girls are 
particularly underprivileged, despite the fact that education is one possible way to 
escape from poverty. 
The valuation section continued with a description of the aid program seeking to reduce 
school absenteeism organized by the fictitious charity “Initiative Help4Children”. We chose a 
fictitious organization for logistical reasons and so that we could implement the necessary 
ceteris paribus comparisons without deceiving subjects (e.g., describing an organization that 
has or does not have a quality seal, depending on the treatment). As is usual for CVM studies, 
the project, the implementing institution, and the resulting benefits were explained. 
Respondents were told that the program is dependent on donations and that study participants 
can actively contribute to making a change. 
It may be that some parents regard education as useless. Imagine the fictitious 
organization “Initiative Help4Children”, which informs parents about the income 
options of successful school graduates. This information conveys important incentives 
for parents to send their children to school and to support their education. This 
campaign, however, can only take place with the help of your contribution. Your 
donation will ensure that as many households as possible can benefit from the aid 
campaign. 
After the context was explained, each respondent was asked about his or her willingness to 
donate: “Do you want to donate to the ‘Initiative Help4Children’ campaign now?” If 
respondents indicated a positive WTD, a further question appeared, requesting them to fill in 





The impact group featured the same basic set-up as the control group. However, the 
fundraising appeal was extended by the additional information that aid programs can often be 
ineffective despite well-intended implementation efforts. Evaluation institutions and their 
services, as well as the benefits of impact evaluations, were explained to participants.  
There is often a lack of information with regard to whether a certain aid project is 
suitable to help people in need. By implementing scientific randomized studies, one 
can determine which program has the greatest benefit for aid recipients for a given 
amount of money. These studies can be compared to experiments in the field of 
medicine in which a treatment is tested on a randomly chosen group of people. These 
results are then compared to those from the control group that was not exposed to the 
treatment. 
Because program evaluations are relatively new and probably unknown to most survey 
participants, it was important to explain their function plausibly to ensure understanding. The 
text emphasized that these randomized, scientifically conducted studies test the cost-
effectiveness of aid programs. The text went on to state that J-PAL has evaluated several aid 
programs that seek to decrease school absenteeism in Africa. According to their findings, the 
most cost-effective treatment is informing the parents about the benefits of education.  
The most promising measure to improve school participation in poor regions is to 
inform parents about the benefits of education for their children. This information 
campaign results in a significant increase in school participation compared to other 
measures for a given amount of money. Thus, 100 USD spent to inform parents about 
the benefits of education increases school participation by 21 children per year. If 
same amount were instead invested in supplying free school uniforms, for example, 
school participation would increase by only 1 child per year. 
The subsequent fundraising request was the same as that of the control group.  
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Quality Seal Treatment 
This treatment also featured the same basic set-up as the control group, followed by an 
additional transparency disclosure. The introductory section, picture, description of one aspect 
of the current educational situation in Sub-Saharan Africa, presentation of “Initiative 
Help4Children” and its “Info-Campaign” aid program, and the plea for financial help were as 
described above. This was followed by a brief passage on organizational effectiveness. The 
text noted that “Initiative Help4Children” is certified by the Austrian Charity Quality Seal (for 
the survey conducted in Innsbruck) or the German “Donation Quality Seal of the DZI” (for 
the surveys conducted in Germany). Both seals assure ethical behavior in fundraising and 
donation-funded activities in accordance with objective and verifiable standards.  
It is often impossible to know whether an organization is suitable to help people in 
need. Some organizations might have a greater effect on poverty alleviation because 
their administration is more accountable and efficient. Consequently, institutes that 
evaluate organizations in terms of quality and accountability have been established. 
Imagine that the fictitious organization “Initiative Help4Children” is certified by the 
Austrian Charity Quality Seal/Donation Quality Seal of the DZI. Certified 
organizations are proven to comply with objective and verifiable standards with 
regard to fundraising activities and the administration of donations. The donation 
quality seal ensures that your donation is actually channelled to those in need and that 
the organization manages donations carefully and responsibly. 
The additional information signals trustworthiness, efficiency, and the reliable use of funds. 





3.3. Data collection 
The sample included students from all departments of the universities of Innsbruck, 
Mannheim, and Marburg who subscribed to the “Email Newsletter on Social-Scientific 
Surveys”. The newsletter included the link to the survey, information on the topic, the 
duration of the survey (10 minutes), and the fact that answers would be strictly anonymous. 
Students were not compensated for answering the questions.
f
 
Although a student sample is unrepresentative of the population as a whole, students were 
chosen as the target population because they represent a homogenous group. This facilitates 
the detection of patterns regarding donation behavior in comparison to a highly fragmented 
target sample. Furthermore, students are an interesting group for analysis: Despite lower 
average donations by current students, it is important for charities to establish a relationship at 
an early stage and create donor loyalty, as contributors do not readily switch their charitable 
allegiances later in life.  
Our study began in Innsbruck in July 2014. We decided to oversample the impact and control 
treatment, as we were initially most interested in these differences. The surveys in Mannheim 
and Marburg were conducted in the first quarter of 2015. Combining the surveys implemented 
in the three locations, we had a total of 578 complete and 279 incomplete responses. The 





Table 1: Observations by treatment and completeness  
Observations Innsbruck Mannheim Marburg Total  
Completed surveys     
Control 126 43 18 187 
Impact 151 58 16 225 
Seal 76 72 18 166 
Total (3 Treatments) 353 173 52 578 
 
Incomplete surveys 
    
Control 76 3 7 86 
Impact 104 8 12 124 
Seal 56 10 3 69 
Total (3 Treatments) 236 21 22 279 
Notes: A total of 857 individuals participated in the surveys conducted in Innsbruck, 
Mannheim, and Marburg; 578 people completed the questionnaire fully, whereas 279 
observations were incomplete (i.e., respondents stopped the survey during/after answering the 
valuation section of the respective treatment). The majority of observations stemmed from the 
survey conducted in Innsbruck, amounting to 589 respondents in total (353 complete and 236 
incomplete answers). Student participants from Mannheim accounted for 194 observations in 
total (173 complete and 21 incomplete answers). The remaining 74 observations (52 complete 
and 22 incomplete answers) were generated by respondents from Marburg. With regard to 
sample size by treatment, most observations were assigned to the impact condition (349), 
followed by the control group (273) and the seal group (235).  
 
3.4. Data analysis  
Willingness to donate (WTD) is the main variable in our analysis, measuring the 
average donation amount indicated by respondents. Because 50% of participants did not 
donate any amount, the outcome variable has a non-negligible probability that customers will 
choose the corner solution, y = 0. We therefore use Tobit regression to circumvent problems 
associated with simple OLS (see the supplementary online appendix for the OLS regressions). 
We also analyze the likelihood of donating positive amounts by using binary probit models. 
For each respondent (i), WTD is measured as a function of the treatment (impact or seal) 
compared to the control group. Other covariates (Xi), such as the location of the survey and 
socio-demographic variables, are included stepwise to increase the precision of the estimation. 
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Thus, we estimate: WTDi = α + β1Impacti + β2Seali + β3Xi + εi. It is important to note that the 
socio-demographic and attitudinal questions could not be accessed before specifying one’s 
willingness to donate or declining to donate. As a result, some of the attitudinal questions may 
be influenced by the treatment itself (which is why we do not include them in the regressions 
but report results separately). However, it is not possible for the attitudinal questions to 
influence the willingness to donate, as the willingness to donate section came first.  
Table 2 displays all survey items collected after the WTD section. The socio-
demographic section covers respondent characteristics such as gender, age, religion, 
partnership status, frequency of attending a house of worship, political party preference, field 
of studies, and previous volunteering experience. We also requested information on donations 
to any charitable group within the last 12 months (Donation Amount) as well as on donations 
to groups focusing on development cooperation (Donation Amount Development 
Cooperation). Our data suggests that respondents in the control group donated significantly 
more to charities in the past 12 months, respondents in the impact group were significantly 
more likely to be majoring in the social sciences, and respondents in the seal treatment 
attended religious services more often. We control for these and other variables in our 
regression models below (using alternative donation variables does not alter our results). We 
further elicit behavioral covariates that aim to reveal typical respondent habits that may 
influence and predict donation behavior and the valuation of the respective treatments. We 
include involvement and level of interest in the topic of development cooperation by asking 
whether participants had watched documentaries or read articles about the topic (Topic 
Interested). Knowledge about the situation in low-income countries was determined by a 
question about travel experience in a developing country (Travel DC).  
We also investigated individuals’ valuation of feedback in terms of organizational 
performance and aid program effectiveness. These questions are endogenous in the treatment 
groups but are unaffected in the control group. We therefore do not include them in our major 
regression models (see the supplementary appendix, Table A2). Respondents were requested 
to evaluate and rank various programs in comparison to the information campaign for parents 
(Campaign Ranking). This allows us to see whether respondents indeed ranked the “Info-
Campaign” higher than other interventions. We further asked whether respondents preferred a 
costly impact evaluation that would postpone the aid program by two years to an alternative 
program without an impact evaluation that would start immediately. For this purpose, we 
briefly described a hypothetical program providing micro-credits to women in African 
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villages for which indebtedness may be a possible consequence. Respondents then had to 
decide whether to choose an option whereby the organization would implement the campaign 
immediately without knowing whether it would benefit or harm the participating women or 
the Alternative with Impact Evaluation, where the program would first be evaluated before 
implementation (cost factor: 100,000 Euros; delay: 2 years). Participants were also directly 
asked whether scientific evaluations should be conducted before aid programs are 
implemented (OP1: Impact Evaluations) and about their attitude regarding the effectiveness 
of development cooperation in general (OP3 and OP4) and in situations of widespread 
corruption (OP2). We hypothesized that people who view development cooperation as largely 
ineffective will not donate as much. An example of the endogeneity of these questions is that 
the majority (63%) of the 225 respondents assigned to the impact treatment chose the 
Alternative with Impact Evaluation. In contrast, only 49% of the control group chose this 
alternative. Thus, being better informed through the initial donation request increased the 
acceptance of costly and time-intensive impact evaluations. 
Finally, we asked respondents whether they would be willing to accept the idea that 
part of their donation would be used to provide reporting on the progress of the project 
(Progress Feedback), as well as how important it was for them to know whether the aid 
organization invests most of its money directly in programs assisting the poor instead of using 




Table 2: Socio-demographics and additional survey items by treatment 
Covariate Total Control Impact Seal 
Gender (1 = male)
a
 0.39 0.41 0.36 0.4 
Age 25 25.74 24.7 24.22 
Religious
a
 0.69 0.65 0.72 0.7 
Church-goer
a
 (Frequency of attending a house of 
worship) 
0.58 0.52 0.57 0.66 
Left-wing Voter
a
 0.48 0.52 0.49 0.42 
Single
a
 0.57 0.56 0.61 0.54 
Volunteered
a
 0.56 0.58 0.56 0.55 
Social Sciences
a
 0.35 0.29 0.41 0.36 
Donated
a 
(Past 12 Months) 0.26 0.32 0.21 0.22 
Donation Amount (Total 12 Months) €51 €57.55 €51.44 €41.61 
Donation Amount Development Cooperation €28.13 €32.95 €28.56 €21.11 
Same Organizations
a 
(Donation Loyalty) 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.12 
Topic Interested
a
 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.61 
Travel DC
a
 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.17 
     
Progress Feedback
a
 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.73 
Targeting
a
 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.95 
Alternative with Impact Evaluation
a
 0.56 0.49 0.63 0.58 
Op1: Implementing Impact Evaluation 1.86 2 1.81 1.95 
Op2: Aid – Corruption 2.2 2.33 2.19 2.22 
Op3: Aid Commitment 2.18 2.15 2.23 1.62 
Op4: Aid Ineffective 1.44 1.48 1.34 1.4 
Notes: a) dummy variable, Likert scale for Op1-Op4 (0 = Don’t agree at all; 1 = Mostly 







In the following sections, we analyze donation participation (4.1) and donation amounts (4.2) 
dependent on participants’ assignment to the impact treatment, seal treatment, or the control 
group. We further analyze attitudinal questions (4.3) and examine whether there was any 
significant attrition between treatments (4.4). 
4.1 Likelihood of donating positive amounts 
We start by analyzing the likelihood of giving any positive amount (see Table 3). Participants 
assigned to the impact group exhibited a higher donation rate (54%) than respondents in the 
seal (49%) and control (46%) groups. There is a remarkably consistent pattern across cities 
(averaging over all treatments), with an average of 50% of our respondents donating a 
positive amount. Among respondents assigned to the seal group, only those in Marburg had a 
relatively high giving rate (61%); however, the sample size was very small (n = 11).  
Table 3: Likelihood of positive donations by city and treatment (completed surveys only) 
 Total  Innsbruck Mannheim Marburg 
Control 46%  46%  49%  39%  
Impact 54%  55% 52%  56%  
Seal 49%  46% 50%  61%  
Total 50%  50%  50%  52%  
 
As a next step, we use a binary probit model (Table 4) to estimate whether these differences 
are significant and whether some of our survey items influenced the likelihood of donating 
positive amounts. Our results suggest that the impact treatment has a positive effect on the 
likelihood of donation. Participants assigned to the impact treatment were 8% more likely 
(significant at the 10% level) to donate a positive monetary amount compared to the control 
group. When controlling for additional factors, this increases to 10% (significant at the 5% 
level).  
We further find that women were on average 11% more likely to donate than male 
respondents (significant at the 5% level), consistent with the findings by Eckel and 
Grossmann (1998). In addition, individuals who regularly visit a house of worship were 11% 
more likely to give a positive monetary amount compared to people who never attend 
religious services (significant at the 5% level). Both these results corroborate previous 
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findings obtained in the long-term representative study conducted by Neumayr and Schober 
(2009) in Austria
g
 Right-wing voters were 17% less likely (significant at the 10% level) and 
centrist voters were 12% less likely (significant at the 5% level) to donate a positive amount 
than supporters of left-wing parties. Singles were on average 9% more likely (significant at 
the 5% level) to contribute than people in a partnership, which is the only result that does not 
confirm previous study findings. Finally, respondents interested in the topic of development 
cooperation were on average 19% more likely (significant at the 1% level) to donate than non-




Table 4: Marginal effects after binary probit models for the likelihood of donating 
positive amounts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Positive donation Positive donation Positive donation Positive donation 
Impact 0.0823* 0.0828* 0.102** 0.102** 
 (0.0493) (0.0494) (0.0504) (0.0506) 
Seal 0.0341 0.0327 0.0355 0.0411 
 (0.0533) (0.0542) (0.0560) (0.0569) 
Mannheim  0.00542 0.0916* 0.108** 
  (0.0475) (0.0537) (0.0547) 
Marburg  0.0264 0.0433 0.0233 
  (0.0745) (0.0764) (0.0795) 
Female   0.115** 0.112** 
   (0.0466) (0.0472) 
Age   -0.00172 -0.00229 
   (0.00323) (0.00339) 
Religious   0.00581 -0.00697 
   (0.0555) (0.0564) 
Church-goer   0.114** 0.111** 
   (0.0514) (0.0518) 
Right-wing Voter   -0.187** -0.168* 
   (0.0858) (0.0878) 
Centrist Voter   -0.128** -0.124** 
   (0.0514) (0.0525) 
Single   0.0830* 0.0895** 
   (0.0436) (0.0441) 
Volunteered   0.0664 0.0401 
   (0.0429) (0.0455) 
Humanities Major   0.00403 0.00873 
   (0.0580) (0.0589) 
Natural Sciences Major   0.00569 -0.000502 
   (0.0502) (0.0505) 
Travel DC    -0.0748 
    (0.0565) 
Topic Interest    0.192*** 
    (0.0462) 
Donation Amount    -9.51e-06 
    (0.000114) 
Observations 578 578 578 578 




4.2 Donation amounts 
We now turn to the analysis of donation amounts. Table 5 shows average donation levels 
differentiated by treatments and city. Donations were highest for participants in the impact 
group (17 Euros), followed by the control group (13 Euros) and the seal treatment (10 Euros). 
Individuals assigned to the impact treatment also gave the highest amount within each of the 
three different samples. When we examine effects by location, donation amounts were highest 
among students in Innsbruck (16 Euros), followed by Marburg (14 Euros) and Mannheim (9 
Euros). Although giving in Mannheim was lower overall, we still find that the impact 
treatment gave on average 2 Euros (20%) more than the other two treatments. Thus, the 
Mannheim students in the impact treatment were more likely to donate but did not give as 
much as students in the other cities.
h
 
Table 5: Mean giving amounts in Euro by city and treatment (completed surveys only) 
 Total Innsbruck Mannheim Marburg 
Control 13 (n=187) 15 (n=126) 9 (n= 43) 8 (n=18) 
Impact 17 (n=225) 19 (n=151) 11 (n=58) 18 (n=16) 
Seal 10 (n=166) 10 (n= 76) 8 (n=72) 17 (n=18) 
Total (3 Treatments) 14 (n=578) 16 (n=353) 9 (n=173) 14 (n=52) 
 
In Table 6, we estimate similar models, as in the case of the likelihood of donating positive 
amounts.  We find that willingness to donate in the impact treatment was between 7 Euros and 
8.50 Euros higher than in the control group. Given an average donation of 13 Euros in the 
control group, this effect size is very large (between 50% and 65% higher). Using a standard 
ex-post robustness test in CVM studies, we additionally test a regression (column 4 in Table 
6) in which we exclude potential outliers who were willing to donate more than 100 Euro per 
year (i.e. eight observations from Impact, six from Control and one from Seal). Our 
estimation suggests that the Impact treatment remains strongly positive significant compared 
to the other two treatments.   
In line with our descriptive results, donated amounts decreased on average by 7 Euros 
for participants in Mannheim compared to those in Innsbruck (significant at the 5% level). 
However, when controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, this geographic effect 
becomes insignificant, indicating that it arises from the specific demographic composition of 
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survey participants in Mannheim. Mannheim is an elite university in Germany with a lower 
share of leftist voters and apparently less interest in development issues. Similar to the results 
of our probit analysis, we find that female participants donated on average 8 Euros more than 
male respondents (significant at the 5% level), and that people who regularly attend a house 
of worship donated on average 11 Euros more than survey participants who never do so 
(significant at the 1% level). Political orientation has a significant influence on donation 
levels as well: Centrist voters and right-wing voters gave on average 12 Euros (centrist voters, 
significant at the 1% level) and 20 Euros (right-wing voters, significant at the 5% level) less 
than respondents who supported left-wing parties. More surprisingly, singles contributed on 
average 8 Euros more than respondents in a partnership (significant at the 5% level). In 
accordance with expectations, interested individuals donated on average 13 Euros more than 
uninterested participants (significant at the 1% level). All these findings confirm the results 





Table 6: Tobit regression: Treatment analysis including covariates and outlier control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables WTD WTD WTD WTD <100€ 
     
Impact 8.156* 8.290* 8.485* 6.903** 
 (4.535) (4.512) (4.365) (2.976) 
Seal -2.622 -1.129 -0.307 2.881 
 (4.417) (4.397) (4.322) (3.141) 
Mannheim  -7.471** 1.297 3.013 
  (3.698) (3.892) (2.851) 
Marburg  -0.0979 -1.883 -0.0782 
  (6.281) (6.260) (4.460) 
Female   8.328** 8.966*** 
   (3.795) (2.605) 
Age   -0.145 0.0850 
   (0.281) (0.206) 
Religious   -3.596 2.083 
   (4.609) (3.187) 
Church-goer   10.63*** 5.274* 
   (4.070) (2.939) 
Centrist Voter   -11.69*** -9.907*** 
   (4.055) (2.893) 
Right-wing Voter   -19.90** -11.84** 
   (7.727) (5.367) 
Single   8.050** 5.791** 
   (3.633) (2.506) 
Volunteered   3.033 2.315 
   (3.872) (2.637) 
Humanities Major   1.175 2.633 
   (4.608) (3.416) 
Natural Sciences Major   2.508 2.517 
   (4.154) (2.779) 
Travel DC   -5.936 -5.007 
   (4.678) (3.241) 
Topic Interest   13.29*** 11.77*** 
   (4.222) (2.820) 
Donation Amount   0.0143 0.00213 
   (0.0161) (0.00842) 
Constant 39.03*** 38.75*** -22.13** -26.07*** 
 (3.325) (3.290) (9.812) (7.259) 
Observations 578 578 578 563 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0. Dependent 




4.3 Answers to selected attitudinal items 
After the donation request, we asked respondents several attitudinal questions that may shed 
some light on the mechanisms underlying the higher donation amount in the impact group. 
Our focus here was on campaign comparisons, the effectiveness of aid in light of corrupt 
politicians, the demand for progress feedback, and the importance of pro-poor targeting, 
which had the most significant results (the other variables are reported in the supplementary 
material). Out of 578 respondents, only 11.76% regarded the “Info-Campaign” as the most 
cost-effective, and 15.74% viewed it as the least cost-effective out of the six alternatives. This 
highlights the need for providing information on proven effectiveness in the fundraising 
request. Participants ranked “measures to prevent teacher absenteeism” first (54%, n = 313) in 
terms of cost-effectiveness, followed by the “Info-Campaign” (15%, n = 85), “financial 
support for the family” (14%, n = 82), “supporting health measures for schoolchildren” (7%, 
n = 42), “supporting training courses for school teachers” (5%, n = 27), “building schools” 
(3%, n = 17), and “financing of school fees” (2%, n = 12). 
Surprisingly, even among respondents assigned to the impact group, only 11.56% 
regarded the “Info-Campaign” as the most cost-effective, with 20.44% of participants 
perceiving it to be the least cost-effective. We might have expected the information revealed 
in our treatment to affect this ranking. However, we observe that participants in the impact 
treatment donated relatively high amounts independent of whether they regarded the “Info-
Campaign” as the best (18 Euros) or worst (€14) aid measure among the six programs (see 
Figure 1). Thus, even sceptics were convinced by the aid appeal for the information campaign 
when it was combined with the RCT. Participants who ranked the information campaign the 
least cost-effective but were assigned to the seal treatment or the control group donated much 
less (€3 or €5, respectively). Thus, the donations of those who were not confronted with the 
impact treatment essentially correspond to their evaluation of aid effectiveness.  
Across all treatments, the majority of respondents (81%) stated that corrupt 
governments make aid ineffective (OP2). People who thought that corruption makes aid 
completely ineffective donated less on average. Again, respondents assigned to the impact 
treatment did not adjust their donation levels according to the beliefs they held about the 
corruption of politicians: The average donation was 17 Euros for those believing that 
corruption makes aid ineffective and 16 Euros for those with the opposite opinion. The overall 
willingness to donate may be higher for participants in the impact group because the RCT 
signals that funds are being channelled through a transparent program, making the relative 
37 
 
fund waste less likely to affect giving behavior. Again, the donations of participants not in the 
impact treatment largely correspond to their evaluation of aid effectiveness. 
The effects in the impact treatment were driven by two other attitudes in particular: 
Demand for progress feedback, and the importance of pro-poor targeting. The majority (71%) 
of our 578 respondents were willing to accept that 5% of their donations would be used to 
provide feedback on the progress of the aid organization (Progress Feedback). People who 
favored feedback and were assigned to the impact or seal treatments also donated relatively 
higher amounts than those who did not want their donations to be used to provide feedback. 
Respondents assigned to the control group (who were not made aware of the importance of 
information or accountability) did not donate differently based on whether they thought 
feedback was important. A similar pattern is found for the item Targeting. The regression 
results for the subsample of respondents in the impact treatment (see Table A.3 in the 
supplementary online appendix) indicate that these two variables are major drivers of high 
donation levels within this treatment and, to a lesser degree, also in the seal treatment. Thus, it 
seems that the impact treatment especially increased donations for people who highly value 




Figure 1: Donation levels and attitudinal questions 
  
  
Notes: Upper-left panel shows results for Campaign Ranking; upper-right panel shows OP2; 
bottom-left panel shows Progress Feedback; bottom-right panel shows Targeting. 
 
4.4 Attrition bias 
As mentioned above, we had a certain amount of attrition during the survey: Some 32% of 
respondents started the survey but did not complete all the questions. A large share of those 
respondents answered the WTD question before opting out. However, it appears that 
participants were not more likely to leave in any specific treatment. The internal validity of 
our work would be compromised if participants who did not complete the survey differed 
between treatments. Approximately 35% of those with incomplete surveys were assigned to 
the impact group, 33% were assigned to the seal group, and 32% were in the control 
treatment. As shown in Table 7, we find no statistically significant effect on donation amounts 
or the likelihood of donating positive amounts between treatments. We also observe that those 















































































































































































entire survey. It is unclear why this was the case, as respondents who completed the survey 
and those who did not complete it had almost the same interest in the topic (Topic Interest 
66% vs. 67%) and traveling experience in low-income countries (Travel DC 61% vs. 56%). 
More information on the incomplete surveys can be found in the supplementary online 
appendix. 
 
Table 7: Treatment effects for incomplete surveys 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




 OLS Tobit Tobit Probit 
Impact 3.986 24.85 17.70 0.0623 
 (2.524) (16.14) (11.77) (0.0489) 
Seal 3.517 28.24 25.63* 0.0905 
 (2.480) (18.13) (14.31) (0.0731) 
Constant 2.066*** -93.60*** -71.58***  
 (0.749) (20.80) (12.31)  
Observations 279 279 277 279 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent 
variable WTD is the stated donation amount in Euro. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The fundraising literature often implicitly assumes that an increase in donations will lead to 
an increase in the beneficiary’s welfare. However, international charities differ in how 
effectively they improve social welfare dependent on how they spend the money. We 
investigate whether providing relevant information on cost-effectiveness and accountability 
increases donations to a charitable organization. Using an online survey directed at students at 
three German-speaking universities and a total sample of 578 participants, we find that stated 
willingness to donate to an aid project is significantly higher when the advertisement 
highlights that the program in question is the best intervention according to the cost-
effectiveness criteria evaluated in a randomized controlled trial. This positive impact on 
donations remains robust when controlling for other respondent characteristics and 
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eliminating outliers. This finding provides valuable information for fundraising practitioners 
and could help to convince organizations to conduct RCTs. Informing donors about the 
scientifically evaluated cost-effectiveness of an intervention may reassure them about the 
positive impact of their money. This highlights the valuable services of external evaluation 
institutes (such as J-PAL) and other organizations and universities that carry out impact 
studies. Aid agencies that already implement the most cost-effective programs should be 
encouraged to actively market this aspect. Taking into account certain caveats inherent in 
RCTs, our further recommendations to aid agencies would be to fund impact evaluation 
studies of their aid interventions or to switch to programs that have been evaluated as more 
cost-effective than others. However, it should be noted that RCTs are not always feasible, and 
their external validity is not always guaranteed. Thus, several RCTs on the same issue in 
different country settings may be advisable, as results may not be readily transferable to other 
settings. Furthermore, some projects may be harder to evaluate than others because they have 
indirect benefits, spillovers, or no clear outcome measures (e.g., with regard to institutional 
capacity or human rights issues). As a result, it may be difficult to devise a cost-effectiveness 
measure for some important and useful interventions; this could ultimately lead to a 
misguided channelling of aid. Consequently, we do not advocate for “effective altruism” in all 
circumstances, but we do believe that it may be useful for many marginal decisions.
i
 
Although individual utility should be higher for a donation for which the donor 
believes that the funds are being handled in a transparent fashion and without excessive 
administrative costs, including a quality seal in the request had no significant influence on 
donation amounts in our surveys (compared to a purely emotional request). One reason for 
this result may be that donors know that less administrative spending is not always better. In 
addition, in the Austrian and German charitable markets, the majority of non-profits already 
carry such a seal. Quality seals therefore have limited distinguishing power and provide no 
real competitive advantage. Unsurprisingly, 92% of our respondents stated that it was 
important for aid agencies to target poor people instead of using their money for marketing 
and internal organization processes. People might therefore become sceptical if an aid agency 
emphasizes their trustworthiness, which is assumed to be a matter of course. In fact, overly 
emphasizing trustworthiness may crowd out trust on the side of the donor (Bowles and 
Polania-Reyes, 2012). Moreover, advertising with specific information is only valuable as 
long as the information is new and important – as was the case for the impact evaluation 
fundraising request. According to prior findings on donation behavior in Austria, the quality 
seal ranks only seventh out of nine relevant criteria upon which a donation decision may be 
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based (Neumayr and Schober, 2009). Interestingly, evidence regarding the valuations of 
charity watchdogs is ambiguous. Some studies have found that ratings positively influence 
donation behavior (Chen, 2009), but in other studies, the evidence is not so clear (Chen, 2009; 
Sloan, 2009; National Council of Nonprofit Associations and the National Human Service 
Assembly, 2005; Szper and Prakash, 2011). Further research will be required to investigate 
the underlying reasons for the low valuation of the charity quality seal.  
Of course, our study is not without limitations. Although students are an interesting 
target population, as their donor loyalty is not yet fully formed, they are not representative of 
the population as a whole. The fundraising scenario should be familiar to students, but the 
results could be different for people who donate regularly and may have established certain 
opinions based on their donation experiences; indeed, such individuals may be more sceptical 
regarding scientific expertise. When we group the respondents according to their field of 
study (humanities, natural sciences, and social sciences), we find that the effect of the impact 
treatment is especially pronounced among students in the humanities and the natural sciences; 
no effect is found for students in the social sciences (including economics). Thus, we do not 
believe that the effect of the impact treatment is dependent on some previous knowledge of 
impact studies (see Table A.4). Further research is essential to validate our results. Given the 
hypothetical nature of our donation request field experiments as those from List and Lucking-
Reiley (2002), Landry et al. (2010), Huck and Rasul (2011) and others could provide stronger 
external validity of the actual donation amounts. One interesting avenue would be to test 
whether the positive effect also holds for other scientific methods, such as qualitative 
research, as well as the potential duration of the effect.  
 
                                                 
a
 Economic theory describes this phenomenon as “information asymmetry” or the “market for lemons” (Akerlof, 
1970), where the consumer experiences uncertainty about the quality of a product and only the seller possesses 
full information. The possibility of dishonest conduct has an economic cost: The buyer, uncertain about a 
product’s real quality, is only willing to pay an average price. High-quality products are unable to achieve fair 
remuneration and disappear from the market, leaving the “lemons” behind (Mocan, 2007). 
b
 This policy proves to be the most cost-effective because the only program costs incurred arise from organizing 
one informational meeting. As a result, 20.7 years of additional education were generated for every 100 USD 
spent. 
c
 The economic literature on fundraising has studied a wide range of methods to increase individual donations. 
List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) conclude that seed money significantly increases average contributions and 
donation participation, as it may serve as a signal of program quality (List and Price, 2012, p. 18). In addition, 
peer effects, conformity, status concerns, and the alignment of donations with social norms are important factors 
influencing contributions (Frey and Meier, 2004; Smith, 2012; Croson and Shang, 2013).  
d
 Chen (2009, p. 355ff.) conducted a study using regression models to examine the effect of non-profit 
organizations meeting standards on received donations. The data, gathered in 2005 and 2006, came from the 
New York Philanthropic Advisory Service of the Education and Research Foundation of the Better Business 
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Bureau (BBB) of Metropolitan New York. Further data was obtained from 730 local non-profit organizations 
participating in the study (after removing organizations with incomplete data). 
e
 Some advantages of the open-ended format are that it does not introduce range or starting-point biases and it 
can be highly statistically efficient compared to discrete choice formats. This latter point convinced us to select 
this format. In the results section, we address the potential problems of choosing zeros and high values. 
f Students from Mannheim participated in a lottery in which they had a chance of winning four prizes of 15 
Euros each after completing the survey. No incentive was offered to students in Innsbruck or Marburg. 
g
 The long-term study by Neumayr and Schober (2009) was conducted under the auspices of the Austrian 
Institute for Fundraising Organisations. Data-gathering and empirical studies were initiated every four years 
from 1996 until 2008. The respective results were integrated into the long-term study in order to present an 
accurate overview of donation behavior in Austria and its development over the years.  
h
 In Mannheim, more participants were male (54%) compared to respondents in Innsbruck (33%) and Marburg 
(33%). In addition, more participants in Mannheim (45%) were not interested in development cooperation 
compared to those in Innsbruck (31%) and Marburg (21%). Only 24% of respondents in Mannheim were left-
wing voters, compared to 59% in Innsbruck and 56% in Marburg. Because being female, affirming an interest in 
development cooperation, and left-wing party preference all usually result in higher giving levels, this can 
explain the comparatively low donation amounts in Mannheim. 
i
 For a recent discussion on “effective altruism“, see the article by Peter Singer in the Boston Review and 
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Appendix B: OLS regression for donation 
When adding the covariates giving levels significantly increase for persons assigned to the 
impact treatment compared to the control group. Donation amounts increase by €4 for 
respondents in the impact group (significant at 10%-level & at 5%-level when controlling for 
payments higher than €100). Results for donation levels generated by respondents within the 
seal group are not significant. They indicate however that giving levels tend to decrease for 
persons assigned to the seal group account for €0 compared to the control group.  
 
As goes along with prior expectations, female participants donate on average €4 more than 
male respondents (significant a 1% level when controlling for payments higher than €100). 
Church visitors donate on average €5 more than survey participants who never visit the 
church (significant at 5%-level), which goes along with findings from previous studies. 
Political orientation has a significant influence on donation levels as well: Center voters and 
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vote for left-wing parties (significant at 1%-level). This finding also matches prior 
expectations. More surprisingly, singles contribute on average €4 more than respondents 
within a partnership (significant at 10%-level). Findings may differ from previous study 
results however since these findings are limited on students only. Persons interested in the 
topic of development cooperation feature higher giving levels than persons who are not 
interested. As goes along with expectations, interested individuals donate on average €4 more 
than not interested persons (significant at 5%-level). 
 
Table A1: WTD –using OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables WTD WTD WTD WTD <100€ 
     
Impact 4.069 4.398* 4.292* 3.843** 
 (2.562) (2.507) (2.494) (1.569) 
Seal -3.216 -1.803 -1.711 0.865 
 (2.168) (2.162) (2.135) (1.532) 
Mannheim  -3.052 -2.540 -0.326 
  (1.890) (1.870) (1.348) 
Marburg  -0.733 -2.243 -0.990 
  (3.488) (3.583) (2.368) 
Female  3.293 2.987 4.380*** 
  (2.032) (1.995) (1.252) 
Age  0.0434 -0.0318 0.106 
  (0.133) (0.142) (0.112) 
Religious  -2.115 -2.589 1.232 
  (2.511) (2.425) (1.614) 
Church Goer  5.277** 4.919** 2.030 
  (2.081) (2.050) (1.585) 
Center Voter  -5.841*** -5.767*** -5.366*** 
  (1.962) (1.965) (1.384) 
Right Voter  -8.151*** -8.893*** -5.468*** 
  (2.516) (2.663) (2.022) 
Single  4.152** 3.951** 2.926** 
  (1.949) (1.920) (1.302) 
Volunteered  1.716 1.138 1.141 
  (1.941) (2.269) (1.443) 
Natural Sciences Study  2.598 2.385 2.253 
  (2.302) (2.288) (1.373) 
Humanities Study  1.023 0.950 2.106 
  (2.368) (2.366) (1.763) 
Travel Multi   -3.038 -2.940* 
   (2.634) (1.682) 
Topic Interest   4.396** 4.891*** 
   (2.139) (1.373) 
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Don. Frequency 
(Amount) 
  0.0107 0.00226 
   (0.0110) (0.00484) 
Constant 12.96*** 6.410 6.762 -2.416 
 (1.812) (4.804) (5.085) (3.508) 
Observations 578 578 578 563 
R-squared 0.016 0.069 0.085 0.123 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Including attitudinal question reported in section 4.3 further increases the significance of the 
impact treatment to 5% level (Table A.2). As expected, a higher ranking for the information 
campaign (Campaign comparison) increases donations such as a demand for Progress 
feedback and Targeting while the opinion of corruption decreases donation levels. 
 
Table A2: WTD – Tobit regressions including attitudinal questions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES WTD WTD WTD WTD <100€ 
Impact 8.968** 9.093** 9.237** 7.806*** 
 (4.473) (4.444) (4.314) (2.963) 
Seal -3.920 -2.136 -1.267 2.109 
 (4.384) (4.345) (4.301) (3.098) 
Mannheim  -9.146** -0.667 1.902 
  (3.758) (3.901) (2.833) 
Marburg  -1.853 -3.354 -0.535 
  (6.174) (6.201) (4.417) 
Female   8.449** 9.299*** 
   (3.842) (2.620) 
Age   -0.0528 0.148 
   (0.275) (0.200) 
Religious   -4.802 1.117 
   (4.600) (3.150) 
Church Goer   10.71*** 5.631* 
   (4.020) (2.898) 
Center Voter   -11.13*** -9.689*** 
   (4.069) (2.899) 
Right Voter   -16.07** -8.798* 
   (7.583) (5.261) 
Single   7.643** 5.628** 
   (3.575) (2.448) 
Volunteered   3.409 2.530 
   (3.844) (2.581) 
Natural Sciences Study   1.624 1.604 
   (4.108) (2.795) 
Humanities Study   1.226 2.560 
   (4.469) (3.335) 
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Travel Multi   -5.502 -4.925 
   (4.662) (3.193) 
Topic Interest   12.42*** 10.99*** 
   (4.173) (2.760) 
Don. Frequency 
(Amount) 
  0.0120 0.000229 
   (0.0149) (0.00798) 
Campaign comparison 2.686*** 2.788*** 2.680*** 2.198*** 
 (0.871) (0.877) (0.844) (0.632) 
OP2 -9.729** -9.118** -6.768* -6.552** 
 (3.987) (3.952) (3.869) (2.973) 
Progress feedback 7.035* 8.076* 7.383* 3.321 
 (4.086) (4.130) (4.040) (2.897) 
Targeting 21.50*** 21.18*** 16.75** 14.41*** 
 (7.294) (7.206) (7.086) (5.189) 
Constant -30.03*** -28.78*** -45.94*** -43.46*** 
 (8.939) (8.794) (13.73) (9.403) 
Observations 578 578 578 563 
 
We further estimate the effects of the covariates in each subsample of the three treatments. 
Within the impact treatment especially the center voters (from Mannheim) decrease the 
donation levels. As outlined in section 4.3 the effect of donations in the impact treatment is 
not driven by a different ranking of the aid campaigns (although it is positive – but 
insignificant). Instead people who value progress feedback and better targeting donate 
significantly more. The ranking, however, has a positive and significant effect in the seal and 
control treatment. 
Table A3: WTD – Tobit regressions: Subsample analysis including attitudinal questions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Impact Seal Control 
VARIABLES WTD WTD WTD WTD WTD WTD 
Mannheim -17.31** -1.258 -1.461 1.540 -4.743 1.322 
 (7.020) (8.100) (4.372) (5.033) (7.887) (7.421) 
Marburg -7.638 -11.04 11.11 8.936 -11.31 -12.41 
 (12.09) (14.53) (9.087) (7.669) (11.32) (11.29) 
Female  9.716  7.372  5.697 
  (6.833)  (5.252)  (7.123) 
Age  -0.0645  -0.199  -0.514 
  (0.460)  (0.347)  (0.526) 
Religious  -6.546  -4.094  -0.171 
  (8.827)  (5.670)  (8.660) 
Church Goer  17.50**  3.234  8.253 
  (6.961)  (5.603)  (7.678) 
Center Voter  -
25.20**
* 
 0.666  -12.01 
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  (8.112)  (5.760)  (7.678) 
Right Voter  -16.13  -3.859  -16.42 
  (13.97)  (8.799)  (14.28) 
Single  2.834  10.23**  2.374 
  (5.943)  (5.036)  (7.236) 
Volunteered  9.000  -4.152  0.927 
  (6.704)  (4.400)  (7.231) 
Natural Sciences Study  11.02  -3.741  -1.742 
  (8.196)  (5.033)  (7.880) 
Humanities Study  10.91  3.494  -15.86 
  (7.389)  (5.571)  (10.95) 
Travel Multi  -3.076  -0.511  -8.075 
  (8.391)  (5.468)  (9.107) 
Topic Interest  12.85*  6.012  21.53*
* 
  (6.990)  (4.695)  (9.318) 
Don. Frequency 
(Amount) 
 0.00713  0.00577  0.0521 




Campaign comparison 2.546 1.991 2.718** 2.661** 3.518*
* 
2.479 
 (1.555) (1.512) (1.194) (1.126) (1.732) (1.634) 





 (6.921) (6.304) (5.374) (5.559) (8.343) (8.270) 
Progress feedback 15.54** 17.66** 6.497 8.394 0.426 -3.221 





18.32* 13.32 15.05 8.728 









-24.34* -24.54 -27.14 
 (13.62) (20.64) (9.477) (14.66) (18.86) (29.87) 
Observations 225 225 166 166 187 187 
 
Lastly, we are interested to know whether the effect is driven by some social desirability 
effect among students who might have heard about randomized control trials. To our surprise 
in Table A.4 we find that students from the humanities where the ones who reacted most 
positive to the impact treatments. Thus, these are the most non-mathematical subjects. 
Students from the natural sciences (including medicine) also reacted positive to the impact 




                                                                                                                                                        
Table A4: WTD – Tobit regressions: Subsample analysis by area of study  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Humanities Natural Sciences Social Sciencs 
VARIABLES WTD WTD WTD WTD WTD WTD 
Impact 21.88** 22.85** 9.938 12.46* -3.694 -3.493 
 (9.444) (8.893) (7.506) (7.343) (7.350) (6.818) 
Seal 16.18* 12.75 -7.556 -2.894 -5.582 -0.849 
 (9.717) (9.263) (7.686) (7.400) (6.939) (6.161) 
Mannheim -11.11 -10.56 -9.219 7.197 -0.978 3.798 
 (7.066) (7.157) (6.412) (6.606) (5.793) (5.741) 
Marburg -0.678 0.624 -11.67 -8.832 14.89 11.51 
 (11.16) (9.907) (9.271) (9.897) (13.28) (12.66) 
Female  17.64**  11.69  -2.071 
  (7.232)  (7.155)  (5.339) 
Age  0.327  -0.598  -0.377 
  (0.535)  (0.470)  (0.490) 
Religious  -8.449  0.0105  -3.915 
  (8.630)  (6.727)  (6.967) 
Church Goer  26.30***  13.86**  0.333 
  (8.602)  (6.472)  (6.408) 
Center Voter  -4.875  -25.70***  -3.445 
  (8.060)  (7.856)  (5.160) 
Right Voter  6.125  -19.14**  -24.04** 
  (29.98)  (9.682)  (10.32) 
Single  18.39***  3.469  2.414 
  (6.658)  (6.174)  (5.805) 
Volunteered  8.951  6.553  3.385 
  (6.635)  (7.199)  (5.405) 
Travel Multi  -7.912  -4.020  -9.921 
  (8.264)  (9.181)  (6.650) 
Topic Interest  -2.530  8.037  21.12*** 
  (7.423)  (7.695)  (6.206) 
Don. Frequency (Amount)  -0.0101  0.0396  0.0908*** 
  (0.0129)  (0.0305)  (0.0261) 
Constant -11.10 -49.45*** -0.0217 -12.62 -2.833 -8.070 
 (8.820) (17.79) (6.003) (15.94) (5.308) (16.25) 
Observations 129 129 237 237 201 201 
 
Appendix C: Incomplete Survey Data 
Regarding the non-completed survey responses, giving levels amount for €0 in Mannheim and 
Marburg respectively (Reminder: also giving participation equals 0%). In Innsbruck giving 
levels make up on average €4. When differentiating for treatment the average donation 
amount equals €5 for persons assigned to the impact- and control treatment, followed by €4 
generated in the seal-group. 
Table A5: Mean Giving Levels for Each City and Treatment – Incomplete Surveys 
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Mean Giving Levels (in €) 
Incomplete Surveys 
Total 
 (3 Cities) 
Innsbruck Mannheim Marburg 
Impact 4 (n=124) 5 (n=104) 0 (n=8) 0 (n=12) 
Seal 3 (n= 69) 4 (n= 56) 0 (n=10) 0 (n=3) 
Control 4 (n= 86) 5 (n= 76) 0 (n=3) 0 (n=7) 
Total (3 Treatments) 4 (n=279) 4 (n=236) 0(n=21) 0 (n=22) 
 
Lastly, we can check whether we have attrition bias with regard to socio-demographic 
characteristics and other survey items. Therefore, we compared fully answered questionnaires 
to incomplete survey observations. This comparison is possible, as the valuation section, 
questions about interest in the topic of Development Cooperation and travel experience to low 
income countries were situated in the beginning of the survey. Hence, some data could be 
gathered regarding participants who left the survey before completing it. Results are tested 
and compared based on combined survey data. Regarding Topic Interest, a clear majority 
engages with the topic Development Cooperation (67%), which goes along with results from 
completed survey observations (66%). Therefore, self-selection bias is not very likely. 
Furthermore, the majority has never travelled to a LIC (56%), which goes along with 
outcomes regarding completed answers (61%). Respondent characteristics are very similar 









WTD Study €13.62 €3.62 (n=279) 
Topic Interested
a
 0.66 0.67 (n=187) 
Travel LIC_Multiple
a
 0.21 0.17 (n=47) 
Gender (1=male)
a
 0.39 0 (n=0) 
Age 25 22 (n=3) 
Religious
a
 0.69 0 (n=0) 
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Curch Goer
a
 (Frequency of going to a house of worship) 0.58 0.99 (n=1) 
Left Voter
a
  0.48 0.004 (n=1) 
Single
a
 0.57 0.33 (n=1) 
Volunteered
a
 0.56 0 (n=0) 
Social Sciences
a
 0.35 0.004 (n=1) 
Donated
a 
(Past 12 Months) 0.26 0.004 (n=1) 
Donation Amount (Total 12 Months) €51 €5 (n=3) 
Donation Amount Development Cooperation €28.13 €5 (n=3) 
Same Organisations
a
 (Donation Loyalty) 0.14 0 (n=0) 
Progress feedback
a
 0.71 0.007(n=2) 
Targeting
a
 0.95 1 (n=3) 
Alternative with impact evaluation
a
  0.56 0.01 (n=2) 
Op1: Implementing Impact Evaluation
 a
 1.86 2.33 (n=3) 
Op2: Aid – Corruption
 a
 2.2 0 (n=3) 
Op3: Aid Commitment
 a
 2.18 0 (n=3) 
Op4: Aid Ineffective
 a






Appendix D: Correlations of donation amount and significant socio-
demographic variables and attitudinal variables 
 
Gender 
When comparing gender-based differences, women feature relatively higher participation 
levels than male respondents. Both genders donate with highest frequency when assigned to 
the impact group, where 61% of females in the impact group decide to contribute compared to 
49% in the control-treatment. Regarding the male respondents, 45% decide to donate when 
assigned in the impact group compared to 41% of the male participants in the control 
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treatment. Also, the valuation of male respondents between the impact- and seal group is very 
similar, where donation participation equals 45% for both treatments. 
Female participants show higher giving levels then male respondents which goes along with 
previous study findings. Also both genders prefer the impact treatment, where female 
participants assigned to the impact group donate on average €20 (male: €14) compared to €13 
in the control group (male: €12).  
Figure A3: Donation Participation and Giving Levels per Gender and Treatment 
 
 
Church Visiting Tendency 
Persons who visit the church feature higher donation participation than respondents who 
never visit which goes along with previous study findings. Only the seal-treatment is an 
exception where 50% of non-church goers are willing to donate compared to a donation 
likelihood of 49% of church-visiting participants when assigned to the seal-treatment. The 
difference of 1% however is small. For participants who visit the church, donation 
participation is highest when assigned to the impact treatment (62%), followed by the control- 
(51%) and seal-group (49%). Regarding participants who do not visit the church however, 
giving participation is highest for persons assigned to the seal treatment (50%), followed by 
the impact group (46%) and the control treatment (40%). 
Church Visitors feature higher giving levels than non church-visitors which holds true for all 
3 treatments (the difference however is very small for respondents assigned to the seal-group). 
Also, both church visiting types donate the highest amounts when assigned to the impact 
group (€20 for church visitors/ €14 for non church visitors), followed by the control- (€14/ 





















































































Giving Levels per Gender and Treatment
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Results differ widely for each political orientation type. Participants, who voted for left-wing 
parties, also prefer the impact treatment when regarding donation participation rates (66%), 
followed by the control- (53%) and seal group (48%). This supports previous findings within 
this study, where donation participation tends to be (significantly) higher for persons assigned 
in the impact treatment compared to the other treatments. Center voters prefer the seal 
treatment (54%), followed by the control (45%)- and finally the impact treatment (38%). 
Right voters value each treatment equally (33%).  
Regarding giving levels findings for participants, who are left voters, support previous results 
in this study. Therefore, donation amounts are highest for persons assigned to the impact 
treatment (€23), followed by the control group (€17) and the seal-treatment (€12). Left voters 
also feature higher giving levels compared to center and right wing voters, which goes along 
with expectations and other study findings.  
 















































































Giving Levels for Church Visiting Preference
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Giving participation regarding all three treatments is higher for participants who are single 
compared to persons in a relationship. This finding does not go along with previous studies, 
where persons in a partnership normally feature higher giving levels than singles. The current 
study however focuses on students, whereas other studies take a different sample group into 
account, where persons in a relationship often might share a household together. This makes 
comparison therefore difficult since partners who share a common household have a different 
financial position. Both singles and non-singles feature highest donation participation when 
assigned to the impact-treatment (57%/ 51%). 
Also giving levels for all three treatments are higher for single participants compared to 
respondents being in a relationship. Both relationship types value the impact treatment highest 
in regard to donated amounts, where single persons donate on average €20 (within 
partnership: €14) when assigned to the impact group, followed by €13 (within partnership: 
€12) in the control group and €12 (within partnership: €8) in the seal treatment. 










































































































































































































































































Giving Levels and Partnership Status
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Development Cooperation Interest 
Persons interested in the topic of development cooperation feature higher participation levels 
compared to respondent who are not interested, which goes along with previous expectations. 
Interested persons value the impact treatment highest where donation participation rates make 
up 63% when assigned to the impact group, followed by 53% for persons in the control- and 
52% in the seal-treatment. Non interested respondents however feature highest donation 
participation levels when assigned to the seal group (45%), followed by the impact- (36%) 
and control group (31%). 




The majority of 75% out of 578 respondents agrees that impact evaluations should take place 
before an aid program is implemented which also holds true when differentiating for 
treatments. However, giving levels seem unaffected for respondents opting for impact 






































































































Giving Levels and Development Cooperation Interest
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The majority of 82% having 578 respondents in total thinks that indeed, much has been done 
in the field of Development Cooperation but at the same time much more could have been 
done. The result remains stable when differentiating for treatments. Persons who think that 
much has been done but at the same time more could have been undertaken to support poverty 
alleviation also feature higher giving levels on average. This goes along with prior 
expectations as it signals that persons care about the topic and support development 




















































OP1: Impact Evaluations before Aid Implementation
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For the statement that development cooperation is apparently ineffective, the majority of 59% 
(578 respondents in total) does not support this argument. The results do not change when 
differentiating for treatments however relatively fewer people neglect this argument when 
assigned to the impact treatment (54%) compared to control (61%) and seal (62%). This 
might indicate that persons think that aid at the moment is quite effective. As goes along with 
expectations, persons who think that aid is effective also feature higher giving levels on 
average (except for respondents within control group where giving levels are equal 




















































OP3: Development Aid - Much Done, But Not Enough
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Figure A9: Giving Levels Regarding OP4 
 
 
Appendix E : Survey and general information about the organizations: 
Wording of our additional attitudinal questions 
 Topic interest: “Are you concerned with the topic of Development Cooperation, i.e.: 
by watching documentaries or reading articles?” (Answer options: “yes”; “no”) 
 Travel DC:  “Have you ever travelled to a low-income country?” (Answer options: 
“yes, once”, “yes, multiple times”, “no, never”) 
 Campaign Ranking: “Please rank the following aid programs A-F in terms of 
effectiveness compared to the previously presented aid program “Info Campaign”, 
beginning with the most effective one in your opinion.” (Options: Program A: 
Financial Support for the family; Program B: Financing of the school fees; Program C: 
Building schools; Program D: Supporting training courses for school teachers; 
Program E: Control Measures for teachers to prevent teacher absenteeism; Program F: 
Supporting health measures for school kids) 
 Alternative with Impact Evaluation: Imagine a NGO wants to provide microcredit to 
women to start a tailor business. However, this can lead to indebtedness of women.  
“Please decide whether you prefer the “Standard Alternative” or the “Alternative with 
impact evaluation which costs 100.000 Euro and delays the project by two years but 














































                                                                                                                                                        
 Progress feedback: “Would you be willing to accept that non-profit organizations use 
a percentage of donation (i.e.: 5%) to provide a better information on donation usage 
(for example by publishing detailed annual reports on aid project developments)?” 
(Answer options: “yes”, “no”). 
 Targeting: “For me it is important to know whether the bulk of donation inflows are 
actually invested to help the poor in the best way or whether the organization uses 
them instead for internal process, such as financing advertisement material and staff.” 
(Answer options: “Totally agree”, “Rather agree”, “Rather don’t agree”, “Don’t agree 
at all”) 
 OP1: “Do you agree that aid programs should be scientifically tested for effectiveness 
before implementation?” (Answer options: “Totally agree”, “Rather agree”, “Rather 
don’t agree”, “Don’t agree at all”) 
 OP2: “Do you agree that Development Aid is of no use as long as there are corrupt 
governments taking profit of donation inflows?” (Answer options: “Totally agree”, 
“Rather agree”, “Rather don’t agree”, “Don’t agree at all”) 
 OP3: “Do you agree that generally, much has been undertaken to fight poverty but 
much more could have been done so far?” (Answer options: “Totally agree”, “Rather 
agree”, “Rather don’t agree”, “Don’t agree at all”) 
 OP4: “Do you agree that Development Cooperation was not very successful since 
much has been done in the past 50 years but nevertheless, many people live in 
poverty? (Answer options: “Totally agree”, “Rather agree”, “Rather don’t agree”, 
“Don’t agree at all”) 
 




Description of the organizations referred to in our study. 
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 The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) 
(http://www.povertyactionlab.org/about-j-pal) was established in 2003 as a research 
center at the Economics Department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Since then, it has grown into a global network of researchers who use randomized 
evaluations to answer critical policy questions in the fight against poverty. 
J-PAL’s mission is to reduce poverty by ensuring that policy is informed by scientific 
evidence. We do this through three main activities: 
o Conducting Rigorous Impact Evaluations: J-PAL researchers conduct 
randomized evaluations to test and improve the effectiveness of programs and 
policies aimed at reducing poverty. 
o Policy Outreach: J-PAL’s policy group analyzes and disseminates research 
results and builds partnerships with policymakers to ensure that policy is 
driven by evidence, and effective programs are scaled up. 
o Capacity Building: J-PAL equips practitioners with the expertise to carry out 
their own rigorous evaluations through training courses and joint research 
projects.  
 The main purpose of the German Institute for Development Evaluation (Deutsches 
Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; DEval) is to provide 
independent evaluation of the performance of German development cooperation 
measures (http://www.deval.org/de/about-us.html). 
 The Austrian Charity Quality Seal (http://www.osgs.at/ueber-das-oesgs) exists since 
2001 and is awarded by the Austrian Chamber of Chartered Public Accountants and 
Tax Consultants (Österreichische Kammer der Wirtschaftstreuhänder). It certifies 
charities that feature objective standards regarding fundraising activities and donation 
usage. The seal is the only form of watchdog institution service available in Austria 
and it is highly popular among organizations: 90% of the 50 biggest nonprofits are 
already certified and the number of evaluated organizations is steadily increasing since 
its introduction in 2001 (Fundraising Verband Austria, 2013). The seal is valid for the 
period of one year and needs to be requested annually in order to secure donation 
security. Strict requirements need to be fulfilled in order to acquire the seal, getting 
assessed through 300 questions based on 35 special criteria.  
 In German: „Spenden Siegel des DZI - Zentralinstitut für Soziale Fragen“ 
(http://www.dzi.de/spenderberatung/das-spenden-siegel/). Organizations certified with 
a donation quality seal by the DZI have proven to fulfil certain economic, legal and 
ethical quality standards following after a rigorous assessment of the organizations’ 
submitted documents including financial statements, reports about control- and 
surveillance structures, advertisement- and further informational material (Deutsches 
Zentralinstitut, 2015). The standards are well known and accepted among non-profit 
practitioners in Germany in terms of trustworthiness and serious conductance. The 
seal is valid for the period of one year and needs to be requested annually in order to 
secure donation security. Strict requirements need to be fulfilled in order to acquire the 






                                                                                                                                                        
Appendix F: Treatments in German 
[not shown] Treatment IMPACT 
Sie werden nun einen Text lesen, der über die Bildungssituation in Afrika aufklärt - daraufhin 
folgt ein fiktiver Spendenaufruf. Bitte versetzen Sie sich bei diesem Aufruf in die Situation, 
dass Sie tatsächlich spenden werden. Sie dürfen sich auch für ein Nicht-Spenden entscheiden. 
Beachten Sie bitte außerdem Ihr tatsächlich verfügbares Einkommen nach Abzug sämtlicher 
Ausgaben wie Miete, Einkäufen und Ähnlichem, und geben Sie nicht mehr aus, als Ihnen zur 
Verfügung steht. 
Forscher haben zudem herausgefunden, dass Personen in Befragungen hinsichtlich ihrer 
Spendenbereitschaft dazu neigen, eine höhere Summe anzugeben, als sie in Realität bereit 
sind auszugeben. Bitte beachten Sie dies und nennen Sie nur den Betrag, den Sie tatsächlich 
zahlen würden. Bitte lesen Sie sich nun Folgendes durch: 
  
 
 In Ländern südlich der Sahara gab es in den letzten zehn Jahren einen bemerkenswerten 
Anstieg der Einschulungsraten. Dennoch haben weiterhin mehr als 21,6 Millionen Kinder im 
Sekundarschulalter keinen Zugang zu Schulbildung und für viele ist zu erwarten, dass sie 
niemals Zugang zu formaler Schulbildung erhalten werden. Besonders benachteiligt sind 
Kinder aus den ärmsten Familien, Waisen und häufig auch Mädchen. Dabei ist Bildung eine 
Möglichkeit dem Kreislauf der Armut zu entkommen.  
Es mag sein, dass einige Eltern den Nutzen von Bildung nicht erkennen. Stellen Sie sich die 
fiktive Organisation „Initiative Help4Children“ vor, die Eltern gezielt über spätere 
Verdienstmöglichkeiten von erfolgreichen Schulabgängern informiert. Das könnte ein Anreiz 
dafür sein, dass Eltern ihre Kinder vermehrt in die Schule schicken und stärker unterstützen. 
Diese Maßnahme kann aber nur mit Hilfe von Spendengeldern durchgeführt werden. Mit 
Ihrer Spende können Sie dazu beitragen, dass möglichst viele Haushalte vor Ort von der 
Kampagne profitieren. 
Häufig weiß man allerdings nicht, ob eine Kampagne tatsächlich geeignet ist, um den 
Menschen in Not zu helfen. Anhand von wissenschaftlichen, randomisierten Studien wird 
getestet, welches Programm den größten Nutzen für Hilfsempfänger bereithält - bei 
konstantem Geldmitteleinsatz. Diese Studien lassen sich mit Experimenten im Bereich der 
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Medizin vergleichen, wo eine Maßnahme an einer ausgewählten Personengruppe getestet 
wird. Die Resultate daraus werden mit den Ergebnissen einer Kontrollgruppe verglichen, die 
der Maßnahme nicht ausgesetzt wurde. 
Das amerikanische Institut J-PAL (www.povertyactionlab.org) und die in Deutschland 
ansässige Organisation DEval  (www.deval.org) führen Programmevaluierungen durch. Die 
Forschung von J-PAL ergab Folgendes: Die erfolgversprechendste Maßnahme zur 
Verbesserung der Schulanwesenheit in armen Regionen erfolgt durch Informieren der 
Eltern über Vorteile, die mit der Schulbildung der Kinder einhergehen können.  
Diese Maßnahme ermöglicht eine deutliche Steigerung der Schulanwesenheit, verglichen mit 
anderen Vorgangsweisen - bei gleichbleibendem Einsatz von Geldmitteln. Konkret bedeutet 
das: Bei einem Betrag von 100$ könnte die Schulanwesenheit von 21 Schulkindern durch 
Informationsmaßnahmen der Eltern um 1 Jahr erhöht werden. Werden die 100$ 
vergleichsweise in die freie Vergabe von Schuluniformen investiert, erhöht sich die 
Schulanwesenheit in der Regel bloß für 1 Schulkind um 1 Jahr.  
(http://www.povertyactionlab.org/policy-lessons/education/student-participation)  
















                                                                                                                                                        
[not shown] Treatment SEAL  
Sie werden nun einen Text lesen, der über die Bildungssituation in Afrika aufklärt - daraufhin 
folgt ein fiktiver Spendenaufruf. Bitte versetzen Sie sich bei diesem Aufruf in die Situation, 
dass Sie tatsächlich spenden werden. Sie dürfen sich auch für ein Nicht-Spenden entscheiden. 
Beachten Sie bitte außerdem Ihr tatsächlich verfügbares Einkommen nach Abzug sämtlicher 
Ausgaben wie Miete, Einkäufen und Ähnlichem, und geben Sie nicht mehr aus, als Ihnen zur 
Verfügung steht. 
Forscher haben zudem herausgefunden, dass Personen in Befragungen hinsichtlich ihrer 
Spendenbereitschaft dazu neigen eine höhere Summe anzugeben, als sie in Realität bereit sind 
auszugeben. Bitte beachten Sie dies und nennen Sie nur den Betrag, den Sie tatsächlich zahlen 
würden. Bitte lesen Sie sich nun Folgendes durch: 
  
 
In Ländern südlich der Sahara gab es in den letzten zehn Jahren einen bemerkenswerten 
Anstieg der Einschulungsraten. Dennoch haben weiterhin mehr als 21,6 Millionen Kinder im 
Sekundarschulalter keinen Zugang zu Schulbildung und für viele ist zu erwarten, dass sie 
niemals Zugang zu formaler Schulbildung erhalten werden. Besonders benachteiligt sind 
Kinder aus den ärmsten Familien, Waisen und häufig auch Mädchen. Dabei ist Bildung eine 
Möglichkeit dem Kreislauf der Armut zu entkommen.  
Es mag sein, dass einige Eltern den Nutzen von Bildung nicht erkennen. Stellen Sie sich die 
fiktive Organisation „Initiative Help4Children“ vor, die Eltern gezielt über spätere 
Verdienstmöglichkeiten von erfolgreichen Schulabgängern informiert. Das könnte ein Anreiz 
dafür sein, dass Eltern ihre Kinder vermehrt in die Schule schicken und stärker unterstützen. 
Diese Maßnahme kann aber nur mit Hilfe von Spendengeldern durchgeführt werden. Mit 
Ihrer Spende können Sie dazu beitragen, dass möglichst viele Haushalte vor Ort von der 
Kampagne profitieren. 
Oftmals ist es unmöglich zu wissen, ob eine Organisation geeignet ist, Menschen in Not zu 
helfen. Einige Organisationen könnten einen größeren Einfluss auf die Armutsbekämpfung 
haben, weil ihre Verwaltung sich verantwortlich zeigt und effizienter ist. Infolgedessen 
wurden Institute eingerichtet, die Organisationen in Bezug auf Qualität und 
Rechenschaftspflicht bewerten.  
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Stellen Sie sich vor, die fiktive Organisation „Initiative Help4Children“ trägt das Spenden-
Siegel des DZI (Deutsches Zentralinstitut Für Soziale Fragen). Jene Organisationen, die mit 
dem Spenden-Siegel ausgezeichnet sind, erfüllen objektive und nachprüfbare Standards 
bei der Aufbringung wie auch bei der Verwaltung Ihrer Spenden. Das 
Spendenqualitätssiegel sorgt dafür, dass die Spende tatsächlich an die Bedürftigen geleitet 
wird und dass die Organisation Spenden sorgfältig und verantwortungsvoll verwaltet. 
Spenden-Siegel des DZI 
"Das DZI Spenden-Siegel ist das Gütesiegel für seriöse Spendenorganisationen. Es belegt, 
dass eine Organisation mit den ihr anvertrauten Geldern sorgfältig und verantwortungsvoll 
umgeht und die Spende direkt an die bedürftigen leitet." 
Quelle: http://www.dzi.de/spenderberatung/das-spenden-siegel/ 



















                                                                                                                                                        
[not shown] Control  
Sie werden nun einen Text lesen, der über die Bildungssituation in Afrika aufklärt - daraufhin 
folgt ein fiktiver Spendenaufruf. Bitte versetzen Sie sich bei diesem Aufruf in die Situation, 
dass Sie tatsächlich spenden werden. Sie dürfen sich auch für ein Nicht-Spenden entscheiden. 
Beachten Sie bitte außerdem Ihr tatsächlich verfügbares Einkommen nach Abzug sämtlicher 
Ausgaben wie Miete, Einkäufen und Ähnlichem, und geben Sie nicht mehr aus, als Ihnen zur 
Verfügung steht. 
Forscher haben zudem herausgefunden, dass Personen in Befragungen hinsichtlich ihrer 
Spendenbereitschaft dazu neigen, eine höhere Summe anzugeben, als sie in Realität bereit 
sind auszugeben. Bitte beachten Sie dies und nennen Sie nur den Betrag, den Sie tatsächlich 
zahlen würden. Bitte lesen Sie sich nun Folgendes durch: 
  
 
In Ländern südlich der Sahara gab es in den letzten zehn Jahren einen bemerkenswerten 
Anstieg der Einschulungsraten. Dennoch haben weiterhin mehr als 21,6 Millionen Kinder im 
Sekundarschulalter keinen Zugang zu Schulbildung und für viele ist zu erwarten, dass sie 
niemals Zugang zu formaler Schulbildung erhalten werden. Besonders benachteiligt sind 
Kinder aus den ärmsten Familien, Waisen und häufig auch Mädchen. Dabei ist Bildung eine 
Möglichkeit dem Kreislauf der Armut zu entkommen.  
Es mag sein, dass einige Eltern den Nutzen von Bildung nicht erkennen. Stellen Sie sich die 
fiktive Organisation „Initiative Help4Children“ vor, die Eltern gezielt über spätere 
Verdienstmöglichkeiten von erfolgreichen Schulabgängern informiert. Das könnte ein Anreiz 
dafür sein, dass Eltern ihre Kinder vermehrt in die Schule schicken und stärker unterstützen. 
Diese Maßnahme kann aber nur mit Hilfe von Spendengeldern durchgeführt werden. Mit 
Ihrer Spende können Sie dazu beitragen, dass möglichst viele Haushalte vor Ort von der 
Kampagne profitieren. 
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We examine how economic, political and environmental drivers of migration, influence acceptance levels 
of respondents to an online survey experiment at the University of Innsbruck in Austria (n=686). Our 
novel design allows us to investigate differences in acceptance levels between legal and illegal 
immigration reasons, and to study how perceptions of migration due to self-imposed environmental 
degradation in contrast to migration due to external climatic factors influence acceptance levels in 
destination countries. We find that acceptance levels are lowest for migration due to economic and self-
inflicted environmental reasons, while migration due to climate change or political violence depicts 
significantly higher acceptance levels. According to the perception of respondents, climate migrants are 
almost accepted as political refugees, as opposed to the Geneva Convention classification. Participants 
with rather right-wing political orientation disclose lower acceptance levels throughout all treatments, 
some even rejecting legal refugees. The results of this paper offer important insights into underlying 
reasons for different perceptions towards immigration and shed light on the blurred lines between 
migrants and refugees in the context of climate change and environmental degradation. In this sense, the 
findings refer to both the recent “refugee crisis” as well as long-term migration flows expected for the 
coming decades in Austria and globally, which are increasingly shaped by environmental reasons and 
economic imbalances. 
JEL Codes: C83, O15, Q54 
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Migration is not a new phenomenon. People have always moved across regions, states and 
continents over the last millennia. However, international migration flows have been rising 
constantly over the last decades with a rather unlikely perspective of a reverting trend given the 
global socio-economic, demographic, political and environmental imbalances in this world. In 
2017, about 244 million people were living outside of their country of birth (IOM, 2018). 
Contrary to public perceptions, most of these migrants move within their regions and between 
countries of similar socio-economic characteristics, while only a very small proportion moves 
between least developed and industrialized countries (ibid, 2018; Rigaud et al., 2018). The United 
Nations classifies migrants into four broad categories: migrant workers, refugees and forcibly 
displaced people, asylum seekers and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). In public and political 
discourse refugees are at the center of attention, still the lines between the different categories are 
often blurred. According to common definitions as also promoted by the UN, refugees are 
individuals, who suffer from a “well-founded fear of being persecuted
1
” while further categories 
of migrants are classified along the degree of voluntariness underlying their decision to move. 
This paper focuses on the questions what types of asylum seekers are publicly accepted and 
which characteristics of both the migrant and the assessing individual contribute to different 
acceptance levels. Thereby, we distinguish between self-inflicted and forced migration, i.e. 
different levels of responsibility and voluntariness underlying the choice to migrate.  
 Europe has been facing the largest influx of asylum seekers since Second World War in 
recent years, mostly driven by conflicts in the Middle East. For 2017, the UN estimated 68.5 
Million forcibly displaced people, among those 3.1 Million asylum seekers worldwide and 650 
000 in Europe (UNHCR, 2018). However, the trend is declining again with EU-28 statistics 
showing a radical decrease in asylum seekers by more than 50 percent compared to the peek 
years of the so-called “refugee crisis” in 2015 and 2016
2
 back to the level of 2014 (Eurostat, 
2018). Austria currently ranks 9
th
 among EU-28 states in terms of asylum applications, in relation 
to its population, the country ranks 3
rd
 in Europe, though (Eurostat, 2018a). Syria, Iraq and 
                                                 
1 United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of refugees, 1951. 
2 Asylum applications (non-EU) in the EU-28 Member States Statistics: 2014: 627 000; 2015: 1 322 800; 2016: 1 
260 900 people (Eurostat, 2018). http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics 
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Afghanistan have been the top three countries of origin over the last years in Austria.
3
 Less than 
half of applications on Austrian territory have been decided positively
4
. Since the implementation 
of the agreement between the EU and Turkey in March 2016, new arrivals have significantly 
decreased but asylum seekers chose even more dangerous routes to Europe leading to more than 
3700 deaths on the route via the Mediterranean Sea per year since 2015 (UNHCR, 2016a). 
            
 The described recent trends in migration are largely driven by conflicts and violence. 
Since the end of the Cold war, the global prevalence of conflict has been declining, mainly driven 
by the vanishing of inter-state conflicts. However, 2016 has been marked as the fifth most deadly 
year since 1989. Most conflicts today are intra-state, often with involvement of external actors 
(Dupuy, 2017). Considering these recent conflict trends, a steady number of refugees leaving 
areas of active conflict can be expected also for the upcoming years. Nevertheless, migration 
frames a vast heterogeneity of motivations to move and goes beyond forced displacement by 
conflict or suppressive political regimes, which has been in the focus of public attention in recent 
years. Global economic imbalances, demographic developments as well as climate change and 
environmental degradation are long-term drivers and push factors of migration flows and often 
interlinked. Already in 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warned 
that the most tangible impact of climate change could be migration (IPCC, 1990). Estimates show 
a very wide range and suggest that without any adaptation measures between 25 and 1 billion 
people could be displaced due to climate change over the next 40 years, with 200 million being 
the most commonly cited figure (Myers 1997; IOM, 2009; Campbell, 2016; Rigaud et al., 2018). 
In a recent popular study, Missirian and Schlenker (2017) project a 28% yearly increase of 
asylum applicants based on the forecasts for rising global temperatures
5
. Environmental disasters 
such as earthquakes, cyclones or tsunamis capture the media and public attention. However, 
while these are in most cases temporary phenomena, it will be rather the gradual changes in the 
environment, especially temperature increases and variations in rainfall, exerting a profound non-
linear impact on migration movements in the future (Pachauri et al. 2014; Bohra-Mishra, 2014). 
Despite the continuously rising trend in migration due to climatic and environmental reasons, it is 
                                                 
3
 Most asylum applications to Austria in 2015 came from Afghanistan (25.475) followed by Syria (24.538) and Iraq 
(13.602) (BM.I. Abteilung III/5b, 2016).  
4
 With a significant variance for asylum seekers from Syria, of whom 81% were accepted for the procedure to grant 
the right of asylum in 2015 (BM.I. Abteilung III/5b, 2016).  
5
 This projection is estimated under representative concentration pathway (RCP) scenario 4.5. The authors estimate 
an increase of even “188% (660,000 additional applications per year) under RCP 8.5 for the 21 climate models in the 
NASA Earth Exchange Global Daily Downscaled Projections (NEX-GDDP)” (Missirian and Schlenker, 2017). 
70 
 
important to note that the majority of affected people, will not have the resources to migrate and 
stay in their regions of origin facing the increasingly challenging environmental conditions.
 6
   
 In the context of the described global realities, governments in Europe are confronted 
with profound challenges regarding classification and acceptance of asylum seekers. Critics argue 
that the Geneva Convention does not do justice to the current and future realities but rather 
grounds its identification system on the global realities and challenges after WWII. In this 
perspective, the convention is very much based on the concept of the nation state and the 
necessity to protect its boundaries and can, thus, not incorporate a concept like climate change 
affecting regions regardless of any territorial boundaries
7
. Under this framework of international 
humanitarian law, environmental or climate migrants do not have a legal right to apply for 
asylum. However, they are often referred to as climate refugees rather than migrants, as some 
people argue that the urge to leave their homes has been due to factors that were caused by other 
countries outside their range of influence (Oreskes, 2004; McGregor, 1993). Looking deeper into 
the root causes of many of the current conflicts in the Middle East, climatic reasons played an 
undeniable role in stimulating political uprisings. The Syrian drought from 2006-2011, for 
instance, led to massive migration movements within the country, largely ignored by the al-Assad 
government and followed by the initial political unrests. There is empirical evidence 
demonstrating that the severity and duration of the drought in Syria is by a large fraction caused 
by human interference in the climate system (Kelley et al., 2015). Sudan and Somalia show 
similar patterns of conflicts which can be traced back to initial environmental shocks followed by 
resource allocation problems. A recent meta-study by Hsiang et al. (2013) finds strong causal 
evidence based on 60 studies on the interlinkage of climate change and conflict across all global 
regions
8
. The climate-element of many refugees’ history is, thus, hidden behind a layer of conflict 
or political oppression. In this context, there is also a large scientific and public debate on the 
responsibility of the west, predominantly the US and Europe, emerging from their stake and role 
in environmental developments and following conflict upsurge, due to power imbalances and 
                                                 
6
 A recent study by Cattaneo & Peri (2016) provides empirical evidence using a cross-country dataset on how 
different global warming trends affect agricultural productivity and migration patterns. They find that higher 
temperatures in middle-income countries increases rates of migration, domestic and international, contrary to poor 
countries in which people cannot afford migration due to financial constraints. 
7
 There have been numerous initiatives on regional levels to extend the refugee definition provided by the Geneva 
Convention, to make it more adaptable to current and future global realities and developments such as conflict, 
environmental degradation and climate change (e.g. the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969 or the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. 
8
 The magnitude of climate’s influence Hsiang et al. find is substantial: “for each one standard deviation change in 
climate toward warmer temperatures or more extreme rainfall, median estimates indicate that the frequency of 
interpersonal violence rises 4% and the frequency of intergroup conflict rises 14% “(Hsiang et al, 2013).  
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resource scarcity, which can be easily exploited by different national but also external players. 
Many voices argue that this responsibility should lead to a widening of the criteria for legal 
asylum (Lüders, 2015). UNHCR has played an instrumental role in highlighting the protection 
regarding cross-border disaster displacement in the context of climate change and catalyzing the 
process of the Nansen Initiative
9
 (UNHCR, 2017). Still, the term economic migrant or economic 
refugee is constructed by the media, commonly known as people, who choose to migrate in order 
to improve the future prospects of themselves and their family (UNHCR, 2015). The term 
environmental migrant is not recognized as such officially and more importantly, legally.
10
 
Different from refugees, migrants can be defined as people who make their decision to migrate 
freely for reasons of personal convenience, e.g. finding work or education in the absence of a 
threat for their life (International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families, 1990). The UN New York Declaration for Migrants and 
Refugees adopted in September 2016, followed by the currently running process to develop a 
“Global Compact on Migration” directs the debate in a direction towards opening the 
international humanitarian law and responsibilities beyond refugees in the narrow Geneva 
Convention term. The integration of both refugees and migrants in one convention sets a 
precedent and is perceived as an important political signal by many migration experts (IOM, 
2018b).            
 There is only few economic and more psychological or social science evidence on the 
public acceptance of different types of asylum seekers and the characteristics of both the migrant 
and the assessing individual that contribute to these different acceptance levels. Bansak et al. 
(2016) show in their experiment conducted in 15 European countries that asylum seekers with a 
high employability and education status, more consistent asylum testimonies, who are perceived 
as vulnerable, and are rather Christian than Muslim have the highest probability of public 
acceptance. These results suggest that public acceptance levels are shaped by potential of future 
economic contributions, humanitarian concerns, trustworthiness of asylum claims as well as an 
                                                 
9
 The Nansen Initiative was pledged by Norway and Switzerland in 2011 to address the need for a more coherent 
approach to the protection of people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and the effects of climate 
change and is backed by several countries. https://www.nanseninitiative.org/secretariat/. 
10
 The first known definition was published by El-Hinnawi (1985): “Environmental migrants are those people who 
have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental 
disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality 
of their life”. Environmental disruption is any harm to the environment due to physical, biological or chemical 
changes in the ecosystem. A more recent definition by Crisp (2006, p. 10) describes it as follows: “People who are 
displaced from or who feel obliged to leave their usual place of residence, because their lives, livelihoods and 




anti-Muslim bias. In a similar vein, Böhm et al., investigate economic and psychological 
determinants of citizens’ pro-social behavior towards refugees and find that behavior in favor of 
refugees becomes less likely if societal costs are incurred and more likely the higher the 
neediness of the refugee is assessed. In the context of the experiment conducted for this paper, it 
should be considered that acceptance levels may be shaped by the public and political discourse 
as well as media reporting. Therefore, it is important to consider the specific context at the point 
in time, the survey was conducted at the University of Innsbruck. On September 5
th
, 2015, 
Germany and Austria opened their borders for asylum seekers coming from Hungary, where the 
government refused to accept any asylum applications offending the Dublin regulation. In 
Vienna, officials had to send well-wishers away from the train station due to overcrowding (The 
Guardian, 2015). In late autumn and winter 2015 this formerly unseen euphoria, publicly referred 
to as “Willkommenskultur” was vanishing and the term “refugee-crisis” framed the public 
discourse towards a more negative connotation. Naturalistic metaphors like refugee “avalanche” 
or “wave” were increasingly used by media and in public discourse, reinforcing fears in the 
population that the situation was out of control of European governments and asylum 
administration. An opinion poll carried out in Germany in October 2015 found that 51% of the 
3502 respondents were afraid of the rising number of migrants in Germany (Infratest dimap, 
2015). Since, the overall situation has resulted in political polarization of citizens in many 
European countries and heated debates and friction in recent years, including the upsurge of 
extreme and moderate right-wing parties and movements such as the “Patriotic Europeans 
Against the Islamization of the West” in Germany or the “Identitarian Movement”, also active in 
Austria and other European countries. The political mobilization of citizens on the basis of 
emotionalized interpretations of these issues, numerous attacks on asylum centers and a partial 
suspension of Schengen borders as a political reaction are among the tangible consequences 
(Statista, 2016). On the other side of the spectrum, numerous supporting initiatives emerged such 
as “Refugees Welcome”
11
.          
 The impact public opinions and perceptions in this context may exert on de facto policies, 
clearly displayed inter alia in the Brexit referendum, which has been attributed among other 
reasons to rising anti-immigrant sentiments in the United Kingdom. In 2015, the number of 
asylum applications in Austria more than tripled with a total number of 88.912 applications 
compared to the preceding year (BM.I Abteilung III/5, 2015). A profound shift in public 
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perceptions can also be observed in recent national elections Austria in 2017, displaying the 
second highest vote share for the right-wing populist Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in their 
history (26%), ranking third after the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democratic 
party of Austria (SPÖ). The vote resulted in a coalition of FPÖ and ÖVP in the current 
government, leading 6 of 14 ministries, among them interior, foreign affairs and defense (BMI, 
2017). Since, the Austrian government has been highly involved in debate on migration 
management in the EU, i.a. claiming extraterritorial migration facilities (Reuters, 2018).   
 However, it remains puzzling, why some citizens openly welcome the recent 
developments in European migration, while others harshly oppose it. This paper contributes to 
shedding light on both sides of this phenomenon: The effect of characteristics and perceptions of 
citizens in the host countries and perceptions towards different types of asylum seekers. Most 
existing studies look at rather general attitudes towards immigrants, ethnic minorities or 
adherents of religious groups, and do not clearly frame public opinions and perceptions in the 
context of asylum seeking and differentiating between different types of applicants (Pew 
Research Center, 2016; Esses, et al., 2017; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Grigorieff, 2018). 
Furthermore, most of these studies have been conducted before the current situation referred to as 
a “refugee or migration crisis” (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Markaki et al., 2013; Masso, 2009; 
Mayda, 2006). Thus, there are only very few studies like Bansak et al. 2016 or Böhm et al., 2018 
shedding light on the particular types of asylum seekers, the European public is willing to accept 
for the current reality since 2015. Studies with a psychological background focus on how 
personality traits and personal values of people influence acceptance of migrants. Among those 
factors are stereotypes, expectations towards behavior of the other and the outcome for the 
citizens in the host country, as well as a perceived threat to cultural and religious values or even 
an increase in terrorism (Fiske et al., 2002; Brown and Zagefka, 2011; Piontkowski et al., 2002; 
Pew Research Center, 2016; Brader et al., 2008). Vecchione et al. (2012) find high correlations 
between values and personality traits and that these are more important than socio-demographic 
characteristics when explaining people’s perception towards immigration. The effect on 
immigration perceptions of personality traits such as openness and agreeableness is channeled 
through values of universalism and security. Vecchione et al.’s (2012) findings are also supported 
by Hainmüller & Hiscox (2007) who used ESS (European Social Survey) data and came to the 
conclusion that people with a higher educational background are more likely to accept migrants, 
regardless of their educational- or skill level. Grigorieff et al. (2018) similarly show that the level 
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of knowledge about migration, such as statistics about actual ratios of migrants within the society 
increase the acceptance level. Beyond these rather psychological factors there is also evidence 
that people assess migration from a rather economic cost-benefit perspective. This perspective is 
very often framed in the context of the migrants’ participation in social welfare systems, 
displaying parts of citizens who reject to share these collective goods financed by taxed with 
migrants (Kauf and Wagner, 2012; Faccini and Mayda, 2009, Citrin et al., 1997, Card et al., 
2012). Hainmüller & Hiscox (2007) claim that immigration has little or at least equivocal effects 
on employment and unemployment for native workers and their real income. Evidence also 
suggests that negative attitude towards immigration appears more powerful correlated with 
cultural values such as tradition and a high advocacy of concepts of national identity.  
2. Hypotheses  
Borders run counter to almost all moral writings, intuitions and philosophies, no matter if seen 
from utilitarian, egalitarian or libertarian perspectives and are often perceived as human-made 
inventions (Weber, 1991; Abizadeh, 2008; Carens, 2013). As discussed in the introduction, there 
is no effective general international law allowing the entry and settlement in the territory of 
another state, with the exceptions of very restrictively framed legislation for special 
circumstances as regulated by the Geneva Convention. This is also largely due to the fact that 
migration is a very complex concept covering a wide range of human mobility, which is hard to 
capture and frame in international law. However, in practice the degree of social acceptability of 
different types of migrants is a driver of profound dividing lines within the concept of migration. 
The common labelling of highly qualified and socially as well economically desired migrants as 
“expats” rather than as migrants is a striking example of this (Schwenken, 2018). From this 
perspective, some groups of migrants are treated superior to others. While there is profound 
international law regulating discrimination against race, gender, religion, ethnical affiliation, 
sexual orientation and many more attributes, discrimination due to the place of birth is legally 
accepted. In this vein, several popular ethical theorists argue that such privileges of birth are 
morally unjust and unmerited, manifesting global inequalities also referred to as the “open-
border-argument” (Carens, 2013; Singer, 1994). In this context Blake (2015) advocates the “right 
to leave”, an inviolability of the right of emigration, despite the phenomenon of brain-drain as 
prominently discussed developing countries. Seen from the angle of economic theory, it is also 
suggested that people only care about the final outcome (i.e. a 10% increase in migrants) but not 
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how this outcome comes about. In this line of understanding, preferences are conditional on 
attributes of choice. Based on these diverse considerations from philosophy to economics, the 
null hypothesis is that people do not differentiate between different causes of migration.  
 
Null Hypothesis – Open borders: There is no difference in acceptance levels of 
migrants between the different treatments. Participants do not differentiate between 
causes of migration. 
However, based on some fairness theories people do not only care about the outcomes but also 
how these outcomes come about, especially the responsibility for a certain outcome (i.e. the urge 
to migrate). It can be argued that political migrants deserve acceptance from the society more 
than other groups of migrants, as their cause for migration is considered as the most legitimate 
one and their decision to leave is based on a very low degree of voluntariness or responsibility. 
Furthermore, political migrants (in our study due to a civil war) are the only type of migrants, 
who can legally apply for asylum based on prevalent international law, the rejection of these type 
of migrants is, thus, a human rights violation, seen from the perspective of procedural justice. 
Assuming that living space, resources and capacities of the social systems of hosting countries 
have a certain limitation, according to alternative hypothesis 1 asylum is granted to the people, 
who need it most. This line of argumentation is coherent with general economic theories about 
allocation of scarce goods and realistic group conflict theory that expects competition over scarce 
resources to cause conflict between groups, where immigrants are perceived as a threat to 
resources (Ponce, 2017). While political refugees according to the Geneva Convention jump the 
line, further migrants are assessed based on a certain basis for assessment, such as their 
willingness to pay or their economic or social “value” for the hosting society or according to the 
degree of “responsibility” behind their decision to migrate. While our study design holds the first 
argument constant, it provides variations of the second. This leads to the hypothesis that 
treatment POL will experience the highest acceptance levels among all treatments. 
Alternative hypothesis 1: Acceptance of political-migrants (POL) is higher compared to 
all other treatments.  
Alternative hypothesis 2 is also based on fairness theory and therefore differentiates the 
individual responsibility underlying the decision to leave the country of origin. ENV CC is based 
on climate change whereas ENV SI is based on self-inflicted reasons to the environment. In this 
context, Walker et al. (1999) hypothesize that willingness to pay for environmental conservation 
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is driven by the degree of responsibility that people feel for the damages. Similarly, responsibility 
for ENV SI is higher than for ENV CC and we would expect lower acceptance where people are 
responsible for their actions 
Alternative hypothesis 2: Acceptance of migrants which are displaced due to climate 
change (ENV CC) is higher than when the reasons are self-inflicted (ENV SI). 
Based on the same reasoning, economic migrants are expected to receive the lowest acceptance 
levels of all migrant groups because they are leaving their home voluntarily instead of forcefully 
like political or environmental migrants and are, thus, fully responsible for their actions. 
Alternative hypothesis 3: Acceptance of economic migrants (ECON) is lowest of all 
treatments. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
This study provides an insight into the level of public acceptance for migration based on different 
responsibilities for leaving the country of origin by using an online survey-experiment. In 
contrast to opinion polls, survey experiments have a clear advantage as they randomly assign 
treatments in a survey context, which allows a higher degree of control of internal and external 
validity considerations (Krupnikov and Findley, 2016). The method is close to vignette studies 
commonly used in Psychological sciences, however, it is commonly criticized of hypothetical 
bias, which we addressed in our design. As this study incorporates three treatments and a control 
group for purposes of comparison, it is assumed that any hypothetical bias, should it occur, would 
affect all groups in the same way. To control for this, we carry out robustness tests and several 
socio-demographic and attitudinal questions. Response options are set up on a Likert-Scale, a 
method of ascribing quantitative values to qualitative data, to make it applicable for statistical 
analysis. Strengths of a Likert-Scale are the simple way in constructing them, the likelihood of 
producing a highly reliable scale and that it is easy to read and complete for respondents 
(Bertram, 2007). There are potential weakness to be considered when implementing Likert-Scales 
such as a central tendency bias or compliance bias. The former refers to participants avoiding 
extreme answer possibilities, while the latter refers to a tendency of participants to answer in a 
way to please the experimenter (Bertram, 2007). Another potential weakness could be a social 
desirability bias in which participants aim to present themselves in a more social way instead of 
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stating their real opinion. Social desirability bias can be decreased by the fact that all respondents 
participate anonymously and therefore are less tempted to state wrong preferences (Lelkes et al. 
2012). However, we do not have any reason to believe that biases differ between treatments and 
the aim of this study is to compare treatments and not measure absolute or true levels of 
acceptance in the treatments. Furthermore, as elaborated more in the results and discussion 
sections, results on general and political attitudes are largely coherent with statistics of opinion 
polls such as the European Social Survey and national election results underlining the 
assumption, that our study provides a realistic picture of examined context. 
3.1. Study Design and Experimental Treatments 
We conducted an online survey-experiment at the University of Innsbruck with a total sample of 
686 completed surveys in October 2015. To avoid misunderstandings in terminology, the overall 
term migrant was used in the survey and will be used in this paper, as every refugee is a migrant, 
but not every migrant is a refugee. The design of the study differentiates between the following 
scenarios: (i) legal migration (ii) illegal immigration, based on effective migration law in Austria. 
Additionally, the design distinguishes between migration due to externally imposed 
environmental pressures and environmental migration which is at least partly self-inflicted as 
well as migration for economic reasons. The four treatments are classified as “political migrant” 
(POL) and “economic migrant” (ECON) which serve as comparisons to the “environmental 
migrant due to climate change” (ENV CC) and “self-inflicted environmental migrant” (ENV SI) 
treatments.            
 Each respondent was randomly allocated to one of the four treatments. Each treatment is 
set up with a certain probability (one sixth POL and ECON, one third for ENV CC and ENV SI 
respectively) to occur to ensure balanced assignment of participants to treatments with a special 
focus on the different environmental responsibilities. The treatments have particular distinctions, 
however, they all share the same basic characteristics and description to ensure comparability. All 
respondents are introduced to a hypothetical identity in the form of a 26 years old Muslim 
fishermen from Chad, who is married, has two children and studied business administration but 
only found employment as a fisherman. This basic scenario ensures comparability between 
treatments, while some specific facts, relating to migration-types are additionally highlighted. 
ENV SI refers to a scenario where Mbaya cannot provide enough resources and decides to 
migrate due to over-fishing and overuse of water by him and other users of the ecosystem. In 
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contrast, ENV CC refers to the vanishing of Lake Chad due to decreasing precipitation as a result 
of climate change. As outlined in the introduction, only politically persecuted migrants are 
entitled for legal migration to Austria, economic and environmental migrants, are not entitled to 
obtain a legal visa without having a family member or a working contract in Austria. 
Respondents to the different scenarios were asked to state their preferences and attitudes for the 
migrant’s intention to seek asylum in Austria on a scale from 1 “refuse completely” to 8 
“support completely” after being randomly allocated to one of the four treatments.   
 We chose Chad as a country context, as it provides realistic scenarios to fit all four drivers 
of migration. Furthermore, the actual migration from Chad to Austria has been very low
12
 over 
the last years, assuring a rather neutral basic perception of Austrians to this group of migrants. 
Since independence in 1960, the landlocked country ranking 186 out of 188 on the Human 
development Index has been plagued by political and social instability due to rivalry ethnic and 
religious groups, vastly affected by the conflicts in the neighboring countries and the 
consequences of climate change and desertification, which becomes very tangible in the drying 
up of Lake Chad (The World Bank, 2018). Environmental problems are highly prevalent in the 
country facing severe desertification and intensified droughts
13
. Since 2014, the region has 
witnessed a severe increase in violence, mostly driven by terror attacks by Boko Haram targeting 
civilians in the Lake Chad basin. Consequently, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) 
and refugees is growing
14
 (UNICEF, 2016). The country has been constantly among the countries 
hosting most refugees in proportion to its population. Currently Chad hosts approximately 300 
000 refugees in 17 refugee camps, mostly from South Sudan and Central African Republic and 
Nigeria and 160 000 IDPs in the eastern and southern parts (IOM, 2018a). For the ECON 
treatment, figures of the 2015 UNDP report on Chad were taken into account, illustrating a 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) value of 0.545, demonstrating the high prevalence of 
poverty and severe deprivation in the country (UNDP, 2015). Among the top countries to seek 
asylum of people originating from Chad in the year the experiment was conducted were the US, 
Germany, Italy, Canada and France. Acceptance rates in these countries range between 10 and 
55% of applicants and are thus, rather low (UNHCR, 2018). However, the by far most prominent 
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 In 2015, there were 3 asylum applications from Chad in Austria. (BM.I., 2016)  
13
 Lake Chad is home to over 20 million people from 8 different countries who derive direct or indirect livelihoods 
from the lake. As a result of decreased rainfall and increased water usage, Lake Chad decreased by 95 per cent since 
1963 (United Nations Environment Programme, 2008.). 
14
 Since 2013 about 2.6 million people had to flee from the whole region are currently displaced, putting additional 
pressures on relatives, friends and neighbours in host communities (UNICEF, 2016). 
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migration destination are within the region, headed by Angola and Gabon. Based on the 
described realities Chad faces, authentic and credible treatment scenarios were created. Further 
information provided in all treatments about the hypothetical migrant from Chad were 
educational level, religious affiliation and the job-market situation in his country. Participants 
also learned about his family situation and daily activities. To visualize the country context, a 
map of the Sahel-Belt and its surroundings was shown
15
. Common to all scenarios is the 
information that the individual plans to migrate, even though he knows that he cannot legally 
enter Austria without a working permit or a family reunification case. The following basic 
treatment distinctions were provided to the survey participants: 
Political migrant treatment (POL) 
In the POL treatment the respondent receives the general scenario common to all treatments. The 
information specific to this treatment highlights the consequences of the conflict and violence in 
Chad leading to political instability and affecting the income and economic perspective of Mbaya 
and his family. The reference of conflict should account to the respondent’s knowledge that this 
case illustrates a political migrant according to the Geneva Convention. 
Economic migrant treatment (ECON) 
 Starting with the introductory scenario as well, this treatment refers to the publicly used image of 
an economic migrant. In this scenario, Mbaya wants to migrate to Austria to improve his 
economic prospects and to find a job in the profession he studied, despite the fact that he enjoys 
an acceptable living standard as a fisherman in his country.  
Environmental migrant due to climate change (ENV CC) 
The ENV CC treatment highlights climate change as a cause for migration. The scenario 
description presents two pictures demonstrating of the shrinking of Lake-Chad. As the lake 
diminished immensely, fishing is not as profitable anymore as it used to be. To demonstrate the 
external responsibility underlying this treatment scenario, it is mentioned that there is evidence 
showing that industrial nations are mainly to blame for the rising CO2 emissions and the negative 
consequences for the Chad-Lake due to change of climate induced drought. These information 
aims at framing the scenario in a way that respondent understands that the individual cannot be 
hold accountable for the situation. 
                                                 
15
 For detailed information about the information given in each treatment, see Appendix A3. 
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Environmental migrant self-inflicted (ENV SI) 
This treatment highlights a hypothetical the aspects that the individual and other citizens do not 
stick to regulatory rules regarding fishing policies, agricultural policies and other laws which 
should help to ensure a sustainable use of agricultural space, fisheries and the environment. As a 
consequence, income opportunities by fishing have been decreasing over time affecting the 
economic situation of the potential migrant. The scenario underlines that all these reasons are 
self-inflicted.  
3.2. Data Collection 
The research subjects were students from different University faculties at the University of 
Innsbruck, who are recipients of a regular email newsletter about social-scientific surveys. The 
email included the link to the survey, broad information about the topic, duration (about 10 
minutes) and respondents were informed that answers were treated strictly anonymously. 
Students were not financially compensated for participation but respondents who finished the 
survey took part in a lottery, where they had the chance to win 25 Euro. The survey was online 
for one month from October 2015 using the online survey tool Lime survey
16
 for facilitation. The 
sample is, of course, not representative for the whole population of Austria. Survey experiments 
are frequently conducted at Universities, with students as subjects, being aware that their actions 
and decisions are studied. These students constitute a rather homogenous subject pool with 
similar education, income, age and cognitive abilities. Henrich et al. (2010) argue in this vein, 
that lab experiments are usually based on decisions of western, educated, industrialized, rich and 
democratic (WEIRD) societies and criticize that these results are then often generalized on very 
different populations and contexts even though they lack sufficient external validity. As a 
reaction to this, study design and implementation were conducted in a way that maximized 
applicability and suitability for policy recommendation. Questionnaires followed the choice 
scenario, providing important insights into relevant characteristics and perceptions of the 
respondents. Despite the limitations of the subject pool we believe that this paper provides an 
interesting insight into acceptance levels towards migrants within a homogenous group.   
 A total of 1197 students opened the survey, out of whom 686 fully completed it and 511 
aborted the survey at some point (see Figure 1). Compared to former surveys conducted on 






different topics, this is an outstandingly high response rate for an online survey at the University 
of Innsbruck, speaking for a high interest in the topic
17
. Overall, about 57% of students 
completed the survey with no systematic differences in non-completed surveys between 
treatments (Kruskal-Wallis rank test, p=0.86). This gives us confidence about the internal 
consistency of our results. Unfortunately, we do not have any information when respondents 
aborted the survey nor any individual characteristics, which we could use to check whether they 
differ significantly from the ones which completed the survey.  
Figure 1: Observations by treatment 
 
Note: The differences between treatments are not statistically significant and mainly follow the distribution 
aimed for the treatments: ECON 1/6, POL 1/6, ENV CC 1/3 and ENV SI 1/3.  
 
4. Estimation Strategy and Descriptives  
Regarding the econometric strategy, the outcome variable of interest is the level of acceptance 
measured by the respondents’ answers in their randomly allocated treatment. The level of 
acceptance is measured by a function of the treatments compared to POL as the legally allowed 
group of migrants. Other covariates included in the identification strategy are included in 𝑋𝑖 , 
which is the vector of all behavioral-, attitudinal- and socio-demographic-covariates that are 
stepwise added to the main regression. Equation (1) shows the impact of each treatment on the 
level of acceptance: 
𝐴𝐶𝐿𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐸𝑁𝑉 𝐶𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐸𝑁𝑉 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐹 ∗ +𝛽4 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   (1) 
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 In a survey experiment conducted in 2014 and 2015 (Vollan, Henning and Staewa, 2017), 589 students responded 








































Table 1 provides an overview of the survey items we collected after the survey experiment and 
their balancing. Socio-demographic variables cover respondent characteristics such as age, 
gender, religious affiliation, political-party preference, field of studies, participants’ 
neighborhood (foreigners, crimes and poverty condensed into an index) and perceptions related to 
impacts of immigration (i.e. stealing jobs or increased crime rate). Further questions inquire the 
interest in the topic of migration and whether they know the legal fundamentals for migration 
according to the Geneva Convention.        
 Additionally, there is a section with binary questions about what kind of attributes 
immigrants should have if they want to live in Austria that are deemed important by respondents. 
Some attributes focus on potential similarities like education, culture, norms, religion and skin, 
while others highlight that age is important or having at least basic local language skills. These 
eight items are consolidated into a simple additive index, ranging from zero, none of the factors 
are relevant, to eight, all factors are important. A higher score indicates that the respondent 
perceives more factors as important.          
 There are slightly more female than male respondent with 62%. A majority of 54% 
(n=371) of the sample would rather vote for a left-wing oriented party, evenly distributed over 
treatments. Followed by central voters with 26% (n=180) and right-wing voters with 7% (n=51). 
The “other” option was chosen by 12 % (n=84) stating that respondents do not vote at all or have 
a preference for a foreign party, not covered
18
. About 50% of respondents perceive a slight 
increase in crime rates due to immigration and more than 70% are advocates for extraterritorial 
migration management. Responses to the questions about asylum eligibility according to the 
Geneva Convention show that 30% of respondents do not know who can legally apply for asylum 
in Austria. About 20% (10%) of respondents wrongly think that environmental migrants 
(economic migrants) can also apply for asylum, while only ten respondents do not know that 
politically persecuted migrants can apply. 
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 These political party preferences show a more left-centered voting pattern than the Austrian average of people 
below the age of 29 at the latest national elections in 2017, in which 30% voted for the right-wing party FPÖ and 
only about 28% for parties on the left spectrum of political parties (Statista, 2018) For the city of Innsbruck, the 
results are closer to our sample with 42% voring for rather left-wing parties. However, also here 20% voted right-
wing for FPÖ. Interpreting these results, it should be taken into account that the national votes 2017 took place two 




Table 1: Treatment Balance 
 
Notes: Share of different  study-programs (social sciences 19,  humanities 20,  natural sciences 21) is  fairly even,  with 32.22 
% (n=221) studying social sciences,  35.13 % (n=241) in the humanit ies sector,  22.30 % (n=153) natural sciences and 
10.35 % (n=71) other studies.  The joint  F-tests indicate that  only the POL and ENV CC treatment differ overal l in  the 
observed variables (p < 0.1) .  Joint  F-tests of differences between (2) -(3),  (2)-(4) and (3)-(4),  which are not  reported  
here,  al l turn out  insignificant . 
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 Social Sciences: Business, Economics, Statistics, Political Science, Sociology, Psychology, Sports, Educational 
Science 
20
 Humanities: Theology, Philological-Cultural Studies, Philosophy, History, Law 
21
 Natural Sciences: Architecture, Biology, Geology, Mathematics, IT, Physics, Medicine, Technical Studies 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 




ENV CC ENV SI ∆ ∆ ∆ 
Variables Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (1)-(4) 
Female 0,64 0,58 0,61 0,64 0,06 0,03 -0,01 
 [0,48] [0,50] [0,49] [0,48]    
Age 23,07 23,16 24,00 23,55 -0,09 -0,93 -0,48 
 [5,65] [6,34] [6,61] [6,64]    
Dummy: Religious affiliation 0,68 0,65 0,65 0,67 0,03 0,03 0,02 
 [0,47] [0,48] [0,48] [0,47]    
Dummy: Never goes to mess 0,42 0,51 0,44 0,48 -0,09 -0,03 -0,06 
 [0,50] [0,50] [0,50] [0,50]    
Dummy: Single 0,55 0,45 0,49 0,54 0,09 0,06 0,01 
 [0,50] [0,50] [0,50] [0,50]    
Dummy: Left voter 0,60 0,55 0,53 0,52 0,06 0,07 0,09 
 [0,49] [0,50] [0,50] [0,50]    
Dummy: Right voter 0,08 0,02 0,06 0,11 0,06** 0,02 -0,03 
 [0,27] [0,13] [0,24] [0,32]    
Dummy: Center voter 0,21 0,25 0,29 0,26 -0,04 -0,08 -0,05 
 [0,41] [0,44] [0,46] [0,44]    
Dummy: No party preference 0,11 0,18 0,11 0,11 -0,08 -0,01 -0,01 
 [0,31] [0,39] [0,32] [0,32]    
Dummy: Very interested in migration 
topic 
0,44 0,41 0,44 0,39 0,03 0,00 0,05 
 [0,50] [0,49] [0,50] [0,49]    
Dummy: Foreign friends 0,81 0,87 0,86 0,86 -0,07 -0,05 -0,05 
 [0,40] [0,33] [0,35] [0,35]    
Index: Neighborhood 2,17 2,24 2,22 2,24 -0,07 -0,05 -0,07 
 [0,63] [0,64] [0,69] [0,70]    
Dummy: Immigrants steal jobs 0,12 0,05 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,04 0,05 
 [0,32] [0,23] [0,26] [0,25]    
Dummy: Immigrants cost the welfare state 0,36 0,30 0,26 0,32 0,06 0,10** 0,04 
 [0,48] [0,46] [0,44] [0,47]    
Dummy: Migration increases crime rate 0,45 0,43 0,45 0,53 0,02 0,00 -0,08 
 [0,50] [0,50] [0,50] [0,50]    
Dummy: Asylum pleas outside the EU 0,64 0,70 0,70 0,72 -0,06 -0,07 -0,08 
 [0,48] [0,46] [0,46] [0,45]    
Index: Important attributes of immigrants 1,60 1,78 2,00 1,90 -0,18 -
0,40** 
-0,30* 
 [1,60] [1,38] [1,54] [1,52]    
Dummy: Knows the Geneva refugee 
convention 
0,69 0,65 0,69 0,71 0,04 -0,00 -0,02 
 [0,46] [0,48] [0,46] [0,46]    
N 113 110 242 221    
F-test of joint significance (F-stat)     1,17 1,58* 1,17 




The empirical analysis is separated into two sections, descriptive and regression analysis. Firstly, 
we examine the differences in acceptance levels of migrants between the four treatments, 
showing statistically significant disparities. Subsequently, we explore individual determinants of 
acceptance levels by analyzing the impacts of socio-demographics, individual perceptions and 
behavioral covariates, overall and within each treatment. Based on our null hypothesis of open 
borders, we would expect that participants do not differentiate between causes for migration, i.e. 
the four treatments in our survey experiment. However, based on our alternative hypotheses we 
expect that participants show lower acceptance in treatment ENV SI and ECON, as according to 
these specifications migrants have a greater degree of voluntariness regarding their decision to 
leave their country of origin. Therefore, we expect, different distributive norms, among them 
responsibility and procedural justice driving higher acceptance levels in the POL and ENV CC 
treatment compared to ENV SI and ECON. 
5.1. Acceptance Level and Rates 
Figure 2, Panel A presents distributions of acceptance rates on the whole Likert-scale ranging 
from 1 (refuse completely) to 8 (accept completely). More than two thirds of the participants 
(67%, n=463) state a rather supporting preference regarding their acceptance level, while 33% 
(n=223) at least “rather refuse” a positive asylum plea for the individual. The majority of 
participants (63%; n=431) stated a preference somewhere on the mid-range of the scale between 
4 (“rather refuse”) and 6 (“support fairly strong”)
22
. In order to get a clearer understanding of the 
drivers of the polarity in acceptance rates, Panel B in Figure shows differences in acceptance 
levels, pooled into four groups along the treatments. This reveals that 18% of respondents in the 
POL treatment would “rather reject” political migrants and 7% would even “strongly reject” 
them. This is a highly interesting finding as it reveals that one fourth of respondents would deny 
an international human right. On the other hand, we also observe strong support for economic 
migrants, as 30% would “strongly approve” and another 12% would “rather approve” such a 
migrant in the ECON treatment. These rejection (approval) rates of migrants that can (cannot) 
legally apply for asylum could be explained by the fact that about 30% of respondents do not 
know the Geneva Refugee Convention (see Table 1). An alternative explanation for this finding 
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 About one forth (26%, n=181) state “rather support”, 19% (n=128) “support fairly strong” and similar figures for 
“rather refuse” with 18% (n=122). 
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could be the positive expectation of economic contribution by an economic migrant in contrast to 
an individual fleeing from political oppression or war. 
Figure 2: Distribution of acceptance levels 
 
Notes: Panel A shows the full 8-point scale of acceptance levels,  while Panel B shows pooled acceptance 
levels to four categories over treatment.  The four categories are :  strongly reject  (<4),  rather reject (=4),  
rather approve (=5) and strongly approve (>5).  
 
We find that respondents in POL, who know the convention have 11 percentage points lower 
acceptance rates of migrants than respondents, who do not know the convention using a binary 
acceptance level (see Appendix A 1). This difference is not statistically significant (Mann-
Whitney test, p=0.2), but it shows that knowledge, or the lack of it, cannot explain why some 
respondents would deny an international human right. This finding is, however, rathe surprising 
and reveals a very restrictive attitude towards migration by some respondents. Figure A 1 also 
shows that people, who know the convention in the ENV CC have 17 percentage points lower 
accept rate of environmental migrants (Mann-Whitney test, p<0.01). In this case, however, these 
decisions are coherent with current international law.       
 Figure 3, Panel A shows the mean of acceptance levels over treatments and corresponding 
confidence intervals. Average acceptance is 5.17, disclosing that respondents overall rather 
approve the migration of the hypothetical individual. Acceptance levels are highest in the POL 
and ENV CC treatments with a mean of 5.52 and 5.53 respectively, while ENV SI (4.86) and 
ECON (4.64) both have lower mean acceptance levels. Acceptance levels in the ECON and ENV 
SI treatments are significantly lower than in the POL treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p<0.01 for 
both tests), while there is no difference in acceptance between ENV CC and POL (Mann-
Whitney test, p=0.8). These findings, thus, support our Alternative Hypothesis 2 and 3. Focusing 
86 
 
on a binary indicator of approval or rejection of a migrant
23
 (Figure 3, Panel B), we find that pure 
acceptance rates are significantly lower in ECON with 42% compared to the other treatments 
ranging from 66% to 77% (Mann-Whitney tests, p<0.01 for all three comparisons). Interestingly, 
acceptance rates in ENV SI are not statistically different from POL and ENV CC. These findings 
are particularly interesting in the light of public political referenda, conducted in numerous 
countries on similar topics. In such a scenario of a majority decision scheme, ENC SELF and 
POL would be accepted as valid reasons for seeking asylum.  
Figure 3: Acceptance levels by treatment 
 
Note: Panel A shows the average acceptance level across treatments, while Panel  B shows the acceptance 
rate. Acceptance rate is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if respondents approve migration 
(acceptance > 4) and 0 otherwise. Dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
In a nutshell, results suggest that forced environmental migrants disclose an average acceptance 
level similar to political migrants, while self-inflicted environmental migrants are classified 
closer to the level of economic migrants. However, by looking beyond the exact magnitude of 
acceptance, we see similar acceptance rates of self-inflicted environmental migrants as political 
migrants. The results show variation in the magnitude of acceptance as well as in the rate 
accepting migrants, clearly rejecting the null hypothesis of equal acceptance of migrants over all 
treatments. 
5.2. Determinants of Acceptance 
In order to shed more light on the underlying drivers and determinants of these effects, the 
subsequent paragraphs show OLS regressions covering a combination of behavioral, attitudinal 
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 Approval defined here as categories >4 on the Likert-scale. 
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and sociodemographic variables including personality traits and general information as 
introduced in the previous section. Table 2 and the following regressions use POL, as the only 
treatment based on clear international law as the control group. Column (1) shows results with 
treatment dummies only and without further control variables, to identify treatment effects as a 
starting point for comparison. In column (2) to (4), we further add socio-demographic controls, 
political interest and party preference and individual perceptions of the impacts of immigration
24
. 
As presented in column (1) without controlling for further covariates, overall acceptance levels 
are significantly lower by half a standard deviation (-0.49) in ECON (β=-.89, p<0.01) and a third 
of a standard deviation (-0.37) in the ENV SI (β=-.66, p<0.01) treatment compared to the POL 
treatment. Acceptance levels for the ENV CC treatment are of similar size as the control group 
POL (p>0.1). These effects are robust when including further control variables and remain stable 
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Table 2: Main treatment effects  
 Would you agree that this person can legally migrate to Austria? 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ECON -0.89*** -0.91*** -1.00*** -0.91*** 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) 
ENV CC 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) 
ENV SI -0.66*** -0.69*** -0.54*** -0.59*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) 
Female  0.31**   
  (0.15)   
Single  -0.07   
  (0.14)   
Age  -0.00   
  (0.01)   
Religious affiliation  -0.24   
  (0.16)   
Foreign friends  0.45**   
  (0.19)   
Never goes to mess  -0.01   
  (0.15)   
Very interested in migration topic   0.21  
   (0.13)  
Knows the Geneva convention   -0.25*  
   (0.13)  
Left voter   0.33**  
   (0.15)  
Right voter   -2.43***  
   (0.28)  
No party preference   -0.20  
   (0.24)  
Index: Neighborhood    -0.12 
    (0.10) 
Index: Important attributes of immigrants    -0.30*** 
    (0.05) 
Asylum pleas outside the EU    -0.27** 
    (0.13) 
Immigrants steal jobs    -0.97*** 
    (0.29) 
Immigrants cost the welfare state    -0.66*** 
    (0.16) 
Migration increases crime rate    -0.28** 
    (0.13) 
Constant 5.52*** 5.17*** 5.61*** 6.91*** 
 (0.15) (0.39) (0.20) (0.25) 
     
Observations 686 686 686 686 
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.28 
Notes:  The dependent variable is acceptance and ranges from 1 “refuse completely” to  8 “support 
completely”. POL is used as the reference group for treatment effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses 





In column (2) we control for demographic factors. Females show a significantly higher (β=.31, 
p<0.05) level of acceptance, as well as respondents with friends from different ethnic or religious 
backgrounds. (β=.45, p<0.05). Overall, demographics do not offer much explanatory power for 
the overall variance of acceptance levels (R
2
=0.04 without versus R
2
=0.06 with), still they 
provide interesting insights that match with findings of prior research showing a more open 
perception of women towards migration and ethnic diversity (Semyonov and Glikman, 2009; 
Ponce, 2017). Controlling for interest in the migration topic, knowledge of who can legally apply 
for asylum and party preferences (see column (3), increases model fit by 14 percentage points 
(R
2
=0.2). Party preference shows the expected effects. Voters of left-wing oriented parties have a 
significantly higher overall acceptance level of about half a point (β=.33, p<0.05), while voters of 
right-wing oriented parties show acceptance levels of 2 points less (β=-2.43, p<0.01) compared to 
participants with center party preferences. Participants, who know who can legally apply for 
asylum in Austria based on the 1951 Geneva Convention, have slightly lower acceptance (β=-.25, 
p<0.1), as already described before.         
 Column (4) shows the effects when controlling for participants perceptions about the 
influence of immigrants on society and whether people live in a neighborhood with prevalence of 
crime, poverty and foreigners. These factors are significantly contributing to explain unique 
variance by accounting for roughly 30% of overall variance (R
2
=0.28). An increase in the 
immigrants’ attributes index of one point yields a significantly lower acceptance level of 0.3 
points (ß=-.3, p<0.01). The dummy variables on the impacts of immigration are all negative and 
lower acceptance between 0.28 to 0.97 points at the 1%-level. These covariates are adherent to 
participants, who believe that immigrants are a burden to the Austrian welfare system, increase 
the crime rate or take away jobs from Austrians. Also, respondents who rather agree that asylum 
pleas should be already decided and managed outside the European Union depict lower 
acceptance levels (ß=-.27, p<0.05). Appendix A5 provides an overview of these perceptions per 
affiliation of the political spectrum, showing significant deviations from the means for right wing 
and left-wing voters in the expected directions.        
 We also test for significant differences between ENV SI and ECON by using ENV SI as 
the reference group (see Appendix A2). Results remain robust and we find that acceptance levels 
in the ECON treatment are only significantly lower than in the ENV SI treatment when 
controlling for political interest and party preferences (ß= -0.47, p< 0.05). As a robustness test, 
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we also use a dichotomous dependent variable that captures the acceptance rate and not their 
magnitude. The results of the probit regressions can be found in the appendix (see A  in the 
Appendix). The main difference compared to the OLS results is, that acceptance rates are only 
slightly lower by about 10 percentage points in ENV SI compared to POL. The effect turns 
insignificant when controlling for political interest and party preferences.    
 Table 3 provides an overview of the determinants of acceptance levels for each individual 
treatment controlling for opinions about immigration (uneven columns) and political interest and 
party affiliation (even columns). Among all treatments, model fit is relatively high when 
controlling for opinions (R
2
 > 0.3) with the exception of the ECON treatment, showing that the 
independent variables only explain between 13% of the total variance of acceptance levels. 
Political interest and party affiliation explain less variation in the POL and ECON treatment 
(13% and 17% respectively) than in the ENV treatments (about 25%). This may be due to the fact 
that the treatments of POL and ECON are much less publicly disputed than environmental 
migration. Interesting to note is, furthermore, that contrary to all other treatments attitudes 
towards migration are not statistically significant in the ECON treatment. Moreover, there is a 















Table 3: Determinants of acceptance levels by treatment 
 POL ECON ENV CC ENV SI 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Female -0.16 -0.07 -1.04** -0.95** 0.53** 0.77*** -0.03 -0.08 
 (0.29) (0.34) (0.39) (0.36) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) 
Foreign friends 0.08 0.25 -0.16 0.35 0.30 0.35 0.60* 0.47 
 (0.31) (0.29) (0.53) (0.44) (0.30) (0.26) (0.35) (0.35) 
Index: Neighborhood -0.31  0.25  -0.19  -0.14  
 (0.22)  (0.28)  (0.14)  (0.18)  





 (0.10)  (0.17)  (0.07)  (0.09)  
Asylum pleas outside the EU -0.30  -0.14  -0.19  -0.36  
 (0.27)  (0.39)  (0.22)  (0.22)  
Immigrants steal jobs -0.63  -1.03  -
1.30*** 
 -0.91*  
 (0.50)  (1.13)  (0.48)  (0.47)  
Immigrants cost the welfare 
state 
-0.97**  -0.52  -0.41  -
0.81*** 
 
 (0.38)  (0.40)  (0.27)  (0.29)  
Migration increases crime 
rate 
-0.31  -0.31  -0.28  -0.02  
 (0.27)  (0.35)  (0.23)  (0.22)  
Interested in migration topic  0.14  0.58*  0.17  -0.06 
  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.21)  (0.24) 
Knows the Geneva 
convention 
 -0.00  0.44  -
0.61*** 
 -0.34 
  (0.37)  (0.36)  (0.20)  (0.24) 
Left voter  0.17  0.82**  0.12  0.41 
  (0.30)  (0.41)  (0.22)  (0.28) 








  (0.55)  (0.68)  (0.50)  (0.45) 
No party preference  -0.80  0.71  -0.63  -0.25 
  (0.61)  (0.56)  (0.47)  (0.36) 
Constant 7.37*** 5.42*** 5.35*** 3.83*** 6.55*** 5.28*** 5.92*** 4.86*** 
 (0.53) (0.41) (0.84) (0.66) (0.50) (0.31) (0.49) (0.46) 
         
Observations 113 113 110 110 242 242 221 221 
R-squared 0.36 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.35 0.25 0.29 0.24 
Adjusted R-squared 0.31 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.33 0.23 0.26 0.21 
F-test 8.00 2.31 1.92 5.39 21.21 11.00 14.09 9.90 
Prob > F 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes:  The dependent variable is acceptance and ranges from 1 “refuse completely” to  8 “support 
completely”.  Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Columns (1) and (2) show acceptance levels for POL only. We find that the variables that 
immigrants are costly for the welfare and respondents, who think immigrants should be more 
similar with respect to sharing the same norms or religion have significantly lower acceptance 
levels (ß=-0.97 and ß=-0.24 respectively, p<0.05). Nevertheless, these findings may indicate that 
even respondents with restrictive views on political migrants, seem to agree that the acceptance 
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of political migrants is indispensable according to international human rights treaties. Also, right-
wing oriented voters have significantly lower acceptance than central voters in POL (ß=-1.7, 
p<0.01) and even lower ones in all other treatments. Opinions and party preference should not 
matter in POL, as it is an international human right. Interestingly, the opinion variables turn out 
insignificant in ECON, where acceptance levels are rather driven by party affiliation and topic 
interest. Left oriented voters have higher (ß=0.82, p<0.05), while right oriented voters have again 
lower acceptance (ß=-2.43, p<0.01) both compared to central voters. The acceptance levels in 
ENV CC and ENV SI are also driven by opinions about immigration and the attributes index as 
in POL. Respondents that think immigrants steal jobs have significantly lower acceptance by 1.3 
points in ENV CC (p<0.01) and 0.91 in ENV SI (p<0.1), while expecting one more attribute from 
the immigrant lowers acceptance by about 0.35 points (p<0.01) in both treatments.   
 Female respondents show significantly lower acceptance in the ECON treatment by about 
1 point (p<0.05) and higher acceptance in the ENV CC treatment (0.53 to 0.77 points, p<0.05) 
and no significant differences in the remaining two treatments. Knowledge of the Geneva refugee 
convention has only a significant negative effect in ENV CC, lowering acceptance by about 0.6 
points (p<0.01). As a robustness test, we again focus on binary acceptance rates and not their 
magnitude. The results of the probit regressions highlight the importance of respondents’ 
perceptions about immigration, especially the costs for the welfare state, and party affiliation as 
the main determinants of accepting immigrants (see A in the Appendix).  
6. Discussion  
Migration is without a doubt one of the biggest global challenges of today’s reality and is a 
highly polarizing topic, heatedly debated in most European countries. Our survey experiment 
shows, that migrants have a significantly higher probability of being accepted if they are political 
migrants, leaving their country due to conflict, ethnic or religious tension or political oppression. 
This finding is not surprising, as it mirrors the effective migration law as framed by the Geneva 
Convention. More astonishing is the result of our study, that migrants moving due to 
environmental reasons based on external factors and implying responsibilities of industrial 
countries, inducing climate change, show almost similar patterns of acceptance. This finding is in 
line with the often-used informal framing of climate migrants as “climate refugees” and the 
public discourse around the restrictions in migration law, only granting political migrants a 
legally validated refugee status.         
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 The analysis of characteristics of the survey respondents show a considerably individual 
heterogeneity regarding the acceptance levels. Main drivers we identified are gender, political 
affiliation, general expectations towards the behavior and prerequisites of the migrants, as well as 
perceptions about crime rates and the impact on the welfare systems, i.e. the expected burden for 
tax payers. Female respondents show less acceptance towards economic migrants but more to 
environmental migrants, who are victims of external patterns. This finding is in line with several 
cross-national studies fining higher acceptance rates of women in the context of immigration and 
ethnic diversity and higher sensitivity for environmental issues (Semyonov and Glikman, 2009; 
Ponce, 2017; Mohai, 1997). An interesting finding is that for the ECON treatment, perceptions 
were not significantly correlated, while political attitudes were. This may be also due to the fact 
that this type is among the most debated cases of migration, displaying a wide range of opinions 
also displayed in the media and public debates. Right-wing voters show significantly less 
acceptance for all migrant types but particularly for economic migrants and self-inflicted 
environmental migrants. Respondents holding the opinion that tax burden will increase are less 
likely to accept political migrants. Respondents assuming, that crime rates will go up with 
increasing immigration depict less acceptance towards political and environmental migrants. The 
general model, showing overall determinants also identifies a negative correlation of acceptance 
for respondents, who think that migration management should be managed outside of the EU, and 
for expectations about similar norms and values.      
 The findings of this paper provide interesting insights for policy makers regarding the 
promotion of positive attitudes towards migrants and refugees. While the results on political party 
affiliation are less surprising and mirror the ongoing public and political debate in Europe, the 
effect of perceptions and general opinions on acceptance level may be less obvious. Most of these 
results are in line with perceptions expressed in recent public opinion polls. In a study on 
welcoming culture in Germany, for instance, 80% of respondents state that they expect a severe 
burden for the social schemes due to immigration
25
. 72% perceive migration as a factor for higher 
crime rates and conflicts between locals and migrants but nevertheless welcome refugees 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017). Interestingly the subjective perception of crime rates pictures a 
trend, which is contrary to official statistics. In Austria, crime rates have shown a constant 
downward trend since 2010, with a particular drop of 5.4% for 2017 compared to 2016. Among 
the different categories of violence only cybercrime and business crime show slightly rising 
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figures. While absolute figures of crimes committed by asylum seekers in Austria have been 
slightly rising in recent years, relative figures show a clearly decreasing trend
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(Bundeskriminalamt Republik Österreich, 2018). In this vein, Bianchi et al. (2012) examined the 
empirical relationship between immigration and crime across Italian provinces and find that rates 
increased only for robbery and an insignificant effect on the overall national crime rate. 
Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015) find in their recent analysis of the correlation between legal 
status of immigrants and crime rates that immigrants accepted for asylum are significantly less 
likely to be involved in criminal activities due to alternative (legal) income opportunities. The 
subjective impression that crime rates are on the rise particularly for more severe types of crime 
such as heavy assault, sexual harassment or even homicide, may be fueled by certain political 
movements or types of media, perverting statistics and promoting particularly catchy and fear-
based headlines.           
 The finding of our study that proponents of an extraterritorial migration management 
show lower acceptance rates, is clearly mirrored in recent political developments in the EU in 
June 2018. EU Governments, particularly Germany and Austria show major concessions to 
claims for stricter migration management from the political right spectrum. On the initiative of 
Germany, 14 Member States negotiated about a reform of EU migration management building on 
closed facilities at the border between Austria and Germany in order to facilitate return or 
permission for asylum application within 48 hours. The Austrian Government shows a 
particularly strict perspective, which is also expected to coin the current EU Council presidency. 
In this context they recently filed a proposal requiring asylum seekers to file their applications 
outside of EU territory (Reuters, 2018).          
 As mentioned in the section on the study design, a limitation of this study is the subject 
pool, consisting of University students only, constituting a rather homogenous and politically 
liberal social group. D׳Hombres and Nunziata (2016) show in their paper a positive effect of 
higher education levels on reported attitude toward diversity and on the assessment of 
immigration’s role in host countries. Similar findings are were also presented in the most recent 
European Social Survey (2018), showing that 66% of high-educated young people are proponents 
of the acceptance and support of immigrants (regardless of their background). This finding is also 
in line with the overall high acceptance levels across the treatments. Further research could shed 
more light on the acceptance rate of different population groups, for example differentiating 
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 The most common types of crime committed by asylum seekers are theft, medium criminal assault and drug crime 
(Bundeskriminalamt Republik Österreich, 2018). 
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between rural and urban populations or different groups of economic strata. A further weakness 
of the design may be that the scenarios are phrased in a way illustrating that the hypothetical 
migrant has not yet left his country of origin but only plans to migrate in the future. Thus, the 
effort of the actual migration, often linked to emotional images, such as migration corridors via 
the sea or the threat of being caught in activities of human trafficking in transitional territories 
such as Libya, may not be counted into the decision about acceptance. Further research could fill 
this gap by adapting the scenario to an actual asylum seeker, present in the country of destination 
and waiting for the decision on his case. 
7. Conclusion  
This paper examines the acceptance levels of hypothetical migrants, i.e. asylum seekers with 
different motivations underlying their decision to migrate to Austria. In a survey-experiment, 
conducted with students at the University of Innsbruck in 2015 – a peak period of the proclaimed 
“refugee crisis”- we tested different treatments covering political, economic and environmental 
reasons for migration. Among environmental migrants, a further differentiation is made between 
externally induced environmental problems due to climate change and self-inflicted based on 
unsustainable use of resources. The major finding shows the highest acceptance rates for political 
migrants, closely succeeded by externally-induced environmental migrants. This finding is 
coherent with the publicly often used terminology referring to climate migrants as climate 
refugees and feeds into the ongoing political debate about the restriction of permission for legal 
asylum to refugees covered by the Geneva Convention. UNHCR and other UN agencies have 
repeatedly advocated a formal admission of climate and disaster migrants as refugees. The lowest 
acceptance rates in our survey experiment are shown for migrants, whose decisions are driven by 
primarily economic reasons. This finding suggests that survey participants applied a fairness 
norm based on the responsibility of the migrant. The analysis of further respondent characteristics 
and perceptions inquired in an appendant survey reveals some interesting further aspects that can 
inform policies addressing migration. Determining characteristics are gender, political party 
affiliation and expectations as well as perceptions about the migrants’ behavior, integration and 




A 1: Knowledge of the Geneva Refugee Convention and acceptance 
About 70% of the respondents (no significant differences between treatments) know who can 
legally apply for asylum in Austria based on the Geneva refugee convention from 1951. We see 
that binary acceptance rates are 9 percentage points lower in POL for people who know this 
person has the right to apply for asylum (Mann Whitney test, p= 0.21).  28 respondents would 
rather deny this person’s basic human right for refugee, from which 22 respondents know it 
exists. Looking at the other three treatments, we see that respondents would rather accept the 
migrant in ECON in 40% of the cases, while acceptance is significantly higher in ENV SI with 
about 65% (Mann Whitney test, p < 0.01). Acceptance rates in ENV CC are significantly higher 
than in ECON and ENV SI and people that don’t know the Geneva Convention have 15 
percentage points higher acceptance rates (Mann Whitney test, p < 0.01). 
 
Notes: Knowledge of the refugee convention  takes the value 1,  i f respondents knew who can and who can’t  



























 POL ECON ENV CC ENV SELF  
No Yes
Respondents knows who can legally apply for asylum.
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A 2: Acceptance levels – OLS with ENV SI as comparison group 
When using ENV SI as the control group, results stay highly significant. ECON shows 0.22 to 
0.45, lesser acceptance levels than ENV SI. This difference is only significant when controlling 
for political interest and party affiliation (p < 0.05). Acceptance levels in POL and ENV CC are 
significantly higher throughout, ranging from 0.53 to 0.67 in all model specifications (p < 0.01). 
 Would you agree that this person can legally migrate to Austria? 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
POL 0.66*** 0.69*** 0.54*** 0.59*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) 
ECON -0.22 -0.22 -0.47** -0.32 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.21) 
ENV CC 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.53*** 0.63*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) 
Female  0.31**   
  (0.15)   
Single  -0.07   
  (0.14)   
Age  -0.00   
  (0.01)   
Religious affiliation  -0.24   
  (0.16)   
Foreign friends  0.45**   
  (0.19)   
Never goes to mess  -0.01   
  (0.15)   
Very interested in migration topic   0.21  
   (0.13)  
Knows the Geneva convention   -0.25*  
   (0.13)  
Left voter   0.33**  
   (0.15)  
Right voter   -2.43***  
   (0.28)  
No party preference   -0.20  
   (0.24)  
Index: Neighborhood    -0.12 
    (0.10) 
Index: Important attributes of immigrants    -0.30*** 
    (0.05) 
Asylum pleas outside the EU    -0.27** 
    (0.13) 
Immigrants steal jobs    -0.97*** 
    (0.29) 
Immigrants cost the welfare state    -0.66*** 
    (0.16) 
Migration increases crime rate    -0.28** 
    (0.13) 
Constant 4.86*** 4.48*** 5.08*** 6.32*** 
 (0.12) (0.39) (0.18) (0.26) 
     
Observations 686 686 686 686 
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.28 
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.19 0.27 
F-test 10.23 4.55 19.48 28.43 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes :  The  dependent  va r iab le  is  acceptance  and ranges  fro m 1 “ re fuse  comple te ly”  to  8  “ suppor t  comp le te ly” .  ENV SI  is  us ed as  




A 3: Binary– Main treatment effects of acceptance rate 
 Marginal Effects: Acceptance rate (>4) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ECON -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.39*** -0.40*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
ENV CC 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ENV SI -0.10* -0.11* -0.08 -0.12* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female  0.08**   
  (0.04)   
Single  -0.01   
  (0.04)   
Age  0.00   
  (0.00)   
Religious affiliation  0.02   
  (0.04)   
Foreign friends  0.08   
  (0.05)   
Never goes to mess  0.00   
  (0.04)   
Very interested in migration topic   0.04  
   (0.04)  
Knows the Geneva convention   -0.11***  
   (0.04)  
Left voter   0.09**  
   (0.04)  
Right voter   -0.56***  
   (0.06)  
No party preference   -0.13*  
   (0.07)  
Index: Neighborhood    -0.03 
    (0.03) 
Index: Important attributes of immigrants    -0.07*** 
    (0.01) 
Asylum pleas outside the EU    -0.10** 
    (0.04) 
Immigrants steal jobs    -0.24** 
    (0.09) 
Immigrants cost the welfare state    -0.21*** 
    (0.05) 
Migration increases crime rate    -0.02 
    (0.04) 
     
Observations 686 686 686 686 
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.20 
Note: The dependent variable acceptance rate is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1  if respondents 
approve migration (acceptance level > 4) and 0 otherwise. Marginal effects were calculated after probit  





A4: Marginal effects of determinants of acceptance rates in each treatment 
 POL ECON ENV CC ENV SI 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Female 0.04 0.02 -0.24** -0.23** 0.08 0.11* 0.03 0.02 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Foreign friends -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.27** 0.17* 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.15) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) 
Index: Neighborhood -0.12*  0.05  -0.01  -0.05  
 (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.05)  
Index: Important attributes  -0.03  -0.02  -0.08***  -0.09***  
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.03)  
Asylum pleas outside the EU -0.12  -0.13  -0.03  -0.17**  
 (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.07)  
Immigrants steal jobs -0.25  -0.09  -0.34**  -0.16  
 (0.18)  (0.23)  (0.15)  (0.16)  
Immigrants cost the welfare state -0.37***  -0.08  -0.09  -0.32***  
 (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (0.08)  
Migration increases crime rate 0.06  -0.00  -0.02  0.04  
 (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.08)  
Interested in migration topic  -0.03  0.21**  -0.00  0.01 
  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
Knows the Geneva convention  -0.07  0.02  -0.22***  -0.06 
  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
Left voter  -0.06  0.13  0.07  0.18** 
  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
Right voter  -0.56***    -0.71***  -0.50*** 
  (0.18)    (0.10)  (0.11) 
No party preference  -0.50***  0.13  -0.18  -0.11 
  (0.17)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (0.12) 
         
Observations 113 113 110 108 242 242 221 221 
Pseudo R-squared 0.31 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.16 
Note: The dependent variable acceptance rate is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1  if respondents 
approve migration (acceptance level > 4) and 0 otherwise. Marginal effects were calculated after probit  












A 5: Opinions about immigration by party affiliation 
 







voter No voter ∆ ∆ ∆ 
Variable Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (1)-(4) 
Index: Neighborhood  2.15 2.26 2.54 2.23 -0.12** -0.39*** -0.09 
 
[0.60] [0.70] [0.95] [0.65] 
   Index: Important attributes of 




[1.17] [1.38] [1.74] [1.74] 
   
Asylum pleas outside the EU 0.65 0.73 0.92 0.68 -0.07* -0.27*** -0.02 
 
[0.48] [0.45] [0.27] [0.47] 
   
Immigrants steal jobs 0.03 0.08 0.45 0.05 -0.05*** -0.42*** -0.02 
 
[0.16] [0.27] [0.50] [0.21] 
   




[0.38] [0.49] [0.20] [0.47] 
   




[0.48] [0.50] [0.20] [0.50] 
   
N 371 180 51 84 
   
F-test of joint significance (F-stat) 
    
10.59*** 73.27*** 5.51*** 
F-test, number of observations 
    
551 422 455 
 
A 6: Randomized Treatments
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In the following you will read a text about a migrant, who wants to travel from his country of 
origin to Austria. Please put yourself in the position of having to decide if you rather reject or 
support the admission of this person to Austria. 
 
ECON-Treatment: 
Mbaya is a 26-year-old fisherman from Chad. He is married and has 2 children of school-age. He 
is also well educated with a degree in business administration. However, due to the precarious 
labor market situation, he does not find an adequate work in his country of origin. Therefore, he 
pursues the same profession as his father and works as a fisherman. Like most people in Chad, 
Mbaya is also a practicing Muslim. 
Chad is located in the Sahel zone of Africa, a transition zone between the adjacent desert area of 
the Sahara in the north and the dry and wet Savanna in the south. The population is increasing 
steadily, which means an increased demand for food. 
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 The original instructions of the treatments and survey questions were provided in German. The translation may of 
course deviate from the connotation of the original text. The original text and wording can be provided by the 





Fishing is mainly operated at Lake Chad, which has a size of around 1350 km². Mbaya can 
supply himself and his family by selling the surplus of his catch. Mbaya enjoys a stable, 
economically independent life based on the living conditions in Chad. Mbaya believes that life in 
Europe would be more lucrative for him. In particular, he believes that his degree in business 
studies will help him to get a suitable job in Austria. Mbaya decides to not continue fishing in his 
country of origin Chad but to try to get to Austria instead. Since he cannot immigrate officially 
without a work permit, he tries to get to Austria somehow. 
  
Would you rather refuse or rather advocate that he can migrate to Austria by legal means? 



















Mbaya is a 26-year-old fisherman from Chad. He is married and has 2 children of school-age. He 
is also well educated with a degree in business administration. However, due to the precarious 
labor market situation, he does not find an adequate work in his country of origin. Therefore, he 
pursues the same profession as his father and works as a fisherman. Like most people in Chad, 
Mbaya is also a practicing Muslim. 
Chad is located in the Sahel zone of Africa, a transition zone between the adjacent desert area of 
the Sahara in the north and the dry and wet Savanna in the south. The population is increasing 




Fishing is mainly operated at Lake Chad, which has a size of around 1350 km².  
 
Mbaya can supply himself and his family by selling the surplus of his catch. Mbaya enjoys a 
stable, economically independent life based on the living conditions in Chad.  
 
Mbaya believes that life in Europe would be more lucrative for him. In particular, he believes that 
his degree in business studies will help him to get a suitable job in Austria. Mbaya decides to not 
continue fishing in his country of origin Chad but to try to get to Austria instead. Since he cannot 
immigrate officially without a work permit, he tries to get to Austria somehow. 
 
The consequences of the civil war in Chad make it difficult for Mbaya and the other residents to 




This is the main reason that Mbaya cannot provide enough for his family. Mbaya decides to stop 
fishing in his homeland Chad and to try to get to Austria instead. Since he officially cannot enter 
the country without a work permit, he tries to get to Austria somehow. 
  
Would you rather refuse or rather advocate that he can migrate to Austria by legal means? 
















        
        
ENV CC-Treatment: 
Mbaya is a 26-year-old fisherman from Chad. He is married and has 2 children of school-age. He 
is also well educated with a degree in business administration. However, due to the precarious 
labor market situation, he does not find an adequate work in his country of origin. Therefore, he 
pursues the same profession as his father and works as a fisherman. Like most people in Chad, 
Mbaya is also a practicing Muslim. 
 
Chad is located in the Sahel zone of Africa, a transition zone between the adjacent desert area of 
the Sahara in the north and the dry and wet Savanna in the south. The population is increasing 







Fishing is mainly operated at Lake Chad, which has a size of around 1350 km².  
 
Mbaya can supply himself and his family by selling the surplus of his catch. Mbaya enjoys a 
stable, economically independent life based on the living conditions in Chad.  
 
Lake Chad has a maximum depth of up to 7 meters. Africa's formerly largest freshwater lake is 
shrinking to one-twentieth of its original size. One of the main reasons for this is the severe 
drought periods caused by climate change. 
 
There is evidence that a major part of the responsibility for climate change can be attributed to 
developed countries, such as the US and European countries. Also Asian countries such as China 
and India drive a high proportion of greenhouse gas emissions, causing drastic climatic changes.  
 
Due to the constantly increasing CO2 emissions of industrial countries and the resulting negative 
effects on Lake Chad, Mbaya and other fishermen face massive existential problems. 
These are mainly the reasons why Mbaya cannot provide enough for his family and tries to 





   
Would you rather refuse or rather advocate that he can migrate to Austria by legal means? 












        
 
ENV SI-Treatment: 
Mbaya is a 26-year-old fisherman from Chad. He is married and has 2 children of school-age. He 
is also well educated with a degree in business administration. However, due to the precarious 
labor market situation, he does not find an adequate work in his country of origin. Therefore, he 
pursues the same profession as his father and works as a fisherman. Like most people in Chad, 
Mbaya is also a practicing Muslim. 
 
Chad is located in the Sahel zone of Africa, a transition zone between the adjacent desert area of 
the Sahara in the north and the dry and wet Savanna in the south. The population is increasing 






Fishing is mainly operated at Lake Chad, which has a size of around 1350 km².  
 
Mbaya can supply himself and his family by selling the surplus of his catch. Mbaya enjoys a 
stable, economically independent life based on the living conditions in Chad.  
 
The so-called "bycatch" of unintentionally caught fish is unregulated in Chad and is ignored by 
Mbaya and other fishermen as well as any catch quotas to ensure fish stocks for the future. These 
are the main reasons for the steadily decreasing fishing quotas for fishermen in Chad. 
Further problems include deforestation of the surrounding trees and over-exploitation of the lake 
to irrigate arable land, which is increasingly damaging Lake Chad and also contributing to the 
reduction of fish stocks. 
For all these reasons, fish stocks have fallen dramatically in recent years, allowing Mbaya to 
derive less from fishing. Due to this self-inflicted reason, the supply of his family is now in 
danger. Mainly because of these facts, Mbaya can no longer provide enough for his family and 
instead wants to try to migrate to Austria, in order to be able to be able to take care for his family 
in the future. Since he officially cannot enter without a work permit, he tries to get to Austria 
somehow. 
Would you rather refuse or rather advocate that he can migrate to Austria by legal means? 


















Would you rather reject or advocate a family reunification for Mbaya as soon as he finds a job?  












        
Focus questions 1 
Have you ever dealt in depth with the issue of migration? 
Please select only one of the following answers: 
 Yes, I watch documentations and/or read articles about the topic regularly.  
 I deal with the topic sometimes but not regularly.  
 No, I do not deal with this topic. It is not really of interest to me.  
 
Who among the following persons can count on a positive asylum decision according to the 
Geneva Convention? 
Please select all answers applicable: 
 People who flee from their country of origin due to conflict situations.  
108 
 
 People, who flee from their country of origin due to economic disadvantages  
 People, who flee from their country of origin due to changes of the environment and/or the 
ecosystem.  
 
What factors do you consider important for immigrants who want to live in Austria?  
Please select all appropriate answers: 
 Immigrants should have a similar level of education  
 Immigrants should at least have a basic knowledge of the German language.  
 Immigrants should not be too culturally different from us  
 Age should play an important role.  
 Immigrants should mainly cover the demand for  
 Immigrants should have the same religion.  
 Immigrants should have the same skin color  
 None of the criteria mentioned above seem to be important for me.  
 
Do you think immigrants cover the labor shortage in Austria or take jobs away from Austrians? 
Please select only one of the following answers: 
Immigrants help to cover the labor shortage.  
Immigrants stake away jobs of Austrians.  
I don’t know.  
 
Do you think that immigrants take more from the Austrian state (social benefits etc.) than they 
contribute to it? (labor force, culture, etc.).  
Please select only one of the following options: 
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 Immigrants take more than they contribute.  
 Immigrants give more than they contribute.  
 I don’t know.  
 
How does the rate of criminal acts change in Austria, with more migrants according to your 
opinion?  
Please select the appropriate answer: 
strong increase moderate increase stays the same moderate decrease strong decrease 
     
 
Focus questions 2 
Asylum pleas should not be processed on European territory but abroad beforehand 
Please select the answer applicable: 
I agree  I partly agree I am indifferent I partly disagree I disagree 
     
 
Please describe your neighborhood.  
Please select the appropriate answer for each item: 
  very high high medium low very low 
How high is the 
proportion of foreigners?      
How high is the crime 
rate?      
How high is the rate of 




All people within a country should agree on the same norms and values  
Please select the appropriate answer:  
I agree  I partly agree I am indifferent I partly disagree I disagree 
     
 
Do you have friends of different ethnic background (skin color etc.) and/or religion?  
Please select the appropriate answer: 
Yes, many Yes, a few No, none 
   
 
Sociodemographic questions: 
Which party would you most likely choose? 






Die Grünen  








Do you belong to a religion?  




How often to you go to church? 






Your Family status: 
Please select only one of the following responses:  
single  
married  
in a relationship  
 
Gender:  






How old are you?  
Please enter your response here: 
_______________   
 
Your field of study is… 
Please select only one of the following answers: 
Architecture  
Business, Economics, Statistics, International Economics  
Educational Sciences  
Biology 
Geo- and Atmospheric Sciences  
Mathematics, IT, Physics 
Political Sciences, Sociology  
Psychology, Sports Sciences 
Technical Sciences  
Religious Sciences, Theology  







What is your country of origin?  
Please fill in your response here: 
_______________  
  
Please enter your e-mail address to participate in the lottery.  
 
Please fill-in your answer here:  
_______________    
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Conflict and discrimination among different religious groups are widespread in many societies 
worldwide and often seen as a downside of religion and religious worship. Surprisingly, 
discrimination exists although religions teach tolerance and respect for others. Yet it is unclear 
whether religion is indeed a driving force for discrimination. We provide novel experimental 
evidence from Ethiopia showing that participation in religious rituals promotes equal treatment of 
religious in-group and out-group members in terms of the amount donated in a simple 
experimental game. While we observe discrimination in the sample of people who were about to 
attend church, discrimination is not present among those who just attended church. Moreover, we 
identify perceived religious conflict, frequency of attending religious services, and strength of 
moral convictions as key factors that moderate the effect of religious worship on discrimination.  
 
JEL codes: C9, D7, J7 
Keywords: Religion; conflict; altruism; discrimination; worship; Ethiopia 
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1. Introduction  
Across cultures and eras, religion has always been an enormously important facet of  mankind. 
One major trait of religions is their ability to categorize and bind people into groups by 
consolidating a common value system, intended to restrict for instance selfish or further socially 
undesired behavior. On the downside, it is exactly this major trait of religion that makes 
adherents particularly vulnerable to external manipulations and moral suasion, which may  foster 
inter-group conflict and a tendency towards out-group hostility. In the most extreme case, this 
may even result in blatantly aggressive behavior such as murder-suicide, as displayed by 
fanatically fundamentalist groups operating under the disguise of religion. Besides these extreme 
acts carried out by minorities, a religious dimension has been prevalent in many large scale and 
long enduring conflicts that the world has seen and it has been identified by numerous scholars as 
an important driver of conflict. Yet, one cannot draw a causal link between religion and conflict, 
since many wars carried out in the name of religion are in reality motivated by other reasons 
(Armstrong, 2014;  Juergensmeyer et al., 2015).  
Focusing solely on the view of religion as a value system providing behavioral guidance, 
the promotion of pro-social values becomes evident in frequently cited passages in the Bible and 
the Qur’an.: “Love your neighbor as yourself. There is no commandment greater than these” 
(The New Testament, The Great Commandment, Mark 12:31); “Humankind shall pursue the 
highest good for self and others, and thereby fulfills the purpose of creation in service and 
worship of God” (The Qur'an, 51:56). However, beside the essential virtues of honesty, solidarity 
and pro-sociality, the original texts also feature more ambiguous passages that discriminate 
against non-believers.
1
 Thus, one cannot deny a history of deliberate interpretations that have 
fostered extremism and aggressive behavior, as much as one cannot deny the reconciliatory 
power emanating from religious organisations and their leaders to overcome religious intolerance 
or nationalism – such as Nobel peace laureates and bishops Desmond Tutu in South Africa or 
Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo in East Timor, Mother Theresa and Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai 
Lama as well as Nathan Söderblom who received the peace prize in 1930 “for his efforts to 
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 Deuteronomy 13:1-5 "If there arise among you a prophet, ... saying, Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not 
known, and let us serve them...And that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams, shall be put to death...So shalt thou put 
the evil away from the midst of thee...." or 2 Corinthians 6:14 "Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: 




involve the churches not only in work for ecumenical unity, but also for world peace” 
(Lundestand, 2014).  
So far, the relationship between religion and conflict has been mainly explored at the 
country level, with a strong focus on violent intra- and interstate conflict. Our study takes a more 
disaggregated approach based on individual behavior, and aims to contribute to our 
understanding of the interplay between religion and conflict by using experimental methods in 
order to assess how worship affects discrimination between religious groups. This is the first 
study to examine the effect of religious worship on pro-social behavior and discrimination using 
a controlled experiment in a real-world context. More generally, we will relate our work not only 
to the literature on the relationship between religion and conflict, but mainly on the relationship 
between religion and social behavior in general. Indeed, belonging to a religious in-group is not 
for free. Performing religious rituals is often very costly and acts as a signaling device to other 
members, as it is more costly for freeloaders to perform these acts (Iannaccone, 1998). Thus, the 
collective practice of religious rituals may foster social cohesion and promote cooperation and 
other forms of pro-sociality within religious groups (Durkheim, 1912; Putnam, 2000). At the 
same time, it may also spur parochial altruism and out-group conflict. 
Our method circumvents several methodological issues that impede identification of 
causal relationships in the existing literature, as described in detail in the following section. 
Moreover, it combines the advantages of the experimental approach with realism and the 
opportunity to study behavior in the field (Levitt & List, 2009; List, 2011). More specifically, we 
exploit exogenously manipulated participation in a religious ritual (church attendance) in order to 
estimate the impact of religious worship on social behavior within a context of previous religious 
conflict (the city of Jimma in Ethiopia) and in Addis Ababa (the capital city of Ethiopia without 
open conflict among religious groups). Our approach measures short-term effects of religious 
worship on social behavior, which we consider particularly salient given that episodes of conflict 
often start directly after worship. Such a worship effect can be found frequently in media 
coverage of religiously motivated conflict, such as the Friday riots in the Arab Spring or other 
recent riots after prayers in many different country and religious contexts (e.g., Urumqi,China, 
7/2009; Uttar Pradesh, 8/2013; Mombasa, 02/2014; Jerusalem, 7/2017).
2
 The worship effects 
might arise due to parochial altruism and ingroup-outgroup dynamics and the opportunity for 
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 Also, the Monday demonstrations in the former German Democratic Republic followed church visits. Thus, the 




simplified group coordination and conjuncture after worship. However, coordination alone is 
unlikely to explain these riots alone, as the coordination problem can already be solved before 
worship and also at other occasions such as sport or music events.  
We measure social behavior and discrimination in terms of the amount donated in a 
simple experimental game that is commonly used to measure altruism and other-regarding 
preferences, called the dictator game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994). This game is 
also frequently used to study preference-based discrimination (Fershtman etc al., 2001; Adida et 
al., 2015). In this game participants are given an endowment by the experimenter along with the 
opportunity to donate (part of) this endowment to another participant. We chose to conduct our 
study in Ethiopia, which allowed us to exploit the fact that within the country there exist regions 
with very different recent histories regarding religious conflict. In particular, we ran experiments 
in two cities. The capital, Addis Ababa, is a predominantly peaceful site featuring co-existence of 
Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and the two largest religious minority groups Protestantism and 
Catholicism. Inter-religiously motivated unrest and conflict between Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims has remained almost entirely absent in Addis Ababa throughout history and recent 
years. By contrast, the second study site, Jimma, experienced severe unrests between Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims in March 2011.  
In our first study site (Addis Ababa) we document initial (i.e., pre-church visit) 
discrimination between orthodox Christians and Muslims, with the latter receiving lower 
transfers than the former. However, this difference disappears in the post-church sample, in 
which both groups receive very similar (and statistically indistinguishable) amounts. We interpret 
this as evidence that the participation in religious rituals promotes equal treatment of religious in-
group and out-group members. In our second study site (Jimma) we document initial reverse 
discrimination, with Christians receiving lower donations than Muslims in the pre-church sample. 
While the direction of this difference is surprising, we offer some possible explanations for it. 
What is interesting, however, is that – even in this setting of previous conflict – religious worship 
leads to equal transfers for Christian and Muslim recipients in the post-church sample. We 
believe that our results highlight one factor that can help explaining the long-lasting peaceful 
coexistence of people with different religious faith in many settings, as worship may reduce 




We consider possible moderating factors for the documented effect of worship, the first 
being the frequency of attending religious services. We show that there are differential effects for 
regular and sporadic church goers: While regular church goers are the ones more strongly 
affected by worship in Addis Ababa, the opposite is true in Jimma where conflict prevails. In this 
setting, discrimination is observed only among participants who attend religious services 
infrequently. We also show how having strong moral convictions about what is right and wrong 
is associated with less discrimination, especially after church and in the conflict-free context. 
Finally, an important moderating factor is the perceived strength of religious tensions. Both pre-
church discrimination and the elimination of discrimination in the after-church sample are driven 
by those participants who indicate that they perceive relatively stronger religious tensions. 
Given the many potential confounding factors between Jimma and Addis Ababa, conflict 
can only be one of several potential explanations for the different observed patterns between the 
two sites. While those two cases were carefully selected in order not to confound the religious 
out-group dimension with income levels, immigration or minority status, the interpretation of our 
results regarding the differences between Addis and Jimma should not be interpreted as “causal 
evidence” but rather as initial, suggestive evidence on the nature of conflict and religion in a 
specific context. 
 
2. Related Literature 
The relationship between religion and various aspects of social behavior has been studied 
extensively in the social sciences. One stream of the literature focuses on self-reported religiosity 
and how this correlates with higher charitable donations, volunteerism and an increased honesty 
(Sosis & Ruffle, 2003; Trimble, 1997). There also exists evidence that societies belonging to 
world religions or to religions with a more moralistic, knowledgeable and punishing god are more 
pro-social than other societies (Henrich et al., 2010; Purzycki et al., 2016). Interestingly, the 
emergence of moralizing religions increases historically with greater societal size, which may be 
an indicator of the role of religion as a “controlling device” of governing elites (Roes & 
Raymond, 2003). Yet, although insightful to the relationship between religion and social 
behavior, these studies cannot reveal causal mechanisms. Religiosity may be correlated with 
unobserved factors that promote pro-sociality or the relationship may be reverse and pro-social 






 A second strand of the literature uses experimental priming methods to make subjects 
subconsciously think about religious beliefs, religious practice or religious belongings. The 
cumulated evidence supports the non-experimental findings. There seem to be causal effects of 
religiosity on honesty (Bering, 2006; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008), generosity (Ahmed & Salas, 
2011; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Azim F. Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007), and an increase in 
cooperation (Ahmed & Salas, 2011; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011), which has been 
confirmed in a recent meta-analysis covering 93 studies of which 25 are on pro-sociality (A. F. 
Shariff, Willard, Andersen, & Norenzayan, 2016).  
The evidence on pro-sociality and religion has mainly focused on behavior towards 
religious in-group members (or left the receiver unspecified) which does not allow to investigate 
religions’ role for conflict. However, there is also ample evidence that religious pro-sociality is 
uniquely applicable to in-group targets and outgroups are treated less favorably (Blogowska & 
Saroglou, 2011; Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key, & Busath, 2007; Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 
2009; Henne, 2012; Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2010; LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, & Finkle, 
2012; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Ramsay, Pang, Shen, & Rowatt, 2014; Saroglou, Pichon, 
Trompette, Verschueren, & Dernelle, 2005). This may explain why religion (as ethnicity) has 
also often been cited as a reason for between-group conflicts within or among societies and 
organizations with different faith-based beliefs. In political science literature, animosities 
between ethnic and religious groups has often been seen as the motive for the onset of conflict 
(Huntington, 1996; Reynal-Querol, 2002). Religious differences, even more than language or 
ethnic differences, are exclusive (one can speak two languages or be of mixed ethnicity but in 
most cases one only adheres to one religion) and imply different worldviews and social 
relationships. With homophily as a driving force in the background, individuals will tend to form 
network ties with others who share a similar set of beliefs that tend to be polarized along 
ideological or religious lines (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001).This connection may 
have grown stronger in recent millennia as part of the evolution of complex societies and 
competition for scarce resources (Scott Atran & Henrich, 2010). Huntington argues that religion 
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 More long-term aspects of religion are detected in correlational analyses, leaving us with a number of alternative 
conceptualizations (belonging to a denomination, integration in the religious community, aspects of believing, 
having fundamentalist ideas, the share of Protestants in a country, religious diversity, etc) and potential confounds of 
religion over time, which all make it impossible to answer the question on the direct effect of worship on 




is often the primary force that motivates and moves humans – not political ideology or economic 
interests – and one can more easily solve economic or political disputes than religious ones.  
On the other hand, religious outgroup bias may simply be due to stereotyping or may be 
no different from using secular primes as group identity. Indeed a meta-analysis covering 77 
experimental studies on discrimination found discrimination in about one-third of cases and that 
discrimination against the out-group was more likely when identity is artificially induced in the 
laboratory than when the subject pool is divided by ethnicity, religion or nationality (Lane, 2016). 
This reasoning is in line with an economic explanation of conflict which does not see grievances 
and motives as driver for conflict but economic opportunities such as the possibility to extort 
natural resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Obviously, not all societies with religious 
polarization necessarily end up in a civil war. One way to overcome these identification problems 
at the fundamental micro level and to test whether religion is indeed a driver of conflict would be 
to show that outgroup bias increases with attending religious rituals. This is the approach we use 
in this paper. 
Turning to literature that looks explicitly at religiously motivated conflict, self-reported 
measures of regular attendance at religious services indeed predicts out-group hostility and even 
willing martyrdom and religious ideology of a group greatly increases the number of deaths from 
a suicide attack (Ginges et al., 2009; Henne, 2012). Similar findings emerge for representative 
samples of religious Indians, Russians, Mexicans, British, and Indonesians: Greater ritual 
attendance predicts both declared willingness to die for one’s deities, and belief that other 
religions are responsible for problems in the world (Ginges et al., 2009). Similarly, religious 
priming can promote discrimination and prejudice or increase aggressive behavior towards 
strangers (Bushman et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2010). In general, religion - just as any group – is 
likely to enhance commitment to coalitional identities, even independent from the religious belief 
per se (S. Atran, 2003; Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006). In that sense, religious priming 
may affect behavior by increasing the salience of group identity (Charness, Rigotti, & Rustichini, 
2007; Chen & Li, 2009; Eckel & Grossman, 2005). However, for methodological reasons, these 
studies do not allow concluding that religion is a driver of conflict. In order to circumvent these 
problems we test whether a religious stimuli, like worshipping, affects the outgroup bias.  
Finally, with respect to evidence on participation in religious rituals and how that may 




documented both a positive effect of participation in religious rituals with respect to donations as 
well as a negative effect of contribution in a public good game during Ramadan as compared to 
after Ramadan (Akay, Karabulut, & Martinsson, 2015; Xygalatas et al., 2013). However, none of 
the existing field studies have analyzed the effect of religious rituals on out-group discrimination. 
 
3. Experimental Methods and Procedure 
We measure pro-social behavior and discrimination by means of donations in an incentivized 
(i.e., non-hypothetical) dictator game towards religious out-group and religious in-group 
members. Subjects received an initial endowment of 80 Birr (equivalent to US$3.9 in purchasing 
power parity terms) and were asked to decide how much of this amount in steps of 10 (0, 10, …, 
80) they wanted to transfer to another person outside of the session, who remained entirely 
passive. Subjects were randomly assigned to a counterpart with either a typical Muslim or 
Orthodox Christian name. The Muslim names chosen were Osman, Hussen and Mohammed, the 
Orthodox Christian names Getachew, Moges and Gezachew. In order to identify these names, we 
conducted a survey on ten typical “Muslim” and “Orthodox Christian” sounding names and asked 
about peoples’ association with the respective religious affiliations (N=52, see Table 1 for the 
survey results of the chosen names). Participants were told that their partner was from the same 
city but was never in the same session. Actual counter decisions were taken by people contacted 
via the names survey prior to the experiments. The people with the six specific names were 
university students, made decisions, and were also paid after the experiments. As recipients in our 
study were always students from Addis Ababa, there should not be any income differences on the 

















Notes. Coding ranging from 1 (Definitely Christian/Muslim) to 10 (Definitely not 
Christian/Muslim). N=52; Asked separately for Christian sounding names (Getachew, Gezachew, 
Moges) and Muslim sounding names (Hussen, Osman, Mohammed). 
 
In order to identify a causal effect of religious worship on discrimination we compare 
behavior before and after church attendance in a between-subjects experimental design, which 
limits potential concerns about demand effects and a social desirability bias in the answers of 
respondents.
4
 More precisely, we carried out 20 experimental sessions at five study sites in two 
cities in Ethiopia in August 2014, using a sample of 371 participants. All participants were 
Orthodox Christians, recruited one week before the day of the experiment and some at the day of 
the experiment.
5 
The experiment took place on Sundays in two separate sessions, one starting 
early in the morning including only participants who had not yet been attending a service at 
church, and a second session including only participants immediately after experiencing the event 
of worship. Before and after the experiments, participants were asked to answer an individual 
survey on socio-economic and demographic characteristics, religious beliefs and activities. These 
surveys, along with mean responses by participants in each of the two study sites, are shown in 
Table 2 below. In addition, in Appendix 4 we also report the ethnic composition of our 
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 A within-subjects design would raise a whole lot of new problems (demand effects, desire to give consistent 
answers, endowment effects, possibly lower participation rates due to a longer duration, attrition over time during the 
experiment, contamination if subjects talk to each other between the two sessions, and so on). 
5
 Potential participants were randomly targeted by research assistants while coming out of church after they had 
attended the Sunday service. They were provided with an invitation letter (see Appendix 6) and asked to convey their 
names and telephone numbers to be contacted few days later as a reminder and confirmation of their participation. 
Invitations were then followed up by phone calls and SMS reminders. Invited participants were randomly allocated 




participants and discuss how this relates to behavior in the experiment. In any case, it is important 
to refer to Table 2, which confirms that randomization has been successful and that the before 
and after church samples do not vary significantly in terms of any relevant observable 
characteristics of the participants. This also clearly suggests that attrition was not selective in any 
of the two cities.  
 




















Age 25.31 27.22 23.16 24.37 
Gender .34 .24 .24 .26 
Born in Addis/Jimma .537 .62 .371 .451 
Education 2.26 2.22 2.45 2.36 
Marital Status 2.42 2.55 2.68 2.44 
Householdsize 1.97 2.59 1.72 1.89 
Reduction of Meals .17 .22 .23 .26 
Household Income .92 .93 .70 .76 
Radio .78 .83 .89 .80 
Tv .90 .75 .74 .66 
Fridge .39 .42 .32 .29 
Washing Machine .123 .07 .03 .08 
Stove .43 .41 .39 .34 
Sewing Machine .03 .05 .03 .03 
Car .06 .14 .01 .04 
Motorcycle .01 .02 .04 .08 
Generator .03 .02 0 .03 
Cattle .11 .11 .24 .26 
Sheep .07 .06 .17 .20 
Notes: Joint Chi² Test of Significance Addis and Jimma .455. p-values show no significant differences of 
before and after chuch samples. Closest p-values to cutoff (0.05) are Age in Addis (0.06) and Car in Addis 
(0.08). All other values are >0.1 showing no significant differences in the samples in Addis and Jimma. 
Coding for Education: 1. None, 2. Elementary, 3. High School, 4. College, 5. Master Degree. Coding for 
Income: 1. 0 – 1,000 Birr, 2. 1,001 – 3,000 Birr, 3. 3,001 – 5,000 Birr, 4. 5,001 – 7,000 Birr, 5. 7,001-
10,000 Birr, 6. More than 10,000 Birr. 
 
In order to explore the generalizability of our findings and to have evidence from two 
research sites with different recent experiences with respect to religiously motivated conflict, we 




characterized by a largely peaceful coexistence of different religious groups and in Jimma 
(N=179), a city that has experienced profound religious conflict between Christians and Muslims 
in the recent decade (see Appendix A2 for more details on the two study sites). All sessions were 
carried out in parallel in each city by five different teams, in order to avoid information spillover 
effects between the study sites due to time lags. Each team consisted of three persons (moderator, 
facilitator, cashier/registration), without presence of any of the principal researchers. One local 
research coordinator was assigned to handle on-site supervision and coordination.  
One concern with our design is that there might be a confound of time of day, which may 
be related to tiredness or emotional state when comparing people before vs. after religious 
service. While evidence on cognitive depletion and pro-sociality is rather mixed, it could still be 
that people make more intuitive decision when being tired. In order to rule out this possibility we 
exploit the data we collected with the multidimensional mood questionnaire tailored to capture 
internal mood and emotional state (Steyer et al., 1997). As Table 3 reveals, there were no 
significant differences in any of the mood dimensions between the before and after church 
sample, in Addis or in Jimma.  
 
Table 3: Balancing tests for mood dimensions, before and after church attendance 
















sleepy 1.03 .78 1.05 1.09 
good 2.09 2.32 3.09 2.78 
at ease 1.97 2.07 2.32 2.13 
unhappy 1.52 1.53 1.61 1.63 
alert 2.89 3.08 3.30 3.01 
discontent 1.84 1.76 1.75 1.88 
tense 1.31 1.67 1.6 1.74 
happy 2.75 2.48 2.76 2.82 
nervous 1.17 1.21 1.09 1.17 
exhausted 1.29 1.28 1.28 1.25 
calm 2.95 2.97 3.11 2.84 
blessed 2.8 2.68 3.07 3.05 
loved 3.16 2.86 3.27 3.04 
Notes: Joint Chi² Test of Significance: Addis: .512; Jimma .844. p-values show no significant differences 
of before and after chuch samples. All values are >0.1 showing no significant differences in the samples in 





The experimental sessions were carried out in settings such as school or University 
buildings or cafés, close to the churches where people had been invited in order to provide a 
neutral setting for the research and avoid decision biases due to religious or other strong 
contextual environments. Due to security concerns and logistic demands in Jimma, four out of 
five sessions were carried out at Jimma University. Direct transfer for the participants from and 
to their church was provided before and after the sessions to avoid time delays and 
communication between their presence at church and their participation in the experiment.  
Studies of religion and pro-sociality have been criticized for various methodological 
shortcomings (Galen, 2012). The advantages of our methodological approach can be summarized 
as follows: We use an incentivized rather than a hypothetical outcome variable, while our 
explanatory variable “church attendance” is neither self-reported nor primed but is randomly 
allocated to subjects. The experiments are performed with non-students outside the lab in a 
naturally occurring setting, we use a between-subject design which is more conservative and is 
less prone to experimenter demand effects and social desirability effects of participants, and we 
conduct the experiments around ten churches and two cities with different socio-demographic 
compositions in order to increase the generalizability of our findings. 
We must note that, after completion of the dictator game, our participants were asked to 
participate in a second short experimental situation, called the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & 
McCabe, 1995). This game is designed to capture trust and trustworthiness among participants 
and we administered it in order to complement our measure of pro-sociality from the dictator 
game and to examine the extent to which these findings generalize to further aspects of social 
behavior. We show that the behavioral patterns are very similar to those observed in the dictator 
game. Overall, we find no discrimination before or after worship. In addition, there is some 
evidence of discrimination (in the form of lower levels of trust) towards Muslim participants in 
Addis Ababa, the difference again disappearing in the after-church sample. Hence, as in the 
dictator game, the effect of religious worship does not increase discriminatory behavior in the 
dimension of trust. However, due to the way the game was designed (using a between-subjects 
method and having both senders and receivers) our sample size in this game is considerably 
smaller, about one half of the sample in the dictator game, compromising statistical power in the 
analysis. Another methodological caveat is that the trust game was always played after the 








4.1. How does worship affect discrimination? 
Among the sample that played the dictator game before church in Addis Ababa, donations 
are significantly higher towards the in-group. Comparing mean transfers from our subjects to 
participants with Orthodox Christian and with Muslim names reveals a significant discrimination 
against Muslim individuals before church attendance in Addis Ababa (32.56 Birr vs. 23.75 Birr; 
p=0.02, Mann-Whitney U test). In the after church group, however, there is no significant 
difference in transfers and recipients with Christian and with Muslim names are shown equal 
levels of generosity (28.44 Birr vs. 27.66 Birr; p=0.69, Mann-Whitney U test). This is also shown 
in the left panel of Figure 1. 
Interestingly, the pattern is partly reversed in the city of Jimma in which religious conflict 
has been more salient in the past: Donations before church are higher towards the Muslim out-
group, but again the effect of worship is to eliminate the difference and lead to equal treatment in 
the second sample. In the city of Jimma transfers before church show a reversed pattern 
compared to Addis Ababa, with Muslims receiving higher transfers than Orthodox Christians 
(22.97 Birr vs. 30.51 Birr, p=0.08; z = -1.71). After church, discrimination again disappears and 
transfers to Muslims (24.62 Birr) and to Christians (27.14 Birr) are statistically indistinguishable 












Figure 1: Mean transfers in the Dictator Game (including 95% confidence intervals) 
  
 
Table 4 shows the results of Tobit regressions (including church fixed effects) with 
individual transfers in the dictator game as the dependent variable.
6
 Column (1) shows that, 
before church, subjects in Addis Ababa are significantly less generous towards recipients with a 
Muslim name compared to recipients with a Christian name. The magnitude of this effect is very 
sizeable at around 10 Birr. In contrast to this, the difference is close to zero and insignificant after 
church as indicated by the joint coefficient (Muslim recipient + Muslim recipient x After church). 
The results from the city of Jimma, reported in Column (2), also show that participants from the 
two religious groups receive equal transfers on average in the after-church sample. The notable 
difference to Addis Ababa, however, is that the initial, before-church discrimination this time 
favors Muslim recipients and the magnitude of this discrimination is roughly the same as the 
discrimination in favor of Christian recipients found in Addis Ababa. The negative interaction 
term Muslim recipient x After church reveals that Muslim recipients receive substantially lower 
transfers before than after church in Jimma.
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This surprising pattern could potentially be explained as part of the ongoing reconciliation 
process since the 2011 riots (see Appendix A2 for details). In particular, explanatory factors 
could be feelings that come along the psychological processing of conflict such as fear or a 
reluctance to jeopardize the reconciliation process, or just a high sensitivity of the prevailing 
conflict and a resulting attempt to act in a more socially desirable way.
7
 Presumably, the in-group 
experience of joint worship then decreases the conflict perceptions in favor of a stronger 
consciousness of the value of the own peer group. In order to explore potential mediating 
channels, in the next section we will focus on differences between the two locations in the 
perception of conflict and morality as well as in the frequency of church visits.    
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 Similar results are known from gender discrimination experiments where subjects demonstrate slight but significant 
favoritism towards the opposite gender (Lane, 2016). Since gender discrimination in the labor market is pervasive it 
may be that these experiments do not adequately capture the real world setting. For example, subjects might 
deliberately behave according to a social norm or what is socially desirable. Likewise, the pre-church results from 
Jimma may either stem from socially desirable behavior due to the sensitivity of the conflict setting or they may 




Table 4. Transfers in the dictator game 
 Addis Ababa Jimma 
 (1) (2) 
Muslim recipient -10.363** 11.663** 
 (4.273) (5.761) 
After church -3.697 5.811 
 (4.569) (5.313) 
Muslim recipient x After church 9.275 -17.095** 
 (6.322) (7.741) 
Constant 28.078*** 29.790*** 
 (5.386) (6.078) 
No. of observations 192 179 
No. of censored observations (left/right) 35/4 42/5 
F-test on the restriction: 
Muslim recipient + Muslim recipient x After 
church =0 
p= 0.814 p= 0.280 
Notes. Tobit regressions with church fixed effects (N=5 churches). Dependent variable: Transfers in the 
dictator game, left-censored at 0 and right-censored at 80. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
4.2. Further dimensions and heterogeneous treatment effects  
The underlying motives for giving money in the dictator game or the effects of worship might be 
very heterogeneous in our population, depending on an individual’s perception of conflict and 
strength of religious beliefs. Thus, in this section we present further correlational evidence based 
on self-reported strength of religious conflict, moral convictions, and whether people are regular 
church goers. These analyses are meant to uncover certain patterns underlying our main findings 
and should not be interpreted as causal effects. This section will show that our main result on the 
elimination of discrimination after worship is robust to subsample analyses, and also that 





a) Perception of conflict 
This analysis is based on our post-experimental survey and the question relating to the perception 
of religious conflict (which is significantly higher in Jimma than in Addis Ababa, ρ=0.16, 
p=0.00, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient see Table A1).
8
 The question we use was 
phrased like this: “To what extent do the following problems occur in your community/kebele?” 
where religious tension was one item (see Table A4). Possible answers were: doesn't apply at all, 
applies slightly, applies moderately, applies mostly and applies completely. Our dummy variable 
for perceived conflict is one for individuals stating at least a slight perception of conflict. One 
might expect heterogeneous responses particularly for people perceiving a religious tension  and 
being asked to donate money to someone from a different religion. In Addis, people who perceive 
religious tensions donate 26 Birr on average to Muslim recipients before church, while those not 
perceiving a conflict transfer about 21 Birr. After church these differences become much more 
pronounced (34 vs. 23). In Jimma, people who perceive religious tensions transfer 35 tokens 
before church on average to Muslim recipients, compared to 25 tokens for people who do not 
perceive such tensions. We have already speculated that this might be due to fear or an effort 
towards reconciliation. A reversal is observed after worship: People who stated that they perceive 
religious tensions transfer 21 tokens on average to Muslims, while those who do not perceive a 
conflict transfer 29 tokens. Thus, after church, perceived conflict translates into a very strong 
reduction of transfers to Muslims, from 35 to 21 tokens. A summary of this first analysis is that 
the role of worship and the perception of conflict differs between the two sites and may help 
explain the reversed behavioral pattern in Jimma.  
In Table 5 we present regressions with the same specifications as in Table 2 but using a 
sample split for people who perceive at least some religious tension in their community. This 
analysis reveals strong differences between the two samples. In Addis Ababa, the significant 
negative coefficient on Muslim recipient coupled with the significant positive interaction term 
Muslim recipient x After church in column (2) show that discrimination against the religious out-
group as well as the strong potential of worship to reduce this discrimination are driven by those 
participants for which religious tensions are relatively more salient. The same pattern is seen in 
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 The other variables reported in Table A1, “People from different religions can be good friends”, “I think it is good 
for a society if it is multi-religious”, and frequency of contact to people from other religions are also significantly 
higher in Jimma, which seems to support the idea that higher donations to Muslims before worship are due to 




Jimma (the site with stronger exposure to conflict), where in the presence of perceived religious 
tension reverse discrimination (i.e., against the religious in-group) is particularly pronounced and 
disappears after worship (see column 4). Thus, this analysis clearly points towards a decisive role 
of perceived religious tensions in shaping the relationship between worship and discrimination. 
Additionally, we show the effect of perceived conflict for the pooled data set (columns 5 
and 6). In the pooled sample, the coefficients of interest are insignificant not only in the 
subsample that perceives religious tensions, but also among those participants for which this is 
not the case. This is hardly surprising given that initital discrimination in the two cities runs in the 
opposite direction, and therefore the effects observed in Addis Ababa and Jimma in columns (2) 
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 The pooled analysis highlights one caveat in using self-reported evaluations of conflict. Methodological 
assessments of international value studies have shown that the resulting values do not represent absolute values, but 
marginal valuations; therefore, they cannot be directly compared in a cross-section. Marginal valuations are strongly 
contextualized, especially relative to reference points (Maseland and Beugelsdijk, 2011). For example, in a region 
with high conflict, marginal valuation of that conflict might be relatively low. Thus, relying on an endogenous self-
reported measure of conflict within one region is unproblematic while one should be cautious applying it across 
regions as people in different locations evaluate conflict to different reference points (even when using the exact 
same question, Likert scale and cut-off to delineate perceived conflict). A careful selection of an exogenous 





Table 5. Transfers in the dictator game depending on whether people perceive religious tension or not 
 Addis Ababa Jimma Pooled 
 No tension Tension No tension Tension No tension Tension 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Muslim recipient -10.735 -12.103** 4.677 16.481** -4.523 2.369 
 (6.527) (5.574) (10.046) (6.536) (5.683) (4.396) 
After church 2.225 -10.280 1.447 8.509 1.408 -0.822 
 (6.625) (6.438) (8.912) (6.390) (5.458) (4.558) 
Muslim recipient x 
After church 
3.244 21.007** -3.175 -26.564*** 1.317 -4.293 
 (8.835) (9.500) (13.164) (9.089) (7.509) (6.629) 
Constant 20.691*** -6.514 28.633*** 28.065*** 36.517*** 32.270*** 
 (1.766) (6.993) (3.855) (7.345) (7.624) (7.056) 
No. of observations 103 89 81 98 184 187 
No. of censored 
observations (left/right) 
24/0 11/4 21/4 21/1 45/4 32/5 
F-test on restriction: 
Muslim recipient + 
Muslim recipient x 
After church =0 
 
p = 0.203 
 
p = 0.241 
 
p = 0.867 
 
p = 0.103 
 
p = 0.526 
 
p = 0.694 
Notes. Tobit regressions with church fixed effects (N=5 churches). Dependent variable: Transfers in the 
dictator game, left-censored at 0 and right-censored at 80. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
 
b) Frequency of religious services 
The effect of worship may further be mediated by how frequently a person goes to church, and 
this may also interact with whether people live in a location with previous religious conflict. We 
asked the following question after the experiments: “Aside from weddings and funerals, how 
often do you attend religious services?” The answer categories ranged from (1) “every day” to (6) 
“a few times a year” and the frequency table is shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. According to 
the mean distribution we made a regression sample split between those saying that they attend 
“once a week” or more often (51% of the sample), and those who attend at most “once or twice a 
month”. Note that there are no significant differences between Addis and Jimma or in the sample 
taken before and after church related to this distinction. There is also no correlation in Jimma 




rank correlation coefficient), while this correlation is negative and significant in Addis (ρ=-0.22, 
p=0.00, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient). In Table 6 we split the sample between regular 
and sporadic church goers, and – as in the case of religious tensions – we find substantial 
differences between the two samples. In Addis Ababa regular church goers  give significantly 
more to Muslims after church than before church (column 1), while for sporadic church goers 
worship has no impact on giving (column 2). However, in Jimma the pattern is quite different: 
Sporadic church goers are the ones discriminating against the in-group before church and against 
the out-group after church, as can be seen in column (4). Hence, it seems that in this conflict-
ridden setting truly religious orthodox Christians do not engage in religiously motivated 
discrimination, while those who attend church only a few times a year do so to a relatively large 
extent. One could interpret the pattern from Table 6 as suggesting that conflict (as proxied by the 
location) induces the less religious people to act according to ingroup-outgroup dynamics after 
being exposed to worship, while truly religious people are reminded of their belief and the related 
value system and tend to treat everyone alike. We further substantiate this idea in the next section 
focusing on moral convictions.  
In columns (5) and (6) we find that the positive effect of worship in reducing religiously 
motivated discrimination among regular church goers (and the negative effect among sporadic 
church goers) is still present – although less pronounced – in the pooled sample. Thus, in contrast 
to the perception of conflict that was shown to have a location-specific moderating effect, the 
mediating factor of regular church visits seems to be more generalizable over the two locations. 
Furthermore, interacting the frequency of attending religious services with perceived conflict 
shows that the effects for regular and sporadic church goers only hold in the subsample of people 







Table 6. Transfers in the dictator game for regular and sporadic church goers 





















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Muslim recipient -14.846** -5.405 4.078 19.054*** -6.205 5.971 
 (6.670) (5.326) (8.835) (7.161) (5.504) (4.597) 
After church -11.322 2.839 -6.323 14.946** -9.198* 8.930* 
 (7.177) (5.862) (6.802) (7.343) (4.981) (4.800) 
Muslim recipient x 
After church 
22.593** -3.881 0.938 -33.627*** 12.773* -17.872*** 
 (9.030) (8.969) (11.605) (9.624) (7.298) (6.629) 
Constant 33.081*** 21.139** 38.015*** 26.575*** 41.058*** 30.600*** 
 (6.421) (9.479) (10.030) (7.045) (8.759) (6.223) 
No. of observations 91 101 88 91 179 192 
No. of censored 
observations 
(left/right) 
17/1 18/3 20/4 22/1 37/5 40/4 
F-test on restriction: 
Muslim recipient + 
Muslim recipient x 
After church =0 
 
p = 0.212 
 
p = 0.196 
 
p = 0.494  
 
p = 0.018 
 
p = 0.168 
 
p = 0.012 
Tobit regressions with church fixed effects (N=5 churches). Dependent variable: Transfers in the dictator 
game, left-censored at 0 and right-censored at 80. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** 
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
c) Moral convictions 
Next, we offer some insights on a further possible mediating factor, namely the strength of moral 
convictions. We rely on a variable measuring the self-reported strength of moral convictions, on 
the 5-point Likert item “There are clear and absolute standards for what is right and wrong”. 
The idea is the following: When deciding on how to split a given sum of money between oneself 
and another (anonymous) person, morality comes into play. People with strong moral values may 




fair share to the other person, independent of that person’s religion. Eventually, people with 
stronger moral values will act in a fairer way. 
 In line with our prior argument, we find that people with stronger moral conviction give 
more to others (p=0.09, Jonckheere-Tersptra test for ordered alternatives; ρ=0.11, p=0.05, 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient). Interestingly, these differences become more 
pronounced in situations where the other person is an adherent of the other religion. In column 1 
of Table 7 one can see that transfers to Muslims steadily decrease from 33.12 (strongly agree) to 
20.85 (strongly disagree) depending on the agreement to the above statement, while transfers to 




As casual inspection of columns (2) and (3) in Table 7 reveals, the significant relationship 
for Muslims is found only in the after church sample (p<0.01 after church, p=0.36 before church, 
Jonckheere-Tersptra tests for ordered alternatives). Thus, acting based on one’s moral compass 
becomes more salient by worship attendance at church. These results suggest that people who 
have strong moral convictions give more than those who do not, especially to the out-group, and 
that acting according to one’s moral convictions is further strengthened by having been exposed 
to worship. Arguably, worshipping raises the costs of acting against one’s moral convictions.  
While morality often only involves concerns about fairness and not doing harm to others, 
this may change in conflict settings or when people feel threatened. According to Haidt (2007), 
ingroup-outgroup dynamics and the importance of loyalty, intuitions about authority and the 
importance of respect and obedience, as well as intuitions about bodily and spiritual purity might 
become more pronounced. Perhaps owing to the still prevailing conflict in Jimma, several 
mechanisms might be at play that are impossible to discern. 
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 These observations are confirmed by a significant Spearman rank correlation coefficient between transfers in the 
dictator game and the strength of moral convictions only in the sample who received Muslim names (ρ=0.19, 





Table 7. Transfers in the dictator game to Muslims (column 1-3) and Christian (column 4-6) names before and 
after church based on answers to the question “There are clear and absolute standards for what is right and 
wrong” 




















Strongly agree 33.12 32.5
 a)















Disagree 25.88 26.97 24.76 25.09 27.05 24.16 
Strongly disagree 20.85 25.45 18.75 30.52 30.00 30.89 
No of observations 201 87 114 170 76 94 
Notes. 
a)
 less than 10 observations  
 
5. Conclusion 
The motivation of this study was to examine the potentially ambiguous role of religion as a 
conflict driver and promoter of pro-social behavior. Religion is the most important institution in 
the life of Ethiopians influencing everyday life by strict calendars of fasting periods and days and 
worship and prayer times (Karbo, 2013). Existing studies would thus suggest that religion, and 
especially costly rituals, would have the potential to promote parochial altruism and out-group 
hostility. Contrary to this, our results display behavioral patterns showing that religious worship 
eliminates discrimination and promotes equal treatment of different religious groups. 
Consequently, our findings do not support the cross-country studies claiming that religious 
differences are drivers of conflict. However, as discussed in the literature review, our findings are 




of religious-value systems in contrast to the high vulnerability to abuse and manipulation of 
religion as can be exerted by political elites and extremist groups to display their power and spur 
conflict.  
One likely reason for the difference between our findings and much of the literature can 
be the different methodology applied. To our knowledge, we are the first to present results from a 
controlled experiment outside the laboratory on the impact of worship on religious 
discrimination. Our methodology circumvents the use of self-reported religiosity and priming 
subjects in the laboratory: While priming can be applied easily in many situations, it has been 
claimed that it has a narrow thematic focus, is non-generalizable, short-lived and context-specific 
(Galen, 2012; Shanks et al., 2013; Tulving & Schacter, 1990).  
While the findings of this study provide solid evidence for a causal effect of religious 
worship at least not increasing discrimination between religious groups, certain limitations must 
be acknowledged. The experiment was conducted with Orthodox Christian subjects only, which 
raises the question of whether our results transcend to other religions, or perhaps to other 
countries with a different historical context. A second limitation is that our study documents 
behavioral changes that take place directly after religious worship. Although we have already 
argued that such short-term effects are particularly salient in the context of religion and conflict, 
it remains true that our study cannot identify the extent to which these effects would persist over 
the longer run. Finally, we must acknowledge that our findings do not allow us to be precise 
about the exact channel through which religious worship influences behavior. While we 
document differences in pro-social behavior before and after church, we have no record of what 
exactly takes place during the service (content of the sermon, nature of interaction with the clergy 
or other worshippers). An advantage of carrying out our experiments with Orthodox Christians in 
Ethiopia is, however, that church services are highly standardized and always based on the same 
readings at a specific date. Based on ancient texts and liturgy of the early Jewish-Christian 
communities, there is nothing spontaneous about the ceremonies. Words are prescribed in minute 
detail and every aspect of the service is symbolic. As a matter of fact, the results from the mood 
dimensions survey (Table 3) do not reveal significantly different emotions between the samples 
collected before and after worship. Contemporary events or aspects are not discussed in a sermon 
as practiced in many protestant and catholic churches and we had one team member present 




should attempt to further open this black box in order to decipher the various channels of 
influence at play for different forms of worship. 
Reading and reflecting the word of God, then giving God blessings is the basic pattern of 
orthodox worship (McGuckin, 2010). These proceedings constitute an ideal basis for comparison 
of different churches and emphasize the prevalence of worship as such over the individual 
preferences of the preacher. Our findings related to regular church goers and people with high 
moral convictions are in line with Preston and Ritter (2013) who argue that worship activates 
“god” primes that also enhance pro-sociality towards out-group member, while religious primes 
tend to activate pro-sociality only towards in-group members. In our context, it is possible that 
the content of the church service (reading and reflecting the word of God, then giving God 
blessings in line with the basic pattern of orthodox worship) may have activated “god concepts” 
and hence universal concerns for pro-sociality, and to a lesser degree religious identity that is 
often misused for secular purposes and could promote discrimination. Religions and religious 
organisations have an untapped and under-used integrative power potential to cultivate attitudes 
of forgiveness and conciliation. To assess this potential and to understand which factors enhance 






Appendix A1. Distributions of religion in Ethiopia by regions 
 




Appendix 2. Background of the study sites 
Ethiopia has been chosen as an appropriate study site due to its long history of robust religious 
pluralism and peaceful co-existence as it can be rarely found in another country context and if so 
rather in regional dimensions than nation-wide. Numerous studies label the country as a model of 
religious tolerance (Braukämper 2004, Zeleke, 2012). According to Levine (1974), Ethiopia’s 
religious traditions have at least two distinguishing features: First, the country received three 
world religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – at a very early point in history; and second, 




atmosphere over wide periods. These characteristics compose a quite unique point of departure 
for research on social dimensions of religion, because religion does not have the immigration – 
and, thus, often outsider – connotation, like in many other country contexts where adherents of 
other than the predominant religious group settled in the country only at a later point in time. 
While the eastern regions of Ethiopia (including Somali and Afar) are characterized by a 
predominantly Muslim population, the north-western and western regions are mostly inhabited by 
Orthodox Christians. Oromiya, the largest region in Ethiopia surrounding the capital of Addis 
Ababa, is rather balanced concerning the distribution of religious affiliations. The Ethiopian 
constitution guarantees the separation of church and state as well as freedom of religion since 
1975. Secularity is also deeply rooted in people’s opinions as 85% of Ethiopians state that 
government and religion should be separate (PEW Forum, 2010). 
The experiments were all carried out with adherents to the Orthodox Christian belief. The 
Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo is the largest oriental Orthodox Church community worldwide 
and constitutes a rare exception of Christian churches in Sub-Saharan Africa due to its pre-
colonial origin. Home to 13.9% of all orthodox Christians globally, Ethiopia ranks second after 
Russia (39%) in this respect. The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo church is characterized by 
highly ritualized religious services according to a strict calendar of fasting days (200 per year) 
and religious holidays, rigid protocols and liturgy for religious services (Chaillot, 2002; Yesehaq, 
1997).  
Within Ethiopia, we chose the capital city Addis Ababa and Jimma, situated south west of 
Addis Ababa, as suitable study sites. Addis Ababa is a predominantly peaceful scenery featuring 
co-existence of Orthodox Christianity (64.7%), Islam (28.2%), and the two largest minority 
religious groups of Protestantism and Catholicism. Inter-religiously motivated unrest and conflict 
between Orthodox Christians and Muslims has remained almost entirely absent in Addis Ababa 
throughout history and recent years.  
The second study site Jimma experienced severe unrests between Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims in March 2011 after rumor spread that a Christian person destroyed a Qur’an and used it 
as toilet paper. The reports of the unrests and conflicts vary across sources but convey the picture 
that thousands of Orthodox Christian living around Jimma left their homes after more than 50 
churches and houses had been destroyed in the region. According to media estimations about 




authorities did not intervene and legislative action was taken by the Ethiopian national 
government (Heinlein, 2011; Addis Standard, 2011). As part of the post-experimental survey we 
asked for several indicators of a high potential for conflict (see part 3 of this Appendix). The 
results reveal that religious tensions are the only significant difference between Addis Ababa and 
Jimma, even though they are reported as only applying slightly. This points either to a successful 
appeasement of the potential for conflict induced by religious factors since the described incident 
or towards a general aversion to raise the issue of religious conflicts. To further explore the role 
of religion we posed a set of questions regarding the contact with other religions in daily life (see 
Table A1). The difference between answers in Addis Ababa and Jimma are highly significant at 
the 1% level for all questions asked. The perception of the prevalence of religious tensions in 
Jimma is significantly higher compared to Addis Ababa.. However, despite the conflicts and 
religious tensions, we found that in Jimma contact to people adherent to other religions is 
significantly higher than in Addis Ababa, and so is the related opinion that it is possible to be 
good friends with people from other religions. Furthermore, participants in Jimma are more likely 






Table A1: Contact to and opinion about other religions in daily life 
 Addis Ababa Jimma 
 Before After Before After 
(1) How often do you have 
contact with people from 
other religions or non-
believers in your daily 
private and working life? 
3.85 3.71 4.46** 4.35** 
(2) People from different 
religions can be good 
friends 
3.34 3.63 4.23** 4.05** 
(3) Religious tensions 1.61 1.72 2.04** 2.08** 
(4) I think it is good for a 
society if it is multi-
religious 
3.29 3.48 4.05** 4.07** 
Coding for question (1): 1. Never, 2. Seldom, 3. A few times a year, 4. Once or twice a month, 5. Once a week, 6. 
More than once a week  
Coding for questions (2) and (4): 1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3.Neutral, 4. Agree, 5. Strongly agree 
Coding for question (3):. 1. Doesn‘t apply at all, 2. Applies slightly, 3. Applies moderately, 4. Applies mostly, 5. 
Applies completely 
** denotes statistically significant differences at the 1% level between the Before and After church samples, Mann-







Table A2: Attendance frequency of religious services  
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
Every day 52 14,81 14.81 
More than three times 
a week 
20 5,7 20.51 
More than once a 
week 
40 11,4 31.91 
Once a week 67 19,09 51.00 
Once or twice a 
month 
85 24,22 75.21 
A few times a year 87 24,79 100.00 
Total 351 100  
 
 
Table A3: Number of Observations per Church 
 Number of obs before Number of obs after 
Jimma Church 1 17 21 
Jimma Church 2 18 22 
Jimma Church 3 14 17 
Jimma Church 4 19 21 
Jimma Church 5 8 22 
Addis Church 1 20 21 
Addis Church 2 15 20 
Addis Church 3 30 23 
Addis Church 4 16 26 
Addis Church 5 6 15 






Appendix 3. Conflict related characteristics in Addis Ababa and Jimma 
 
Table A4. Perceived conflict in Addis Ababa and in Jimma 
To what extent do the following problems occur in your community/kebele? 
 Addis Ababa Jimma 
Religious Tensions** 1.67 2.06 
Ethnical Tensions 1.61 1.72 
Political Riots 1.57 1.73 
Corruption 2.66 2.61 
Crime 2.46 2.45 
Stealing 2.66 2.61 
Alcohol Abuse 3.05 3.07 
Coding for all questions: 1. Doesn‘t apply at all; 2. Applies slightly; 3. Applies moderately; 4. Applies mostly; 5. 
Applies completely 






Appendix 4. Subject pool and ethnic differences in pro-social behavior 
Socio-economic descriptive statistics based on the pre-experiment survey show that participants 
in Jimma were about three years younger than in Addis Ababa with 23.8 years compared to 26.4 
years of age (insignificant; see Table 2). There were 28% female participants in Addis Ababa and 
25% in Jimma. Education levels ranged on average between high school and college for both 
cities, which can be considered as quite high compared to the national level, at which only 15.7% 
attend secondary education (UNICEF, 2013). The high education level of our subjects may be 
due to the fact that the study was carried out in urban centers. Monthly incomes were typically in 
the range of 0–1,000 Birr or 1,000–3,000 Birr and were slightly higher on average than the 
national mean yearly per capita income of 550 USD / 11,571 Birr (The World Bank, 2015). 
Comparing means of the two different study groups (before and after church) within cities, no 
significant differences can be found, attesting, thus, that the randomization did not cause any 
biases. 
Since Ethiopia is a highly diverse country not only regarding religion but also ethnicities, 
a deeper look into the ethnic composition of the sample population can contribute to the 
interpretation of results. The data shows that our sample from Jimma has a considerably higher 
diversity of ethnicities compared to Addis Ababa, with 21.85 % not being part of one of the four 
major ethnic groups Amhara, Oromo, Tigray or Gurage. In Addis only 2.84% do not belong to 
one of these major ethnic groups. Interpreted together with the previously described statistics 
regarding the contact to and opinions about other religions, the higher ethnic diversity could also 
be an indicator of the higher tolerance levels displayed by individuals in Jimma.  
Regarding mean transfer levels in the dictator game, Oromo transfer significantly less in 
Jimma compared to Addis Ababa (significant at the 5% level). Tigray, Gurage and other ethnic 











Addis Jimma  
 sample 
share  (in 
%) 
mean transfer in 
dictator game 
sample 
share  (in 
%) 
mean transfer in 
dictator game 
National Share 
(census 2007, in 
%) 
Amhara 53.9 27.36 41.72 25.07 26.89 
Oromo 15.60 30.45 26.49 24 * 34.49 
Tigray 16.31 23.91 6.62 34 6.0 
Gurage 11.35 27.95 3.31 34 2.53 
Others 2.84 15 21.85 24.84 30.09 







Appendix 5. Behavior in the trust game 
After the end of the dictator game, subjects in our experiment also played a one-shot version of 
the trust game. We randomly allocated our subjects to the role of sender or receiver. In the trust 
game we applied the strategy method for receivers and randomized the role of the sender and the 
receiver within each session. Sender and receiver were endowed with 80 Birr each. Senders were 
asked to decide how much of their endowment they would like to transfer to a receiver outside of 
the session (in steps of 10 from 0 to 80). The amount was doubled by the experimenter for the 
receiver. Receivers were asked to decide how much they would like to transfer back for each of 
the 9 possible amounts (0 to 160 in steps of 20) that they may have received from a sender 
outside of the session. This game is commonly used to measure trusting and trustworthy behavior 
(measured by the amount transferred by the sender and by the receiver, respectively). 
Descriptive statistics of the senders’ transfer decisions in the trust game in Addis Ababa 
reveal a similar pattern as described in the case of the dictator game. However, differences in 
means are not statistically significant, which may be due to the different roles (sender and 
receiver in the trust game) assumed by participants in our between-subjects design, largely 
reducing the sample size. While in the before-church setting the mean transfer to Orthodox 
Christian individuals is 39.5 Birr, the mean transfer to Muslim individuals is only 32.37 Birr 
(p=0.34, Mann-Whitney U test; N=58). In the after-church setting transfers to Muslim individuals 
increase and transfers show a balanced pattern across in-group and out-group (32.5 Birr to 
Christian names and 32.3 Birr to Muslim names; p=0.96, Mann-Whitney U test; N=58). These 









In the city of Jimma, no significant differences in mean transfers can be found in either of 
the two samples (before and after church), hence we cannot detect a discrimination reducing 
effect of worship since discrimination is not present to begin with. The same is true of the 
decisions of individuals allocated to the role of the receiver, which form our measure of 


















































Table A6. Transfers in the trust game 
 Addis Ababa Jimma 
 (1) (2) 
Expectation 0.459*** 0.326*** 
 (0.074) (0.056) 
Muslim recipient -14.462 5.201 
 (10.124) (5.519) 
After church -4.303 -0.304 
 (10.196) (6.825) 
Muslim recipient x After church 7.144 -11.123 
 (12.086) (8.780) 
Constant 28.002*** 20.107*** 
 (3.204) (2.033) 
No. of observations 116 100 
No. of censored observations (left/right) 23/18 11/9 
F-test on the restriction: 
Muslim recipient + Muslim recipient x 
After church =0 
p= 0.332 p= 0.387 
Notes. Tobit regressions with church fixed effects. Dependent variable is the first mover’s transfer in the 
trust game, left-censored at 0 and right-censored at 80. Expectation refers to the stated expectation of the 








Table A7. Backtransfers in the trust game (average trustworthiness following strategy method) 
 Addis Ababa Jimma 
 (1) (2) 
Expectation 0.119 0.235 
 (0.133) (0.156) 
Muslim recipient 5.264 -7.998 
 (9.750) (11.536) 
After church 2.892 -12.965 
 (9.828) (11.159) 
Muslim recipient x After church 2.839 16.437 
 (15.192) (15.305) 
Constant 40.528*** 55.912*** 
 (15.000) (15.125) 
No. of observations 89 77 
F-test on the restriction: 
Muslim recipient + Muslim recipient x 





Notes. Linear regressions including church fixed effects. Expectation refers to the stated expectation of the 
second mover in the trust game about the actual transfer received by the first mover. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 







Appendix 6. Aditional information on recruitment 
 
The most important information from our recruitment flyer was:  
 
“The research activity in your community will be on: ____________________________ 
Beginning time: ….. [or …….]   
Note: We will schedule the activities in a way that you will be able to attend church before or 




As a reminder of our appointment, we would like to call you or send you a text message one day 
before the workshop. In this message we will also tell you if you are invited to Group A [time] or 






Appendix 7. Experimental Protocol – not intended for publication 
 
[WHEN PARTICIPANTS ARRIVE:] 
 
[There is a desk for registration and payouts. Participants draw a random player number. Upon 
arrival the participants already receive their show-up fee]  
 
[To each participant during registration]: “Good afternoon/morning, we are glad that you are 
participating in this workshop. We will shortly tell you what the activity is about. Please enter the 
room and look for the seat with your participant number. Once everybody is here we will start the 
activity” 
 
[Participants are assigned a seat according to the player number. All participants are seated away 
from each other.] 
 
[Pre-questionnaire with basic information while waiting] 
 
[WELCOMING THE PARTICIPANTS] 
 
Thank you all for coming today. My name is [NAME] and I am a member of a research team 
supported by the Ethiopian Development Research Institute, the University of Innsbruck and 
Planet Guarantee that is going to conduct a workshop in your community during this month. 
Together with my colleagues I want to conduct some games with you. In these games you can 
earn real money that will be paid to you privately in cash at the end, I am here for a research 
study on decision making. This kind of study is conducted with people like you and me all over 
the world. In the games you will have to make decisions that will influence your personal earning 
and the earnings of others. In the games you can earn up to 100 Birr. The money paid to you is 
not our private money but it is given to us for research purposes. We are interested in your 
decision during the activity and it is very important to bear in mind that there are no “right” or 
“wrong” answers. The whole procedure will last for about one hour. Thank you in advance for 





Before we start to explain the games, we want to announce some general rules that you 
should know: 
 
1. If at any time you find that this is something that you do not wish to participate in for any 
reason, you are free to leave. But if you already know that you will not be able to stay for 
one hour, then you should not try to participate, because otherwise we cannot use the 
results.  
 
2. In the workshop, your identity will be kept anonymous. This means that except for the 
person calculating payments, no one will come to know the decisions you made or the 
money you earned. Instead of using your name, we assigned you a number (show sample 
player number that we will use throughout the workshop. Please do not lose this card.  
 
3. You will be paid 20 Birr for coming to the workshop, which you already received at the 
registration plus the additional earnings that you have made in the decision task randomly 
chosen for payment. We will keep a record of your earnings in all the decision tasks to 
make sure that you receive the correct amount 
 
4. If you have questions during the games just raise your hand and wait until one of the 
assistants comes to you. Then you can ask your question in private and the assistant will 
answer it.  
 
5. We will draw a card at the end to determine which of the three games will be paid out to 
you. [Show cards with numbers] This is why the outcomes in one game have no influence 
on the other games. So if you play a game, don’t worry what happened in the games 




Thank you in advance for your effort and time. We will now begin with the instructions for 












In this game you are randomly matched with another player who is not in this room today. You 
will not learn the whole identity of the person you are matched with, and your partner will never 
learn about your identity. The only thing you will know about the other person is his prename and 
that he lives in Addis Ababa as well. The person you are matched with is not in this group today 
but we took his/her decisions separately. In this Game you will be called Player A and the other 
Player outside will be called Player B.  
 
You receive an amount of 80 Birr and player B 0 Birr. You can decide whether to keep the 
money for yourself or transfer to player B. The amount that you transfer to Player B must be a 
number from the set (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80).You are not obliged to transfer anything. 
The amount can also be 0.  
 
The amount you transfer will be subtracted from your initial 80 Birr you received at the 
beginning of the game. You yourself will keep the amount you did not transfer. This is the 
amount relevant for your payout in case this game will be chosen for the final payout.  
 
[PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLES LOUDLY, SLOWLY AND CLEARLY. 
DEMONSTRATE THE PAYOFF CONSEQUENCES BY SHOWING THE DECISION SHEET 
AND DEMONSTRATING PAYOFFS WITH PLAY MONEY FOR EACH SCENARIO] 
 
If you decide to transfer 40 from your initial 80 Birr Player B will receive 40 Birr and you will 
receive 40 Birr. 
 
If you decide to transfer 0 Birr from your initial 80 Birr Player B will receive 0 Birr and you will 





If you decide to transfer 80 Birr from your initial 80 Birr Player B will receive 80 Birr and you 
will receive 0 Birr. 
 
Do you have any questions?  
 
Before we distribute the decision sheets, please do not forget that you are not allowed to 
communicate with other participants in the room. 
 
 
It is very important to keep in mind that the decisions are absolutely private and that your 
decision will not be shown to anybody else. 
  












        









 [GAME 2] 
 
[First Movers (Player A)] 
 
In this game, you will be randomly matched to another participant who is not in this room today. 
Both of you start with an endowment of 80 Birr. Each of you will decide what amount of money 
to transfer to another player. You will decide one after the other. The first to decide is called 
player A, the second to decide is called player B.  The only thing you will know about the other 
person is his prename and that he lives in Addis Ababa as well. The person you are matched with 
is not in this group today but we took his/her decisions separately. In this Game you will be either 
Player A or Player B. 
 
If you are player A, you will decide how much of your initial endowment (80 Birr) you want to 
transfer to player B. The amount that you transfer to player B must be a number from the set {0, 
10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80}. Your transfer to B will be doubled by the experimenter. So Player 
B will receive 2x the amount you send to him. 
 
Player B can then decide to transfer an amount back to you. This amount can range from 0 to 240 
the maximum amount he disposes of.  
 
 
[PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLES LOUDLY, SLOWLY AND CLEARLY. 
DEMONSTRATE THE PAYOFF CONSEQUENCES BY SHOWING THE DECISION 
SHEET AND USING PLAY MONEY FOR EACH EXAMPLE] 
 
For example, if you are 
Player A and transfer 80 Birr to player B, the amount that B will receive from you is 160 Birr (80 
Birr x 2). Player B then receives 160 Birr plus the initial 80 Birr which is 240 Birr and can then 
decide how much to return to you. You then have 0 Birr plus the money that you receive from 




- and thus more than the initial 80 Birr. But note that player B can freely decide how much he 
wants to return to you. 
 
Player A and transfer 40 Birr to player B, the amount that B will receive from you is  80 Birr (40 
Birr x 2). Player B then receives 80 Birr plus the initial 80 Birr which is 160 Birr and can then 
decide how much to return to you. You then have 40 Birr plus the money that you receive from 
player B. If player B decides to give you 20 of his 160 Birr, you will have 60 Birr at the end of 
the game and Player B will have 140. 
 
Player A and transfer 0 Birr to player B, the amount that B will receive from you is 0 Birr. Each 
of you will have the original 80 Birr to take home. 
 
Note that it is possible that Player B transfers more money back to you as you transferred to him 







In this Game you are Player A 
 
Please, fill in your decisions as player A in the lines 1) and 2). 
 
 




        






2.  For your decision above you expect Player B [NAME] to transfer back to you  
_______ Birr 





If you are player B, you will receive the doubled amount of money that was transferred to you by 
player A. This doubled amount is added to your initial endowment of 80 Birr. 
Now, you can decide to transfer some part of your total earnings to A. Please look at the 
following decision sheet. Because you do not know now how much Player A transfers to you, 
you have to make a decision on how much you want to transfer back to Player A for all possible 
amount he could transfer to you. Your transfer to A is not doubled. The remaining part of your 
total earnings (the amount that you did not transfer to A) is your payoff of the experiment.  
 
Note that you can decide not to transfer any money to player A. If you do not, then you will have 
your total earnings to take home, while A will have the original endowment minus the transfer 
made to you. 
 
For example: If Player A transfers 0 Birr to you, both of you will have the initial amount of 80 
Birr. Now please note down how much of your amount you want to transfer back to Player A.  
 
 If Player A transfers 40Birr to you, you will receive 80Birr (40Birr x2). So Player A will be left 
with 40 Birr and you will have 160 Birr (the 80 Birr you received plus the 80 Birr of your initial 
endowment). Now please note down how much of your amount you want to transfer back to 
Player A. 
 
If Player A transfers 80 to you, you will receive 160Birr =80Birr x2. So Player A will be left with 
0 Birr and you will have 240 Birr (the 160 Birr you received plus the 80 Birr of your initial 






When you take your decision we will ask you to note down what you believe the other Player 
transfers to you.  
 
 
In this Game you are Player B 
Please, fill in your decisions as player B in part 1) and 2). 
1. 
The table below lists all possible amounts that Player A [ NAME] may send to you. If you 
are randomly determined to be player B, only one of these amounts will actually count, 
namely the one that was chosen by the Player A [NAME] who is matched to you. But, since 
for now you do not know which amount will actually be chosen by player A, you must make 
a transfer decision for every possible amount.. 
Player A  
transfers 
to YOU 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
YOU 
Receive  
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 
Player A 
has 
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 
YOU 
Have 






         
 
Please, fill in a transfer to A [NAME] in each of these empty cells. 











        





Do you have any questions?  
 
Before we distribute the decision sheets, please do not forget that you are not allowed to 
communicate with other participants in the room. 
 
Please also remember that you will receive your earnings from this part of the game only after all 
games are finished. 
 
It is very important to keep in mind that the decisions are absolutely private and that your 
decision will not be shown to anybody else. 
  
We will now distribute the sheets on which you can make your private decision.   
 
 
[AFTER THE LAST GAME] 
 
Thank you for your participation. We will now draw a card to determine which of the games will 
be paid out to you. [Show cards with numbers]. Then, after you have answered a short 
questionnaire, we will hand out the earnings to you. Please come one by one with your player 
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We analyze whether the availability of formal insurance products crowds out informal 
solidarity transfers in two behavioral experiments in the Philippines. The first experiment 
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experiment mimics a laboratory setting without communication and preserves anonymity, 
which minimizes strategic concerns. We only find crowding-out effects in the first setting 
with strategic motives, while there are even crowding-in effects when focusing on 
intrinsic motives. These and additional supporting results suggest that only strategic and 
not necessarily intrinsic motives are crowded out by the availability of insurance.   
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A large majority in the world’s poorest countries is without formal insurance.
1
 As a response, 
informal transfers within networks of friends, neighbors and relatives are important tomanage 
income fluctuations caused by illnesses, accidents, unemployment, or other adverse events. 
Ample evidence for the importance of such mechanisms in developing countries has been 
collected in the economic literature and beyond (see e.g. Townsend 1994, Udry 1994, 
Morduch 1999 or more recently Fafchamps 2008). This paper investigates how the 
availability of formal insurance – such as weather, health, and life insurance products that are 
currently promoted widely – affects solidarity, i.e. the willingness to help those hit by a 
random shock, within the social network. If formal insurance to a large degree crowds out 
informal solidarity transfers, this could substantially limit the overall protective effect of 
insurance schemes. Moreover, we shed light on how the introduction of insurance affects 
different motives for solidarity transfers.  
There is empirical evidence in line with crowding out of informal risk-sharing by 
formal insurance. Dercon and Krishnan (2003) find that consumption is more responsive to 
shocks if there is food aid in rural Ethiopia, Albarran and Attanasio (2003) show that public 
transfers displace private transfers in Mexico, and Jensen (2003) similarly finds pension 
transfers to reduce private transfers in South Africa. Only recently, Strupat and Klohn (2018) 
provide evidence directly assessing the effect of an insurance scheme. Their analysis suggests 
that the national health insurance scheme in Ghana crowds out informal transfers. Besides 
mostly focusing on government programs instead of insurance schemes, these papers lack 
exogenous variation to causally interpret the effect (except for Albarran and Attanasio 2003), 
have difficulties to accurately measure informal transfers under ceteris paribus conditions and 
cannot identify the underlying motives for informal transfers.
2
 Lin, Liu, and Meng (2014) 
avoided such problems by studying crowding-out effects in a lab setting with a student 
population. They find crowding-out of transfers in a multi-period setting with repeated 
interaction and with transfers being revealed after each round. They explain crowding-out 
with strategic reciprocity, where reducing risk through insurance leads to a lower value of the 
                                                 
1
 Different studies find limited access to formal insurance, for example in the 100 poorest countries (Roth, 
McCord, and Liber 2007) and to health insurance amongst the extremely poor (Banerjee and Duflo 2007). Also 
more recent work confirms that  access to insurance policies adapted to the needs of low-income households 
remains small, relative to the potential market of up to 4 billion potential customers (Swiss Re 2010). 
2
 Some papers infer transfers by comparing income/consumption patterns on the village level, with strong 
assumptions involved (e.g. Dercon and Krishnan 2003; Jensen 2003). Others try to measure transfers directly, 
even though such measurement is prone to errors and inconsistencies between sender and receiver data (Comola 




informal arrangement and, therefore, a lower incentive to comply with it. The underlying 
limited commitment argument is the basis of several popular models (such as Coate and 
Ravallion 1993; Attanasio and Ríos-Rull 2000) and constitutes the economists’ main 
workhorse to analyze informal risk-sharing.  
Given the evidence on the importance of intrinsic (i.e. non-strategic) motivations for 
transfers (Leider et al. 2009; Ligon and Schechter 2012) and donations or mutual support in 
general (Andreoni 1990), crowding-out of intrinsic motivation is another important concern to 
study.
3
 According to philosopher Michael Sandel, the advancement of market values in 
almost every aspect of life has led to the crowding-out of nonmarket norms without people 
noticing it (Sandel 2012). A related prominent literature in psychology and economics has 
found examples where extrinsic incentives, such as penalties, rewards or the exhibition of 
control, reduce self-determination and autonomy, thereby undermining intrinsic motives to act 
pro-socially (Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011) or pro-environmentally (Rode, Gómez-
Baggethun, and Krause 2015). Although introducing insurance does not constitute a typical 
extrinsic incentive, the possibility to buy protection on the market might weaken the 
individual feeling of responsibility for others. On the other hand,  positive effects are possible 
in theory as well, e.g. if insurance is perceived as a helpful tool for mutual protection.  
In order to analyze crowding effects in the context of both strategic reciprocal and 
intrinsic motives, we conducted two waves of lab-in-the-field experiments. We believe it is 
important to establish results with people routinely engaging in informal risk-sharing and 
therefore implemented all experiments with villagers in the Philippines. Our first design 
(Communication Experiment) tries to reflect the reality of risk-sharing practices as much as 
possible.
4
 We model risk in a behavioral game using lotteries that involve random losses. 
Informal risk-sharing is implemented in non-anonymous groups of three, where group 
members can transfer money to each other after the lottery. Formal insurance is introduced via 
offering alternative lotteries that are safer but require some fixed ex-ante  payment. An 
                                                 
3
 While purely intrinsic motives are those actions that are done out of enjoyment, for its own sake and because 
they are satisfying in itself, extrinsic motivations come from external goals. The distinction is fuzzy, though 
(Ryan and Deci 2000). In our context, we refer to strategic motives (instead of extrinsic motives) to capture the 
relevant aspect of the limited commitment models and intrinsic motives (instead of non-strategic motives) to 
refer to the set of motives which are done without direct influence of other’s (except the possibility of having 
internalized these pressures and feelings of guilt). It is important for our distinction that intrinsic motives remain 
unaffected by strategic incentives as they are measured in the context of a one-shot, anonymous interaction 
without communication. 
4
 The Communication Experiment has been previously published as a working paper (Landmann, Vollan, and 
Frölich 2012). However, the working paper version did not fully account for possible reciprocal motives due to 
communication and non-anonymity and, thus, was unable to satisfactorily explain motives of the crowding-out 
effect. As a consequence, we designed additional experiments to review our findings based on  an anonymous 




additional feature of the first experiment is that players know and see each other and are also 
allowed to talk to each other before transfers are made. These conditions activate both pro-
social but also reciprocal motives, as prevalent outside the laboratory. The second experiment 
(Anonymous Experiment) follows a typical laboratory or lab-in-the-field experiment by 
preserving anonymity between the players. This conventional one-shot laboratory setting 
without communication inhibits reciprocal strategic behavior and transfers should be driven 
by pro-social considerations. The variation of communication and anonymity between the two 
experiments hence allows us to test and discuss the origin of crowding-out effects based on 
intrinsic or reciprocal motives.  
Interestingly, we find that crowding-out of solidarity only occurs in the “realistic” 
Communication Experiment with a mix of motives involved. Here, the protective effect of the 
insurance mechanism is reduced by a lower willingness to redistribute through solidarity 
transfers. Since around half of all participants opt for insurance if they have the choice,  a 
substantial part remains uninsured. Consequently, those remaining uninsured face a higher 
risk of being left alone with a bad outcome than in a scenario without insurance availability. 
Hence, the results of the Communication Experiment suggest that voluntary insurance could 
potentially limit the overall protective effect of insurance schemes. In the Anonymous 
Experiment, which inhibits strategic motives by restricting communication and ensuring 
anonymity, results are different. Here we find an increase in solidarity with the availability of 
insurance (crowding-in), which can only be attributed to a strengthening of intrinsic motives. 
Combining the results of both experiments suggests that the crowding-out effect in the more 
realistic Communication Experiment most likely cannot be explained by crowding-out of 
intrinsic motives. Thus, introduction of insurance only seems to affect strategic motives 
without threatening truly pro-social motivation. These results are in line with the finding 
analyzing strategic motives in a student lab setting (Lin, Liu, and Meng 2014), as well as 
theoretical work on risk-sharing under limited commitment (such as Coate and Ravallion 
1993; Attanasio and Ríos-Rull 2000). 
 
2. Setup of the Experiments 
In order to measure willingness to help after a financial loss we use modified versions of the 
solidarity game (Selten and Ockenfels 1998).
5
 We believe that it constitutes an adequate 
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 In the original solidarity game according to Selten and Ockenfels (1998), the three members of a group are 




experimental tool to capture mutual aid in a risky environment. This setting also distinguishes  
solidarity from other forms of pro-social behavior such as altruism in dictator games, trust, or 
contributions in public good games.
6
 Our experiments are designed to measure changes of 
solidarity behavior caused by the availability of insurance. Such crowding effects should be 
taken into account when designing optimal risk mitigation policies.  
The rationale of the solidarity game is similar throughout the two experiments 
although they are based on different parameters (compare Table A1 in Appendix A). This 
implies that the experiments were not designed to be directly comparable in terms of absolute 
solidarity transfers. Rather, the second experiment (Anonymous Experiment) can be 
understood as a set of deliberative design choices to rule out strategic reciprocal motives and 
render the initial design more closely to a standard laboratory experiment. We model risk with 
a lottery using random mechanisms to determine the “losers” of the group. This design 
reflects the risk to lose money instead of the possibility to win money. We consider it 
important to play in the loss domain because a different reference point might change 
behavior (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Depending on the result of the random mechanism a 




Our measure of individual solidarity transfers is the willingness to redistribute from 
the better- to the worse-off in the group. This shows an important relation to inequality 
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999), but other models might also explain the motivation to help 
(e.g. Rabin 1993; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Dufwenberg 2006; Bénabou and 
Tirole 2006), including strategic motives for transfers (e.g. Coate and Ravallion 1993). In 
contrast to observational data, the controlled environment of our behavioral experiment 
allows to monitor the endowments and transfer choices of participants perfectly under 
comparable situations. 
Insurance is introduced via offering alternative lotteries that are less risky but require 
some ex-ante fixed payment. The advance fee of insurance thus is always the ‘guaranteed 
                                                                                                                                                        
and a double blind procedure the players had to decide how much they would transfer in case of winning to one 
or two losers. 
6
 From a sociological perspective, solidarity is an own-standing concept. According to Durkheim (1997, 
reprinted from 1893), in societies with a low division of labor (such as the rural Philippines) solidarity captures 
the feeling of unity between individuals who often share the same beliefs and morals as they have similar 
education, religion, work and lifestyle (frequently also kinship ties or familial networks). It generates and 
sustains strong feelings of togetherness and social-cohesion, resulting in collective action and mutual aid (e.g. 
informal risk-sharing arrangements). 
7
 We have chosen a 3-player game as we believe that two player games are not adequate for our experiment. A 





loss’ in case of no shock. We model take-up of insurance as observable to the other group 
members. This observability of insurance for peers is in line with typical distribution channels 
(e.g. farmer associations, cooperatives, saving groups etc.) and diffusion of information in 
developing countries (Cai, Janvry, and Sadoulet 2013; Banerjee et al. 2013). Furthermore, 
public knowledge about uptake of insurance might provide information on how much co-
players' rely on the solidarity network. As solidarity transfers might depend on whether sender 
and recipient are insured, we allow variation in insurance uptake for senders and recipients in 
both experiments. 
The implementation of both experiments is very similar. Both experiments, though 
carried out in different villages, were all conducted on Panay Island in the Western Visayas 
(Region VI) of the Philippines. We used uniform instructions that were translated from 
English into the local language (Hiligaynon) and back to English for verification. Instructions 
were presented orally by the same local field assistant and both experiments were conducted 
with pen and paper. Transfer decisions were taken in private and decisions of co-players were 
never revealed. Group composition remained constant throughout the experiment such that we 
consistently measured behavior towards the same person.
8
 At the end of the experiments the 
participants received their earnings in private. All participants received a fixed show-up fee. 
In the Communication Experiment, a participant earned on average 237 PhP, including a 
show-up fee of 100 PhP. In the Anonymous Experiment, average earnings were very similar  
with 235 PhP, including 100 PhP show-up fee. This amount corresponds to approximately 6 
USD or one daily minimum wage in the formal sector – something few people from our 
sample would be able to earn within one day.
9
 More details on the implementation and the 
sampling of villages as well as households can be found in Appendix A. 
 
2.1 Design of the Solidarity Experiment with Communication  
In the Communication Experiment we investigate two independent experimental rounds 
where participants are provided an initial endowment of 200 Philippine Pesos (PhP).  
Depending on the result of the die roll, participants can keep all or part of it. If the die shows a 
1, 2 or 3, the endowment can be kept. If the die shows a 4 or 5, the participant loses 100 Pesos 
of the endowment. If the die shows a 6,  180 Pesos are lost. Within one round, participants 
                                                 
8
 Note that participants might otherwise have imagined different types of community members being their 
anonymous co-player across rounds. Our setup facilitates a consistent interpretation of solidarity measures from 
different points in time. 
9
 The minimum daily wage in Western Visayas ranged between 235 and 245 pesos in 2012. Larger enterprises 




took an insurance decision (if available), played the lottery, communicated and made 
transfers. Before taking the transfer decision, participants were informed about the amounts of 
money held by their co-players and could then communicate with each other. As every 
possible outcome leads to a unique payoff (see Table 1), players were able to infer whether 
their co-players bought an insurance and/or faced a shock. The use of the communication 
stage before the transfer decision gives subjects the possibility to ask for help or signal their 
neediness. Possibly, participants also communicated over past or future payments and made 
(non-verifiable) reciprocal arrangements. Thus, besides intrinsic motives to help, 
communication also introduces strategic motives for giving, including post-experimental 
considerations.  
We test two variants of insurance (offered in separate sessions), called insurance 1 and 
insurance 2. For insurance 1, participants have to pay 45 Pesos in advance and half of all 
losses are covered. The price for insurance 2 is only 20 Pesos, but only the catastrophic loss is 
covered. Table 1 shows the losses for the no-insurance case and insurance schemes 1 and 2.
10
 
Obviously, insurance is supposed to decrease the uncertainty of outcomes which is reflected 
in the lower standard deviation. In our design we wanted to mirror the fact that more 
comprehensive insurance schemes usually entail higher risk premiums and face higher 
administrative costs due to a higher claim frequency. Hence, we designed our prices such that 
a lower standard deviation translates to a lower expected payoff. Insurance 2 constitutes an 
intermediate case with an interesting additional feature: Due to the low price and the focus on 
the catastrophic loss it can secure an even higher minimum payoff than insurance 1.
11
 By 
making the insurance costly we were not only mimicking reality but also created variation in 
take-up. Observing participants with and without insurance allows us to analyze 
heterogeneous effects of transfers dependent on insurance take-up of sender and receiver (see 
Section 3.3). 
 
                                                 
10
 We never used the word "insurance". In earlier pre-tests in other locations we had framed these options as 
"insurance" and found that almost all participants purchased insurance when it was framed as such indicating a 
very positive image of insurance.  
11
 Individuals with minimax preferences would prefer insurance 2 over 1. Both options 1 and 2 reflect typical 
insurance products where full coverage is impossible. In most developing countries, health insurance for 
example covers only the medical expenses (often less than 100%), but not lost labor income. The more 
comprehensive insurance could be like a medical insurance scheme, while the catastrophic insurance could 




Table 1: Losses (in PhP) under different options  
 
Communication Experiment 



























Normal Risk - 0 - 100 - 180   -63.3 68.7 
Insurance 1 - 45 - 95 - 135   -76.7 34.4 
Insurance 2 - 20 - 120 - 110   -68.3 48.5 
Normal Risk    -0 -200 -66.7 94.3 
Low Risk    -40 -140 -73,3 47.1 
Insurance 3    -40 -140 -73,3 47.1 
Note: The initial endowment is 200 PhP in each round. The loss in case of “no shock” is the price of the 
insurance participants have to pay upfront, i.e. 45 PhP for insurance 1, 20 PhP for insurance 2, and 40 
PhP for insurance 3. 
 
2.2 Design of the Anonymous Solidarity Experiment 
In the Anonymous Experiment  we made several design choices to mainly capture pro-social 
motivations of giving. Most notably we did not allow for communication and one co-player 
was anonymous.
12
 Additionally, we used the strategy method and determined that there would 
only be one loser in the group losing  his entire endowment, in order to ease the analysis and 
implementation. Thus, the solidarity game with strategy method involved two stages. First, 
each player had to state how much of the 200 PhP endowment he or she would like to transfer 
to a potential loser who had lost his entire endowment. Transfers were restricted to a range of 
0 to 70 PhP (in steps of 10 PhP). Note that restricting the range of transfers might anchor 
absolute solidarity transfers in a different way compared to the unrestricted transfer possibility 
in the Communication Experiment. Second, each participant privately drew a ball (without 
replacement) from an opaque bag filled with three balls: An orange ball determined the loser 
of the group and transfers were triggered accordingly but were not revealed to participants. 
Thus, people did not see what others did nor could they change their transfers by reacting to 
what others had done. 
We test one insurance option in the Anonymous Experiment (insurance 3). Players 
could choose this insurance scheme ex-ante, reducing the loss induced by drawing the orange 
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 Each player took one transfer decision to an anonymous co-player and one transfer decision to a known co-
player. We only analyze the decision to the anonymous co-player as this transfer decision should mainly be 




ball to only 100 pesos instead of the entire endowment. The insurance option was available at 
a price of 40 pesos. After players decided on the take-up of insurance, the decision was 
revealed to the other group members before they made their transfer choices. We also 
implemented a low risk treatment similar to insurance 3 where we exogenously implemented 
the payoff structure according to the situation under insurance 3. This creates exogenous 
variation in riskiness, even in the absence of an insurance option.  
 
2.3 Treatment Plan 
Both the Communication and Anonymous Experiment were embedded in sessions with other 
independent games (see Table 2). Since we wanted to keep these games independent from 
each other and stakes for each decision high, only one of the games was paid out at random. 
The Communication Experiment was designed to test several related topics. For example we 
wanted to test differential take-up for different insurance types 1 and 2. However, for 
analyzing the crowding-out hypothesis we pool the data from insurance 1 and 2 to increase 
the sample size. In order to test the effects of the insurance on solidarity transfers, the 
behavioral experiments were implemented as outlined in Table 2. In six villages no insurance 
was offered in round one and two. In this setting, participants had no choice and always 
played without insurance. In eight villages, insurance 1 was offered in round one, while no 
insurance was offered in round two. In another eight villages, the same was done with 
insurance 2. Thus, the crowding-out effect can be identified by only looking at round 1, by 
observing the persistence after removing the insurance in round 2 and by combining both 
round 1 and 2. What is important for the identification of crowding effects is that in both 
situations – with and without insurance availability – we have variation in shock intensity and 
protection levels. This allows us to separate the effect of insurance availability from changes 
in within-group inequalities (i.e. differences between winners and losers of the lottery).  
In the Anonymous Experiment we identify crowding effects due to insurance within 
one round only. Also, instead of creating variation in shock intensity and different insurance 
variants, we included a treatment with similar outputs as if players would buy insurance, but 
without having an insurance choice (Low Risk). Thus, instead of creating exogenous variation 
in shock intensity within one treatment, we implement different shock intensities across 
treatments (Low vs. Normal Risk). Pooling the Normal Risk and the Low Risk groups again 
provides variation in within-group inequalities and, thus, allows us to disentangle the effect of 





Table 2: Treatment plan for both solidarity experiments 
Communication Experiment Anonymous Experiment 
 No Insurance 
(6 villages) 
Insurance  




 (10 villages) 
before  
Solidarity Game 





or Insurance 1 
Normal Risk 






or Insurance 3 
Round 2 Normal Risk Not applicable 
Note: In each block in the Communication Experiment, in half of the villages the experiments were played with 
the “secret-hiding device” (see section 3.4 for further details on the secret hiding treatment) and in the other half 
without. 
 
2.4 Conjectures  
The effect of insurance on strategic motivations is straightforward in theory: Models of 
limited commitment (e.g. Coate and Ravallion 1993; Attanasio and Ríos-Rull 2000) suggest 
that the introduction of insurance decreases the need for strategic risk-sharing, especially 
since all participants were endowed with adequate funds to purchase an insurance contract. In 
contrast, it is unclear whether insurance would increase, decrease or not affect intrinsic 
motivations for solidarity at all. In this section, we therefore focus on theoretical explanations 
related to intrinsic crowding effects. 
In line with arguments that the expansion of markets may lead to more individualistic 
societies and the erosion of social norms (Sandel 2012) one might speculate that insurance 
products are perceived as market solutions which crowd out morality (similar to the effect 
shown by Falk and Szech 2013).
13
 A decrease in intrinsic motivations may occur especially if 
the insurance is perceived to be controlling and restricting participants’ autonomy (Frey and 
Jegen 2001; Bénabou and Tirole 2006; Bowles 2008; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011). 
Since the take-up decision in our experiment is voluntary (and taken before the 
communication stage) we think that a feeling of control is rather unlikely, though. On the 
contrary, insurance might even be supportive and enabling subjects to better help those in 
need, which could also increase intrinsic motivations. A further potential channel affecting 
intrinsic motives is that purchasing insurance (or not) signals types or intentions of 
individuals. A recent behavioral experiment (Lenel and Steiner 2017) shows that solidarity 
transfers decrease if individuals in need forwent the opportunity to purchase insurance, 
suggesting that signaling effects through insurance uptake are indeed possible.
14
 Given the 
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 Note that there is also cross-cultural evidence from Henrich et al. (2010) that market integration may lead to 
more pro-social behavior in encounters with anonymous members of the society.  
14
 This study is different from our paper along several dimensions, though. First, it does not consider a situation 
of mutual solidarity. Senders face no risk in Lenel and Steiner (2017), even though the definition of solidarity 




prevailing theoretical (and empirical) ambiguities, it is still unclear how the introduction of 
insurance should affect intrinsic motives for solidarity transfers.  
Comparing the Communication and Anonymous Experiments allows us to test how 
the introduction of insurance affects strategic and intrinsic motivations. As described in 
Section II, the use of the communication stage before the transfer decision activates strategic 
motives for giving. Figure 1 illustrates that insurance is predicted to reduce strategic motives 
for giving but has an ambiguous effect on intrinsic motives in the Communication 
Experiment. In the Anonymous Experiment, the situation is different. Participants are freed 
from strategic motives since they neither know the name of their partner nor will the transfer 
decisions ever be revealed in public. This setup allows us to test how solidarity, which exists 
within anonymous groups due to purely intrinsic motives, reacts to the introduction of 
insurance.  
The combined analysis of the two distinct experiments hence has a clear advantage. 
We would not be able to identify the source of the crowding-out effect based on the the 
Communication Experiment alone, even though we believe that this set-up has a higher 
external validity than the Anonymous Experiment without communication. With the help of 
the Anonymous Experiment, we are able to tease apart how insurance interacts with intrinsic 
motivations while the Communication Experiment enables us to measure the overall effect of 
insurance in a realistic setting. Based on the above theoretical considerations, we can neither 
derive clear predictions regarding insurance effects on intrinsic motives alone, nor on the 
direction of the total effect in the Communication Experiment. We can, however, conjecture 
that insurance will lead to a more negative effect in the Communication Experiment compared 
to the Anonymous Experiment. Assuming a similar effect of insurance on intrinsic motives in 
both settings, there should be an additional negative effect on strategic motives in the 
Communication Experiment.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
made to recipients who presumably, if one were in need oneself, would have made a gift to oneself”. Thus, 
intrinsic motives to help might be lower than in a “true” solidarity setup. Second, Lenel and Steiner (2017) 
emphasize the preventable nature of financial losses. They use full insurance, such that potential recipients 
opting for insurance do not need solidarity transfers anymore. The insurance offered in this study design is also 




Figure 1: Potential effects of insurance on motivation in both experiments 







3. Empirical Analysis 
In the following, we will first describe the participants of the different experiments and show 
balancing tables by treatments (Section 3.1), before we consider some descriptive results on 
the uptake of insurance (Section 3.2). Afterwards, in Section 3.3, we employ regression 
models to identify crowding effects on solidarity transfers caused by the availability of 
insurance. Section 3.4 introduces evidence from an additional variant of the Communication 
Experiment, where we tried to eliminate strategic motives. 
 
3.1 Sample Description and Balancing Tests 
In the Communication Experiment we carried out 22 experimental sessions, each in a new 
village chosen at random within the study region. Each session consisted of 15-24 
participants, resulting in a total sample size of 466 individuals. Each participant could transfer 
to both co-players in each round independent of their losses. Our description refers to 229 
individuals playing the standard version of the Communication Experiment described above, 
while an additional treatment was played in the other half of the experimental sessions (see 
section 3.4 for further details). In the Anonymous Experiment we also carried out one session 
per village, randomly drawing 30 locations from coastal villages in the study region, 
amounting to 705 participants. Table 3 shows the balancing test between the two experiments. 
Households were randomly sampled in both experiments (see Appendix A for details of 
sampling procedure). We find that the difference in gender is marginally significant in the two 
experiments maybe owing to our invitation procedure, which  targeted the household head or 
spouse. However, as our main interest is the comparison of treatment effects within each 
experiment we do not think these small imbalances are of any importance for the 





Table 3: Sample characteristics Communication versus Anonymous Experiment 
 Communication Anonymous Diff. P value 
Age 43.2 41.4 -1.8 0.1362 
Male 0.27 0.39 0.12 0.0592 
College 0.27 0.20 -0.07 0.1221 
Share of life in spent village
1
 0.71 0.75 0.05 0.1327 
Regular income? 0.24 0.24 0.01 0.8552 
Monthly hh income
2
 3853 4137 284 0.3332 
N 229 705 
  
Notes: P values from OLS regressions on group dummy with standard errors clustered at the village level, 
1
 One 
observation in the Communication and two in the Anonymous Experiment missing. 
2
 Three observations in the 
Communication Experiment missing. 
 
Besides the differences over the two experiments, Table 4 shows balancing tests within each 
experiment for the two randomly assigned insurance treatments.  
 
Table 4: Balancing table for insurance treatments, by experiment 














Diff. P value 
Age 43.3 43.1 -0.2 0.9202 41.4 41.5 0.1 0.9019 
Male 0.23 0.29 0.06 0.5208 0.41 0.35 -0.06 0.3711 
College 0.25 0.27 0.03 0.6984 0.18 0.22 0.04 0.2279 
Share of life in village
1
 0.75 0.69 -0.06 0.1502 0.75 0.77 0.02 0.4303 
Regular income? 0.26 0.23 -0.04 0.7415 0.24 0.25 0.01 0.7698 
Monthly hh income
2
 4058 3772 -286 0.4629 4137 4137 0 0.9992 
N 65 164 
  
469 236   
Notes: P values from OLS regressions on group dummy with standard errors clustered at the village level, 
1
 One 
observation in the Communication and two in the Anonymous Experiment missing. 
2
 Three observations in the 
Communication Experiment missing. 
 
3.2 Insurance Uptake 
A first finding is that the safer lottery options are frequently demanded by participants: On 
average more than 40% of participants ‘buy’ an insurance if they have the possibility to do so 
(Communication: 40.9%, Anonymous: 43.2%). Note that in the Communication Experiment 
we had two different options (insurance 1 and 2, compare Table 1), but the demand for the 
two policies is nearly identical (41.0% versus 40.7%). The similar insurance demand levels 
suggest that differences in the crowding-out effect should not be driven by differential 





Probit regression results for individual characteristics of those persons who "bought" 
insurance are provided in Appendix Table A2. Only in the Anonymous Experiment we find 
that older people are more likely (5% significance level) and men are less likely (10% 
significance level) to purchase insurance. However, pooling the data of both experiments 
renders those estimates insignificant.  
 
3.3 Testing for Crowding Effects 
We conceptualize solidarity as transfers Tij from the better-off i to the worse-off j given the 
inequality (Yi - Yj) of pre-transfer payoffs Y. This is straightforward in the Anonymous 
Experiment, as only the better-off could transfer to the worse-off. However, in the 
Communication Experiment also participants, who lost part of their endowment, could 
transfer money. Hence, we define solidarity as net transfers (Tij = Ti - Tj) given pre-transfer 
differences (Yi - Yj) to measure effective redistribution from the better-off to the worse-off. 
This implies that solidarity in both experiments is given by the net transfer function 
  ij i jT Y Y  if Yi > Yj. For our econometric specification, we linearize the function as follows: 
 (1)      ij i i ijj jT Y Y Y Y        
The linearization obviously involves an assumption, but we do not think that it is particularly 
strong, given the empirical relationship observed between Tij and Yi - Yj. Figure 2 shows the 
result of a nonparametric smoothing, estimating the expected solidarity transfer given 
differences between sender and recipient before transfers were made (solid line) for both 
experiments. Depending on the size of the shock and whether subjects purchased insurance, 
differences between individuals vary substantially, both in the Communication and the 
Anonymous Experiment. Due to the different parameters outlined in Table 1 the possible 
difference between a loser and a winner ranges from 10 to 180 in the Communication 
Experiment and from 100 to 200 in the Anonymous Experiment (see also Appendix Figure 
A.2 for a histogram). Figure 2 clearly confirms that redistribution is sensitive to pre-transfer 
differences and indicates that the relationship can be approximated well with a linear function 
(dashed line). Note that the nonparametric fit is within the confidence bounds of the linear 
estimation.
15
 The slope of these linear estimations (   from Equation 1) is to a large extent 
responsible for effective redistribution. In the case of full redistribution amongst equals, a 
three-person group would implement  0.33  ij i jT Y Y  . 
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of solidarity transfers to inequality (Yi - Yj): nonparametric fit vs. linear 
approximation  
 
Note: The solid line shows predictions from a local constant smoothing (Gaussian kernel, bandwidth 25), while 
the dotted line illustrates the linear specification (95% confidence intervals shaded in grey, account for clustering 
of standard errors at the session level). Note that pre-transfer differences in the Anonymous Experiment only 
range from 100-200 (see Figure A2 for the empirical distribution). 
 
For estimating crowding-out or crowding-in effects, we interact the sensitivity parameter with 
the availability of insurance ( 1vD   in the insurance treatment):  
 (2)         j jij i j i v i ijT Y Y Y Y Y YD           
Note that given the functional form specified, 
1 00 [ |  [ ]|  ]j
D D
ij i ij i jT Y Y T Y YE E
     . In 
other words, the interaction of the difference with the availability of insurance indicates 
whether net transfers, given initial differences, increased ( 0  , crowding-in) or decreased (
0  , crowding-out) due to the availability of insurance. The approximation with a linear 
functional form allows us to estimate crowding effects with one parameter only. Even if the 
linear functional form would not perfectly describe the transfer curves, though, we should still 
be able to pick up relevant crowding effects. In particular, if one curve dominates the other 
this necessarily leads to a higher slope in the linearization.  
Table 5 shows the result of estimating Equation 2 for the two experiments. Column 1a 
shows the overall result for the Communication Experiment, which suggests that net transfers 
are crowded out once insurance is available. The sensitivity to inequality decreases by 
roughly 25% due to the availability of insurance. The coefficient Difference indicates that 
inequality of 10 PhP leads to an increase in transfers by 1.7 PhP without insurance but only to 
an increase of 1.3 PhP when insurance is available. In Column 1b we restrict the analysis to 






















































and insignificant results, but with qualitatively very similar coefficients. In column 1c we 
restrict the Communication Experiment results to cases where the group of three only 
experienced one shock, similar to the design of the Anonymous Experiment. The interation 
effect with insurance remains stable, but becomes significant at the 5% level in this 
subsample. The results appear to be robust, which suggests that insurance crowds 
outsolidarity transfers in the non-anonymous design with communication. In specification 2 
we show the estimation for the Anonymous Experiment. Here we find a positive effect of the 
availability of insurance on net transfers. The positive effect due to insurance makes up 
almost 60% ofthe main effect (Difference (Yi - Yj)).
16
 Thus, when anonymity is given and 
communication is precluded there is no crowding-out effect, arguably because only intrinsic 
motives for giving are salient in this situation. This suggests that crowding-out in the 
Communication Experiment is due to a reduction in strategic motives and not a reduction of 
intrinsic motives.  
As noted above, the linear prediction is an approximation of the true relationship 
between transfers and pre-transfer differences, but should pick up relevant crowding effects 
even in the absence of an exactly linear relationship. To make sure that the linear function 
does not hide important nonlinearities, though, we again compare our linear predictions to a 
nonparametric estimation. Figure 3 displays our main linear regression results (grey) together 
with a non-parametric smoothing (black) in the case of insurance (dashed lines) and no 
insurance (solid lines). Even though the nonparametric graphs do not exactly follow a linear 
trend, they correspond nicely to our linear estimations. In the Communication Experiment the 
transfer levels in the insurance treatment are lower at any given point in the distribution of pre 
transfer differences while the opposite holds for the Anonymous Experiment where the 
transfers are higher in the insurance treatment. Another way to illustrate the crowding-out 
effect in the Communication Experiment is by looking at the outcomes of unprotected 
individuals who face a severe loss: While they on average receive net transfers of 55.8 PhP 
from their co-players in the treatment without insurance, it is only 35.9 PhP in the insurance 
treatment. This means that in particular those who do not opt for insurance end up being more 
vulnerable in this setup when insurance is available.  
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 We repeat all those regressions including a set of control variables and find qualitatively similar results (see 





Table 5: Crowding effects in the Communication experiment and the Anonymous Experiment 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2) 
 Communication Experiment  Anonymous Experiment 
 All Round1 only One shock only  
     
Difference (Yi - Yj) 0.173*** 0.168*** 0.109** 0.0515* 
 (0) (0) (0.0444) (0.0298) 
 [0] [0] [0.0160] [0.0838] 
Insurance x Difference -0.0433* -0.0444 -0.0469** 0.0300* 
 (0.0240) (0.0358) (0.0234) (0.0182) 
 [0.0720] [0.216] [0.0480] [0.0998] 
N 313 173 115 705 
Note: P-values (in square brackets) obtained via wild clustered bootstrap inference (Cameron, Gelbach, and 
Miller 2008), hence standard errors are ‘rigged’ but reported in parentheses to illustrate level of significance, 
clustered at the session level, 500 bootstrap iterations,   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
 
Figure 3: Solidarity by Insurance Treatment: Local polynomial smoothing vs. linear fit 
 
Note: The black lines show predictions from a local constant smoothing (Gaussian kernel, bandwidth 25), while 
the grey lines illustrate the linear specifications estimated in Table 5 column1a (left) and Table 5 column 2 




We can also compare our results with the findings of Lenel and Steiner (2017) who 
find that intrinsic motives are decreased if individuals in need forwent the opportunity to 
purchase insurance. We create a similar condition by distinguishing between recipients who 
did purchase insurance before and those who did not. To test whether we get different results 
by insurance status of the recipient, we interact the crowding effect (Insurance x Difference) 
with a dummy indicating whether the recipient is insured (Recipient insured). Table 6 shows 
the estimated coefficients of this specification. We do not find significant differences in 
crowding effects, neither in the Communication Experiment nor in the Anonymous 
Experiment. This is mainly due to the large standard errors, though. In particular in the 






















































transfers. In the anonymous setting, where only intrinsic motives should be relevant, the 
interaction is positive and close to zero. We hence do not find that the information about the 
insurance decision of the recipient matters for solidarity transfers in the anonymous setup.  
 
Table 6: Crowding effects in both experiments by insurance status of recipient 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2) 
 Communication Experiment  Anonymous Experiment 
 All Round1 only One shock only  
     
Difference (Yi - Yj) 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.0985** 0.0550* 
 (0) (0) (0.0453) (0.0310) 
 [0] [0] [0.0320] [0.0758] 
Insurance x Difference -0.0370 -0.0369 -0.0410* 0.0270 
 (0.0253) (0.0437) (0.0241) (0.0175) 
 [0.144] [0.400] [0.0920] [0.124] 
Insurance x Difference  -0.0498 -0.0245 -0.0551 0.0116 
x Recipient insured (0.0525) (0.0563) (0.0556) (0.0199) 
 [0.344] [0.664] [0.324] [0.559] 
N 313 173 115 705 
Note: P-values (in square brackets) obtained via wild clustered bootstrap inference (Cameron, Gelbach, and 
Miller 2008), hence standard errors are ‘rigged’ but reported in parentheses to illustrate level of significance, 




3.4 Communication Experiment with Secret Hiding 
The above interpretation that insurance crowds out strategic motives for solidarity but crowds 
in intrinsic motivation can be sustained by a further treatment which we implemented in 11 
additional sessions of the Communication Experiment. In order to minimize the strategic 
reciprocal pressure from communication and non-anonymity, we implemented the possibility 
of income hiding. In this setup, players could pretend to have experienced an income shock, 
thereby hiding some of their money from the other two players in their risk sharing group. 
The hiding option provides a specific excuse not to help: Not having enough cash at hand. 
Thus, solidarity transfers become much more intrinsic in this set-up, similar to the 
Anonymous Experiments. Our intention was that the hiding option should reduce strategic 
pressure to give without inducing transfers from the worse-off to the better-off. Hence, we 
permitted hiding up to the equivalent of a medium shock but not pretending catastrophic 
shocks. To avoid influencing participants we did not call this ‘hiding’, but framed this option 
as a possibility to “put money in a lockbox”. If the die result was 1, 2 or 3 (i.e. no shock) 
individuals could decide to hide the monetary difference to a medium shock in a secret 




informed about the amount the person retained after the lottery/lockbox stage (i.e. the other 
members could not know if money was hidden). Similar to the other experiments we observe 
an insurance uptake of 44% and no systematic problems with the balancing of covariates in 
this treatment (see Table A.5).   
The hiding option was used by a large majority of participants: 94% of those who 
suffered no loss pretended to have suffered a medium shock. Table 7 shows how the results 
change in this treatment. In our main specification (1a), sensitivity of solidarity transfers to 
the difference (Yi - Yj) decreases substantially compared to the situation without income 
hiding. The introduction of formal insurance, however, does not lead to significant crowding-
out effects on transfers anymore. To the contrary, the significantly positive interaction effect 
(Insurance x Difference) suggests a crowding-in of solidarity transfers when insurance is 
available. In Figure A2 we show the corresponding non-parametric smoothing graphs, which 
confirm that the transfers with insurance availability strictly dominate the transfers without 
insurance. This is similar to the results from the Anonymous Experiment where strategic 
motives have been eliminated as well. This result is robust to restricting the estimation to the 
first round only and to cases with only one shock per group. We interpret these results as 
additional evidence that intrinsic motivations are not crowded-out but rather crowded-in by 
access to insurance.   
 
Table 7: Crowding effects with hiding opportunity in the Communication Experiment 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) 
 All Round1 only One shock only 
    
Difference (Yi - Yj) 0.0717*** 0.0399* 0.165** 
 (0) (0.0223) (0.0677) 
 [0] [0.0758] [0.0160] 
Insurance x Difference 0.0587* 0.0606* 0.0936** 
 (0.0356) (0.0310) (0.0442) 
 [0.0998] [0.0519] [0.0359] 
N 307 165 136 
Note: P-values (in square brackets) obtained via wild clustered bootstrap inference (Cameron, Gelbach, and 
Miller 2008), hence standard errors are ‘rigged’ but reported in parentheses to illustrate level of significance, 
clustered at the session level, 500 bootstrap iterations,   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
 
4. Discussion  
In order to understand crowding effects on informal risk-sharing (and in other 
domains) it is important to analyze what drives informal transfers. Note that we broadly 




to engage in strategic reciprocal risk-sharing. The value of complying with the arrangement is 
derived from the prospect of future interaction and, thus, the threat of punishment or 
reputational loss in case of non-compliance. The second motive is intrinsic solidarity. It does 
not require any future interaction and is mainly based on pro-social preferences. Both types of 
motives have been shown to play a role in several experiments (Leider et al. 2009; Ligon and 
Schechter 2012). Also, both motives can potentially be crowded-out, which is undesirable in 
itself. It nevertheless seems important to distinguish between these two motives for at least 
two reasons: First, pure incentive effects might easily be reverted by removing the 
intervention, while crowding-out of intrinsic motives might be more persistent even after 
removing the intervention (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). Second, if markets crowd out 
morality per se, introducing insurance products may have negative consequences on other 
spheres of life as well, even if those are unrelated to risk-sharing arrangements. This might be 
especially harmful in small rural communities where pro-social behavior is instrumental for 
many other non-market exchanges.  
Our key assumption is that the differences in the two experimental designs we studied 
in the Philippines influence the relative importance of strategic vis-à-vis intrinsic motives and, 
hence, induce different kinds of crowding effects, as outlined in section II.4.
17
 In the 
Anonymous Experiment, where only intrinsic motives should be present, we find that 
introducing insurance does not lead to crowding-out. While it is hard to identify what exactly 
drives effects here, we do not find evidence that solidarity transfers react to insurance uptake 
of recipients (specification 2 of Table 6). Consequently, we cannot confirm the negative effect 
found by Lenel and Steiner (2017). One reason may be that our setup offers an insurance 
option which is costly and thereby not clearly preferential to no insurance. Overall, we even 
find reinforcing effects of the insurance option on solidarity transfers in the setting focusing 
more on intrinsic motivation. Such situations where pro-social preferences and incentives 
complement each other are not uncommon, though. Of the 50 papers surveyed by Bowles and 
Polanía-Reyes (2012), 31% indeed reported crowding-in effects.  
In the Communication Experiment, where strategic motives should play a role, we find 
crowding-out effects. Based on the theoretical literature related to risk-sharing (Coate and 
Ravallion 1993; Attanasio and Ríos-Rull 2000) we would indeed expect strategic concerns to 
be more susceptible to a crowding-out effect, as the availability of insurance decreases future 
mutual benefits (compare results by Lin, Liu, and Meng 2014). These considerations are 
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 We cannot directly test this assumption, e.g. by comparing absolute levels of transfer between the experiments, 
as such a comparison is confounded by other design differences (see Appendix Table A1). Also, it is unclear 




corroborated by our results from the secret hiding treatment (which offers a ceteris paribus 
test on reducing strategic incentives) as well as the Anonymous Experiment, where mainly 
intrinsic motives are relevant for transfer decisions. Given the theoretical prediction and our 
evidence from the two intrinsic settings, we argue that the crowding-out effect in the 
Communication Experiment is mainly based on strategic considerations.  
In reality, different mental processes might be responsible for crowding effects, both 
regarding strategic as well as intrinsic motives. The relative strength of these mental processes 
not only depends on the nature of the intervention but also on the personality of the person 
exposed to the intervention. For example, a financial incentive might induce extrinsically 
motivated people to react in line with the incentive, while it may discourage intrinsically 
motivated people. Thus, the overall effect of the incentive might be smaller than expected and 
might even be negative. In the Communication Experiment our theoretical considerations 
clearly suggest that strategically motivated people should respond to the insurance 
intervention most. The heterogeneity is more ambiguous in the Anonymous Experiment, 
where people help each other based on intrinsic motives. The crowding-in effect could stem 
from egoistic people becoming more pro-social after the intervention or altruistic people 
feeling even more empowered and acting more pro-social.
18
  
In the Anonymous Experiment we are able to explore these heterogeneities further by 
conditioning our analysis on solidarity types (inspired by the notion of ‘conditional 
cooperation’ from public good games, see Keser and van Winden 2000; Fischbacher, Gächter, 
and Fehr 2001). In particular, we can classify participants into altruistic, egoistic and 
conditional types, which can be used as a proxy for motivational types.
19
 For the following 
analysis, detailed in the Appendix A.4, we assume that altruistic people have a stronger 
intrinsic motivation to help others, while more egoistic people are mainly motivated by 
strategic concerns.  
In the intrinsic setup of the Anonymous Experiment we find that especially egoistic 
participants react positively to the introduction of insurance, while altruistic people do not 
change their donation (see Tables A7 and A8). In the Communication Experiment with 
hiding, egoistic individuals also seem to exhibit the strongest crowding-in effect (see Table 
A8). Thus, in the experimental designs focusing on intrinsic motives, crowding-in effects 
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 Similarly, a potential crowding-out of pro-social behavior could be due to altruistic people becoming less pro-
social in the environment with an intervention or because egoistic people become even less pro-social. 
19
 The data was collected one round prior to the introduction of the insurance scheme. Egoistic participants 
showed a preference for donating little, no matter what their partner in the group donates, altruistic participants 




seem to be driven by those subjects who were initially not intrinsically motivated.
20
 In the 
standard Communication Experiment with stronger strategic motives, however, we find that 
the largest crowding-out effects stem from seemingly egoistic participants (see Table A8). 
This latter result is clearly in line with our theoretical conjecture derived above. Thus, the 
exploration of heterogeneous effects reveals an interesting pattern which in particular 
strengthens our result on crowding-out of strategic motives and might be worth further 
exploring in future research. 
Even though “only” strategic transfer motives seem to be crowded out by the 
introduction of insurance this may still limit the protective effect of insurance schemes. 
Especially those participants who remain uninsured and experience a catastrophic shock 
become worse off compared to a situation without insurance. Such cases obviously become 
less relevant in situations with higher take-up or even mandatory insurance, for example in 
case of a government policy. One may question the desirability of strategic solidarity, though. 
Forms of “forced” solidarity may have negative consequences in real life, for example 
limiting saving and business development (e.g. Grimm, Hartwig, and Lay 2017). Crowding-
out effect may, thus, have positive aspects as well. Given the data at hand, we cannot infer 
how much of the strategic transfers is perceived to be forced and how much is based on a 
mutually advantageous risk-sharing contract.  
As stated earlier the two experiments differ along several dimensions (see Appendix 
Table A1). Although anonymity and communication offer plausible theoretical priors backed 
up by empirical studies underlining the difference between anonymity and communication, 
we cannot rule out that other design elements, have additionally contributed to the divergent 
results. Certainly, further research is needed to fully understand the contextual factors leading 
to either a crowding-in or crowding-out effect. The strength of laboratory experiments is that 
they offer a suitable tool to study a variety of contextual and cultural conditions leading to 
motivational crowding-in and crowding-out, and thereby contribute to building a diagnostic 
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 One possible explanation might be that solidarity without insurance is considered as one’s duty and may not 
create such a positive self-image - in particular for those who are initially less motivated to help. However, when 
insurance is available solidarity may feel more voluntary as it is legitimate to disengage and withdraw one’s 
help. This change in perception from a moral duty to a voluntary act of giving increases self-determination and 





Informal risk-sharing is frequent in many developing countries, but usually cannot 
offer full protection because of limited enforcement mechanisms. In addition, even if people 
voluntarily want to help each other in case of shocks they may not be able to do so in the case 
of covariate shocks, e.g. if the entire network is affected by a disease or other catastrophic 
events. These imperfections of informal risk-sharing might be resolved by the introduction of 
formal insurance products tailored to the needs of the poor. However, there is substantial 
evidence that economic interventions can interfere with intrinsic motives which are important 
drivers of pro-social behavior in personal exchange settings (Frey and Jegen 2001; Bénabou 
and Tirole 2006; Bowles 2008; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011).  
In this paper we present evidence from two behavioral experiments with villagers in 
the Philippines investigating their reaction to the introduction of insurance. Each of the 
experiments investigates whether insurance schemes can undermine (“crowd out”) or 
reinforce (“crowd in”) people's intrinsic motivations or strategic motives to engage in 
solidarity. Our findings suggest that strategic motives are crowded out by insurance schemes, 
which is in line with limited commitment models of risk sharing, while intrinsic motives may 
even be crowded-in. We do not find evidence that the insurance choice by transfer recipients 




Appendix A Implementation Details and Econometric Sensitivity Analysis 
Appendix A.1 Details of the Implementation 
 
The experiments share a common set-up with a group of three villagers who stay 
together throughout the game, make private decisions that are never revealed and where only 
one game is paid out at random. We employed the same field assistants for all sessions, who 
received extensive training and were supervised by the team of at least two authors. 
Participants were seated separately and no group was ever without supervision of at least one 
assistant. After a short socio-demographic survey, participants were seated to receive the 
introduction to the workshop, answered test questions, conducted the experiments, completed 
a final survey and were handed out the payment from one randomly chosen game. The table 
below and the following sections describe the design, implementation and sampling in more 
detail.  
 
Table A1 Summary of design and implementation details 
 Communication Experiment Anonymous Experiment 
Location Western Visayas (Region VI), in 
the province of Iloilo. 
Western Visayas (Region VI), in the province of 
Iloilo.  
Village Sampling Random villages excluding  urban 
and high income Municipalities 
Random coastal villages, random households 
excluding  urban and high income 
Municipalities 
Household Sampling 8 random households per village. 
Each invites two peers 
9 random households per village. Each invites 
two peers 
Network members Random allocation whether to 
play with group of peers or none 
of the peers.  
Recorded decisions to both a peer and an 
anonymous non-peer. We only use the transfer 
to the anonymous non-peer in this paper. 
Experiment conducted Summer 2010 Summer 2012 
Game(s) of interest Round 1 & 2 Round 1 
No. of player/session 15-24 27 
No. of sessions total 22 30 
No. of sessions 
considered 




Initial endowment 200 200 
Size of shock -180, -100 -200, -100 (Low Risk Treatment) 
No. of losers in group 0, 1, 2 or 3 1 
Loser determined Rolling a die Drawing a ball 
Transfer Unrestricted 0-70 
Whom to transfer To anyone in the group Only to loser 
Transfer money to 
multiple players?   
yes no 
When to decide on 
transfer? 
after knowing payoff of all players before knowing payoff of all players (strategy 
method) 
Average money earned 237 PhP 235 PhP 
Average money earned 
in US$ in year of study 
6$ 6$ 









We carried out 22 experimental sessions, each in a new location. Each session consisted of 
15-24 participants, resulting in a total sample size of 466 individuals (each taking two transfer 
decisions per round over three rounds). A participant completing the experiment earned on 
average 237 PhP (equivalent to 5-6 USD in 2010), including a show-up fee of 100 PhP.  
The groups stayed together during all three rounds, and people in a group could identify the 
other two members. We did not allow for communication after the transfer choice. The 
instructor pointed out that communication within groups is forbidden outside the 
communication stage, that violations of the treatment protocol will lead to the exclusion from 
the experiment, that three experiments will be played independently from each other and that 
only one of them will be paid out at random. The instructor explained the decision situations 
to all participants jointly, and everybody received a plastic envelope with graphical 
instructions for this round and their initial endowment of 200 PhP in the form of play money.  
Before participants went to private room 1 to play the lottery, they answered a set of 
questions in order to test their understanding of the experiment.
21
 If the current round 
permited insurance options (see Table 2), participants were given a choice of lotteries. 
Otherwise only the standard lottery (Option A) was available.
22
 After the participants made 
their lottery choice and paid the related price, they rolled a die to determine the loss. Where 
secret hiding was available, players with no shock could then decide to hide a fixed amount of 
their money or not. After all participants had chosen whether to hide or not, the participants 
were allowed to talk for approximately five minutes, before each individual separately went to 
another private room 2. At this point, the amount that the two co-players had taken out of the 
first private room was revealed (endowment, minus insurance premium, minus loss due to 
shock, minus hidden income). Importantly, only the net payout was revealed, and not whether 
insurance had been bought, or whether shocks had taken place or whether resources had been 
hidden. From these payouts, however, one could infer who had purchased insurance and who 
had not. The participant then decided about transfers, i.e. if and how much to give to each of 
the co-players. Everybody was completely free in the way he or she shared the money. These 
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 The test questions can be found in the appendix. When participants made mistakes, the research assistants 
explained the setup once more. Only those who finally answered all questions correctly were allowed to 
participate, but fortunately we only had to exclude less than 1% of all participants. 
22
 Option A is not framed as the default option, but lotteries are instead assigned neutral names: Angola (A), 
Botswana (B) and Cameroon (C). However, participants knew that one option is for free, while potential 




transfers were never revealed to anyone. Only after all three rounds had been completed and 
after one round ha randomly been chosen for pay-out,  the players received any feedback: 
They received cash in hand and from the received cash they could partly deduce whether they 
had received any transfers, still without knowing from whom. Hence, transfers from the past 
could not affect behavior in future rounds. The complete experimental procedure of one round 
is summarized in Figure A1. 
 




To ensure that experimental conditions did not change, the same team of ten assistants was 
employed for the same job all the time, strictly adhering to the experimental protocol (i.e. the 
same person always read the protocol, the same assistants were sitting in room 1 and room 2 
etc). In both private rooms, decisions were recorded by the research team. Communication 
within a group was restricted to the communication stage. Whenever there was an unclear 
situation, one of the authors was present to decide on the issue.  
 
Anonymous Experiment 
In each of the 30 villages we carried out only one session where we aimed at establishing nine 
groups of three participants. In reality, some of the invited participants could not take part and 
one group even dropped out during the experiment. Fortunately, only six groups did not show 
up or participate fully, such that we ended up with 264 groups and  792 individuals who 
completed the experiment. One particularity of our sampling strategy was that we had 
specifically oversampled fishermen as participants (because of an additional research question 




excluded this additional sample consisting of only full-time fishermen.
23
 The remaining 
sample consists of 705 participants (still including randomly sampled fishermen). As 
explained in the subsection above, each of the nine originally invited villagers had to bring 
two friends or relatives to the experiment workshop. Each of the nine persons we originally 
invited was matched with one peer and one anonymous player (who was a peer of someone 
else). In this paper we exclusively focus on the behavior towards participants remaining fully 
anonymous to each other. 
Instructions were always read out loud by the same person to all players. During the 
instruction we illustrated all decisions by showing posters and providing examples of 
solidarity transfers. All decisions took place in private with an assistant who could re-explain 
the experiment every time before asking a set of control questions. When making their 
decisions, posters of the different transfer choices were available to the players.  
After the three games, people answered a post-experiment survey. Since we wanted to keep 
games independent from each other and stakes for each round high, we decided to pay out the 
earnings from one random game. Participants were only informed about their total earnings 
and could not infer how exactly it was composed. Unobserved components of the earnings 
were the transfers from the peer, transfers from the anonymous co-player and the rewards for 
correct guesses (players were not told whether their guess was correct). In total, the procedure 
took about four hours. Earnings were paid out in private and most participants left 
individually and – as far as we could observe – without revealing earnings to other 
participants.  
 
Appendix A.2 Sampling 
The experiments were conducted in the Western Visayas (Region VI), in the province of 
Iloilo. Existing databases suggest that the region is a slightly disadvantaged but not 
unrepresentative region within the Philippines.
24
 A two-stage random sampling procedure was 
applied throughout both experiments. First, we randomly determined the experimental sites, 
i.e. we randomly selected barangays, which represent the lowest administrative level in the 
Philippines and are comparable to a village in rural areas. Municipalities from the first income 
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 When including the oversampled fishermen in our analysis, the main results remain stable. The samples from 
the Anonymous and Communication Experiment now differ significantly, however, as fishermen happen to have 
very distinct socio-demographic characteristics. 
24
 The Demographic and Health Survey 2008 for the Philippines and a household survey conducted by the 
University of Mannheim in 2009 suggest the following: educational attainment is slightly below national 




class (high income) and urban locations were excluded from the sampling process.
25
 Likewise 
very small (population below 500) and very big (population higher than 3000) barangays were 
not considered to make the sample more homogenous.
26
 Permission of the Punong Barangay 
(elected village representative) to conduct the research was obtained in all but one barangay, 
leading to its replacement by another random site. We made all possible efforts to visit also 
remote locations, and all 22 locations of the sample could finally be reached for the 
Communication Experiment. 
Second, in each selected barangay we randomly drew 8 households. Each of these 8 
selected households received letters for inviting two additional representatives from distinct 
households. Thereby, we had up to 24 participants for each experimental site. Our recruiters 
went to the location some days prior to the experiment, asked the barangay officials for 
permission to run the experiment, ensured the availability of facilities for the workshops and 
requested a list of households from which eight households were randomly selected. Only the 
household head or the spouse of a household head were allowed to take part in the workshop.  
The exact combination of treatments played in one site according to the treatment plan 
was also determined randomly, but the randomization had to pass a balancing test regarding 
village size across the treatments. The target population consists of low-income households in 
rural or partially urban areas.  
 
 In the Anonymous Experiment, we focused on 30 rural coastal villages in the 
provinces of Antique, Guimaras and Iloilo, as these criteria ensure that the sample is relatively 
comparable to a representative village in the Philippines.
27
 Within each village, we sampled 
up to nine participants, who each had to bring two friends or relatives to the experiment 
workshop. Part of the participants was sample was chosen completely at random, but because 
of an additional research question unrelated to this paper, we specifically oversampled three 
fishermen per village. We therefore exclude a total of 87 oversampled fishermen from our 
analysis, leaving us with 705 participants. 
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 Income Classification based on Department of Finance Department Order No.20-05 Effective July 29, 2005 
(source: http://www.nscb.gov.ph). 
26
 Four of the 22 barangay were already chosen at random for an earlier household survey. To link the data from 
both studies they were included even though one barangay was slightly too small (350) and another one slightly 
too large (3123). 
27
 The largest part of the Filipino population lives along the coast, the majority in rural areas. Descriptive 
statistics also show that the study region is comparable to the Filipino average regarding wealth and education. 
At the same time it is homogeneous with respect to the local dialect used which facilitated the research in the 




Appendix A.3 Robustness Tests and Additional Analyses 
Buying insurance was voluntary and a substantial number of participants did not buy 
insurance. In the following two tables we examine how those individuals who bought 
insurance in our experiment differ from those who did not. 
 
Table A2: Probit regression explaining insurance uptake in round 1 










     
Age -0.00353 0.0165** -0.000996 0.00483 
 (0.00852) (0.00773) (0.00852) (0.00464) 
Male -0.0134 -0.333* 0.255 -0.0625 
 (0.227) (0.178) (0.209) (0.115) 
HH size -0.0271 -0.0483 -0.0284 -0.0321 
 (0.0505) (0.0449) (0.0448) (0.0263) 
College -0.103 -0.233 0.306 -0.0333 
 (0.244) (0.209) (0.238) (0.129) 
Share of life in village -0.304 0.0826 -0.506* -0.228 
 (0.298) (0.274) (0.287) (0.161) 
Regular income? 0.172 0.0666 0.0288 0.121 
 (0.254) (0.198) (0.240) (0.129) 
Monthly hh income 7.62e-06 -6.98e-06 -1.48e-05 -4.60e-06 
 (4.08e-05) (2.20e-05) (5.74e-05) (1.77e-05) 
Constant 0.243 -0.498 0.291 -0.0282 
 (0.513) (0.428) (0.478) (0.267) 
     
Observations 161 235 168 564 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses,   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
  
 
Table A3: Test of linearization 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b)  (5) (6)  
 Communication Experiment Anonymous Experiment Communication Experiment  
with hiding 
          
Difference (Yi- Yj) 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.0780 0.0617** 0.0617** 0.535 0.0972** 0.0972*** -0.0437 
 (0.0297) (0) (0.0951) (0.0250) (0.0294) (0.358) (0.0432) (0.0335) (0.0690) 
Difference squared    0.000336   -0.00158   0.000670* 
   (0.000385)   (0.00119)   (0.000306) 
Constant 0.144 0.144 3.131 21.39*** 21.39*** -10.82 -3.543 -3.543 2.385 
 (2.978) (2.862) (5.435) (3.882) (0) (24.31) (3.429) (3.677) (3.763) 
          
Observations 295 295 295 705 286 705 295 705 295 
Standard errors clustered wild BS clustered clustered wild BS clustered clustered wild BS clustered 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses account for intra-village correlation either by using cluster-robust 
standard errors (“clustered ) or by using a wild clustered bootstrap (“wild BS ) following  Cameron, Gelbach, 
and Miller (2008) with 500 bootstrap iterations (standard errors are ‘rigged’ but reported to illustrate level of 






Table A4: Estimation including control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Communication Experiment Anonymous  
Experiment 
Communication Experiment  
with hiding 
VARIABLES All Round 1  All Round 1 
      
Difference (Yi - Yj)  0.186*** 0.187*** 0.0530** 0.0725*** 0.0452 
 (0) (0) (0.0268) (0.0272) (0.0323) 
 [0] [0] [0.0479] [0.00798] [0.164] 
Insurance x Difference -0.0500 -0.0644* 0.0289* 0.0609** 0.0613 
 (0.0320) (0.0365) (0.0174) (0.0260) (0.0430) 
 [0.120] [0.0800] [0.0958] [0.0200] [0.156] 
Age 0.182** 0.382*** 0.0641 -0.0418 0.0984 
 (0.0847) (0.131) (0.0549) (0.0785) (0.133) 
 [0.0320] [0.00400] [0.244] [0.595] [0.459] 
Male 11.90*** 13.26*** 1.777 2.761 1.594 
 (0) (0) (1.784) (3.533) (4.108) 
 [0] [0] [0.319] [0.435] [0.699] 
HH size 1.186* 1.267 0.420 0.577 0.584 
 (0.618) (0.775) (0.336) (0.532) (0.838) 
 [0.0560] [0.104] [0.212] [0.279] [0.487] 
College 3.686 4.416 3.383 -4.160 -2.594 
 (4.088) (4.177) (2.077) (2.838) (3.095) 
 [0.368] [0.292] [0.104] [0.144] [0.403] 
Share of life in village -0.660 -2.637 4.147** 3.836 0.796 
 (4.853) (5.766) (1.717) (4.582) (2.992) 
 [0.892] [0.648] [0.0160] [0.403] [0.790] 
Regular income? 6.879** 6.855 2.821 3.526 0.875 
 (3.115) (4.809) (1.908) (3.095) (3.984) 
 [0.0280] [0.156] [0.140] [0.255] [0.826] 
Monthly hh income -0.000247 -0.00130 9.25e-05 -0.000305 0.000528 
 (0.000821) (0.000958) (0.000132) (0.000412) (0.000594) 
 [0.764] [0.176] [0.483] [0.459] [0.375] 
Constant -18.39 -23.94*** 10.92** -9.201 -13.37 
 (11.15) (8.198) (5.508) (7.806) (9.641) 
 [0.100] [0.00400] [0.0479] [0.240] [0.168] 
      
Observations 308 170 703 302 163 
R-squared 0.188 0.262 0.066 0.107 0.069 
Note: P-values (in square brackets) obtained via wild clustered bootstrap inference (Cameron, Gelbach, and 
Miller 2008), hence standard errors are ‘rigged’ but reported in parentheses to illustrate level of significance, 


















Figure A2: Histogram of differences between sender and recipient 
 





Figure A3: Histogram of differences between sender and recipient, by Insurance Treatment 
(a) Communication Experiment   (b) Anonymous Experiment 
 

























































Table A5: Balancing table for Communication Experiment with income hiding 
 
Communication Experiment 















Diff. P value 
Age 43.2 42.3 -0.9 0.5950 42.2 42.3 0.1 0.9780 
Male 0.27 0.35 0.08 0.2276 0.37 0.35 -0.03 0.8191 
HH size 5.3 5.1 -0.2 0.3188 4.9 5.1 0.2 0.5683 
College 0.27 0.23 -0.03 0.5445 0.22 0.24 0.01 0.8797 
Share of life in village
1
 0.71 0.75 0.04 0.2596 0.82 0.72 -0.09 0.0213 
Regular income? 0.24 0.23 -0.01 0.8852 0.19 0.24 0.05 0.4400 
Monthly hh income
2
 3853 3030 -823 0.0146 3186 2968 -218 0.6944 
N 226 237 
  
67 170   
Notes: P values from OLS regressions on group dummy with standard errors clustered at the village level, 
1
 One 
observation in the treatment without hiding missing. 
2
 Three observations in the treatment without hiding and 




Figure A4: Communication Experiment with Hiding: Local polynomial smoothing vs. linear fit, 
overall and by insurance treatment 
 
Note: Left panel (similar to figure 2): The solid line shows predictions from a local constant smoothing 
(Gaussian kernel, bandwidth 25), while the dotted line illustrates the linear specification (95% confidence 
intervals shaded in grey, account for clustering of standard errors at the session level). Right panel (similar to 
figure 3): The black lines show predictions from a local constant smoothing (Gaussian kernel, bandwidth 25), 
while the grey lines illustrate the linear specifications estimated in Table 7 (1a). Solid lines indicate predictions 

























































Appendix A.4 Analysis of Heterogeneous Responses to Insurance 
 
We have the following conjectures regarding the heterogeneous responses to insurance: 
- When there are only intrinsic motives (Anonymous Experiment) and we observe 
crowding-in, these effects should mainly stem from participants who were not already 
intrinsically motivated. Thus, we should see a higher positive effect for egoists / non-
altruists.  
- When there are mainly strategic motives (Communication Experiment) and we 
observe crowding-out, these effects should mainly stem from participants who were 
mainly strategically motivated. Thus we should see higher negative effects for egoists 
/ non-altruists.  
As described in the Discussion section we elicited behavioral types in an incentivized way 
during the Anonymous Experiment in a round prior to the insurance introduction. We allowed 
participants to specify transfers to co-players, conditional on the solidarity transfers received. 
Aside from unconditional transfers Tij, participant i now also specified conditional transfers: 
For each transfer Tji possibly chosen by co-player j player i specified an amount Tij* to be 
transferred. These latter transfers are a measure of how conditional solidarity is on beliefs to 
receive transfers. In case the co-player j lost, either the amount Tij*(Tji) or Tij was then 
triggered (with equal probability). This ensured incentive-compatibility of both transfer types. 
Egoists are defined by Tij*(.) always ≤ 20, altruists by Tij*(.) always ≥ 50 and conditional 
types by a correlation between Tij* and Tji above 0.84 as well as a difference between the 
minimum and maximum conditional transfer of at least 30. The cutoff correlation of 0.84 was 
chosen because a correlation of this magnitude is significant at the 1% level. All who did not 
match those criteria were not classified (about 20% of participants). Alternative classifications 
yield similar results. Table A7 confirms our conjecture regarding the crowding-in effect in the 
Anonymous Experiment. Column 1 shows that the positive effect comes from those subjects 













Table A7: Anonymous Experiment: Crowding-in by motivational type 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Incentivized Measures 
VARIABLES Egoists Non-Egoists Altruists 
    
Insurance x Difference   0.0455*** 0.0262 0.00194 
 (0.0169) (0.0161) (0.0148) 
 [0.00800] [0.104] [0.896] 
Difference (Yi - Yj) 0.00950 0.0528* 0.132*** 
 (0.0243) (0.0297) (0.0447) 
 [0.696] [0.0760] [0.00400] 
Observations 162 543 104 
Note: P-values (in square brackets) obtained via wild clustered bootstrap inference (Cameron, Gelbach, and 
Miller 2008), hence standard errors are ‘rigged’ but reported in parentheses to illustrate level of significance, 
clustered at the session level, 500 bootstrap iterations,   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Same specification 
as first column in main result tables. “Non-Egoistinclude Conditional Cooperators, Altruists and Others. 
 
Unfortunately, we did not elicit these types in the Communication Experiment. In both 
experiments, however, we tried to elicit survey measures of these types. To avoid social 
desirability bias, we asked participants to characterize helping behavior of people in the 
village in general and believe that this reveals what respondents actually consider an 
appropriate behavior for themselves. Figure A4 shows the response behavior to this question 
in both experiments. We take “Little help(“People are always busy and don’t help so much ) 
as a sign of egoism, while “Always help(“People help each other whenever somebody needs 
help ) should be a sign of altruism.  
Unfortunately, we could only ask the survey measure of types after the experiment, which 
means that responses are potentially driven by the experience of the experiment. Figure A4 
shows the indicated answers to the survey items for both the Communication and Anonymous 
Experiment. Interestingly, the Communication Experiment, which focuses on strategic 
motives, delivers a much less intrinsic impression than the Anonymous Experiment. Very few 
people indicate altruism, while more than 20% indicate egoism.
28
 In this case it makes sense 
to distinguish between egoists and non-egoists. In the Anonymous Experiment there are very 
few participants indicating egoism and more than 50% indicating altruism. We can therefore 






                                                 
28
 Note that while the levels of altruism and egoism might not be comparable between the different experiments, 




Figure A4: Distribution of responses to measure  
  
Note: response to “Which sentence characterizes the behavior of the people in your barangay best?  
Little help:   People are always busy and don’t help so much (“Egoists ) 
Family/friends first:  People help first of all their family and friends when help is needed 
Help reciprocal:  People help only those people they know will also help them 
Always help:  People help each other whenever somebody needs help (“Altruists ) 
 
Table A8 (specification 1 and 2) shows results in the Communication Experiment by 
motivational type. We find that crowding-out of strategic motives almost exclusively stems 
from participants indicating egoism. Specifications 3 and 4 show results for the 
Communication Experiment with hiding, where now mainly intrinsic motives should drive 
solidarity. Similar to the Anonymous Experiments, we again find much stronger crowding-in 
effects amongst participants indicating egoism. Finally, specification 5 and 6 of Table A8 
show the estimates for the Anonymous Experiment where again, the crowding-in effect 
appears slightly stronger (and significant) for non-altruists. 
 
 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














Insurance x Difference -0.141** -0.0107 0.149*** 0.0502 0.0347* 0.0265 
 (0.0626) (0.0285) (0) (0.0370) (0.0198) (0.0220) 
 [0.0280] [0.708] [0] [0.176] [0.0800] [0.228] 
Difference (Yi - Yj) 0.192** 0.160*** -0.0797 0.0943*** 0.0471* 0.0560 
 (0.0893) (0) (0.0555) (0) (0.0254) (0.0371) 
 [0.0360] [0] [0.156] [0] [0.0640] [0.132] 
Observations 61 252 68 239 322 383 
Note: P-values (in square brackets) obtained via wild clustered bootstrap inference (Cameron, Gelbach, and 
Miller 2008), hence standard errors are ‘rigged’ but reported in parentheses to illustrate level of significance, 
clustered at the session level, 500 bootstrap iterations,   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Same specification 














































Appendix B Experimental Protocols 
Appendix B.1 Communication Experiment 
 
When participants arrive 
[Participants answer the pre-questionnaire.] 
[Each participant arriving gets a random player number.] 
[Participants are assigned a seat according to the player number.] 
Basic instructions 
Thank you all for coming today. My name is [local instructor] and this is [researcher]. In this 
experiment today, we want to play some games where you can earn a considerable amount of 
money that you are permitted to keep and take home. In these games you will have to make 
decisions that will influence your personal outcome, but each of you will be given a show-up 
fee of 100 Pesos at the end for sure. [Show a 100 Peso bill.] The whole procedure will last 
around 3 hours. Thank you in advance for your effort and time. 
You should understand that the money you can earn in these games is not [researcher]’s own 
money. It is money given to him by the German government to do a research study, which 
will eventually be part of a book. Many other researchers are carrying out similar games all 
around the world. The games are research. 
1. If at any time you find that this is something that you do not wish to participate in for any 
reason, you are of course free to leave whether we have started the game or not. But if you 
feel uncomfortable already now, or you already know that you will not be able to stay 
for the three to four hours, then you should not participate. 
2. It is very important that you understand the games. Therefore we will check your 
understanding by asking each of you test questions about the rules. If you do not understand 
the rules you may always ask the assistants to explain them. But if you cannot answer the 
test questions after explaining them again, we will have to exclude you from the game. 
3. Before you get handed out your money at the end of the workshop, you are asked to answer 
a questionnaire. It is very important for our research, that you answer all questions seriously. 
You will receive your payment only after completing the questionnaire. 
After knowing these rules, is there anybody who does not like to participate anymore? 







[If necessary explain the following:] 
During the game we are going to use a dice. This is what the dice looks like [show 
dice]. A dice has six sides each of it has the same size and shape. Therefore, the 
chance for each side to be drawn is the same.  On each side of the dice you can see a 
number. The numbers range from 1 to 6. If you throw a dice the important number is 
the one which you see at the top of the dice. This means: the number thrown is the 
number which you can see by looking at the dice from above. I will throw the dice 
three times to show you how it works [throw dice to show example and explain the 
number on top]. During the games your payouts will be determined by throwing the 
dice.  
Each player is provided with an amount of 200 Pesos at the beginning of each game. We play 
the games with play money. That means the bills look similar to real bills and have the same 
value. At the end of the workshop you get your earnings as real Peso money. Here you can 
see some of the play money. [Show play money.] 
There will be different games. At the beginning of each game, each of you will be given 200 
Pesos. While playing the game you might lose some of this 200 Pesos. What you are able to 
keep from the initial 200 Pesos will be important for your final earnings. Your private money 
and the show-up fee are always untouched, so you can only lose money that you received 
from us.  
You will be paid 100 Pesos for coming to the workshop plus the additional earnings that you 
have kept during one round of the experiment. You can keep money in each game depending 
on your decisions. Just one of the games is finally paid out. It is randomly determined by a 
dice which of the three games will be paid out to you. So the outcomes in one game have no 
influence on the outcomes in the other games. After you played the games and answered 
your questionnaire at the end, one by one will come to [researcher], who will hand out these 
earnings to you and you sign the receipt. 
You all received a plastic bag with player number and group number already. The player 
number is your personal number and the group numbers is the same for three of you who will 
play in one group for the whole time. You keep this numbers for all three games of the 
workshop and have to show them at the end in order to get paid. So always remember to 
take the plastic bag with your player number with you. After we have read aloud the 
instructions for the first game of the workshop, we will call you by your player number. 
Please follow the assistant if you are called. 
There are some more rules for communication. If you have questions, always raise your hand 
and wait until one of the assistants comes to you. Then you can ask your question and the 
assistant will answer it. When you are sitting at your table during breaks you are not allowed 
to discuss the game, but you may talk about the weather, politics and so on. If you talk to your 
group members when it is allowed to do so, you may not use threats or swearing. If you do 






[In the following, the instructions vary across the different treatments, as indicated by the 
treatment plan. The relevant parts, shown in Table 2 of the main text, are described below.] 
 
 No Insurance Insurance  
Round 1 Normal Risk 
Normal Risk  
or Insurance 1 
Normal Risk  
or Insurance 2 
Round 2 Normal Risk 
 
[We present the instructions for each of the three treatment variants shown above 
(Normal Risk / Normal Risk or Insurance 1 / Normal Risk or Insurance 2)  






Normal Risk Treatment 
Let’s turn to the game. We have formed groups, each consisting of 3 players. [Explain group 
formation
29
] You will get to know your group members later. They are sitting at another table 
and you are not allowed to talk with other tables while you wait here in the welcome room. 
All of you are given 200 Pesos at the beginning of the game. We give you this amount in form 
of play money. It is already in your plastic bag.  
[Show money] 
Each of you can experience different situations during this game that influence your financial 
outcomes: We will randomly determine whether you are exposed to no event, a medium or a 
catastrophic event. They all occur with different chances. No event happens in 3 out of 6 
cases on average. A medium event happens in 2 out of 6 cases on average. A catastrophic 
event happens once in six times on average. Each of you will roll the dice separately in the 
dice room. 
You go to the dice room by yourself where your player number will be checked. To determine 
whether you face no event, a medium event or a catastrophic event you throw a dice. An event 
goes along with a loss of some of your initial 200 Pesos. This is dice option ANGOLA. 
[Explain points at dice poster A]  
 
 Throwing a 1, 2 or 3 means no event: 
If you are exposed to no event you do not lose any of your money. You can keep all 
your 200 Pesos. 
                                                 
29
 Depending on whether group formation was endogenous or exogenous, insert either:  
- “You were asked to bring some of your friend or relatives with you to the game. As far as possible we 
tried to consider this and assign you to the same group”. 
or 




 Throwing a 4 or 5 means a medium event: 
If the medium event occurs you lose 100 of your initial 200 Pesos 
 Throwing a 6 means a catastrophic event: 
If the catastrophic event occurs you lose 180 Pesos of your initial 200 Pesos. 
If you face an event the amount is taken away according to the severity of the event. Do you 
understand how the loss is determined? What happens if you roll a 2? [Wait for an answer.] 
What happens if you roll a 4? [Wait for an answer.] What happens if you roll a 6? [Wait for 
an answer.] 
[Overview poster]  
 
After you rolled the dice you meet with your group. When the group is complete you have 
some minutes to talk within your group. Then you individually go to the transfer room where 
the assistant will announce the amount your group members took out of the dice room. 
Afterwards you choose how much you want to transfer to the other group members. 
Remember that you are not the only one who can transfer, each of your group can transfer to 
the others. An assistant will ask you whether and how much of your money you transfer to 
your other group mates. This amount will be collected by the assistant in the transfer room. 
You can freely choose how much of the money you have in your hand you transfer and to 
which person you transfer. The rest of your money is noted and collected.  
When everybody is back at the table, new start money is distributed and a new game is 
played. You will only get to know which game is paid out after we finished playing all games.  
Are there any questions or points that remained unclear and shall be explained in more detail? 
Otherwise I will now show the procedure again. 




Now we start with this game. Please follow the assistant that calls you. 
 [Call participants and ask test questions] 











[Group by group meets outside. When group is complete, announce that they can talk.] 
Now you have some minutes to talk, before each of you individually decides what to give to 
others. 
[Give at least 3-5 minutes to talk. Assistants note agreements etc. on their sheet. 
Proceed if transfer room is ready for new group.] 
The talking time is over. Please stop talking and follow the assistant if you are called.  
 [Lead individuals to transfer room and play transfer.]  
Box: Dice procedure (play individually with each of the participants) 
  [People arrive at dice room, enter and close the door] 
My name is xxx and you now can roll the dice to determine your outcome according 
to this chart. [Show lottery chart.] Please show me your player and group number. 
[Note player/group number. Give participant the dice and show how to use it. 
Note result.] 
So you finally have ____ Pesos in your hand. Please go to the place outside. Do not 
talk with your group members until the group is complete and the assistant allows you 
to do so. 







Box: Transfer procedure (play individually with each of the participants) 
  [people arrive at transfer room, enter and close the door] 
Hello. My name is xxx and you can now tell me whether you want to give something 
to your group members. I will note this and the money will be redistributed if this 
round is going to be paid out. Can you please show me your player and group 
number? 
 [Note player/group number.] 
I know that … took ... out of the dice room [read list of money at hand for the 3 
members.]  
Do you want to give something to (other1)? 
(if yes) How much do you want to give? [Note and collect amount] 
Do you want to give something to (other2)? 
(if yes) How much do you want to give? [Note and collect amount] 
You have decided to give __ Pesos to (other1) __ Pesos to (other2). Please go back to 
your seat. 






Normal Risk or Insurance 1 Treatment 
Let’s turn to the game. We have formed groups, each consisting of 3 players. [Explain group 
formation
30
] You will get to know your group members later. They are sitting at another table 
and you are not allowed to talk with other tables while you wait here in the welcome room. 
All of you are given 200 Pesos at the beginning of the game. We give you this amount in form 
of play money. It is already in your plastic bag.  
 [Show money] 
Each of you can experience different situations during this game that influence your financial 
outcomes: We will randomly determine whether you are exposed to no event, a medium or a 
catastrophic event. They all occur with different chances. No event happens in 3 out of 6 
cases on average. A medium event happens in 2 out of 6 cases on average. A catastrophic 
event happens once in six times on average. Each of you will roll the dice separately in the 
dice room.  
You go to the dice room by yourself where your player number will be checked. To determine 
whether you face no event, a medium event or a catastrophic event you throw a dice. An event 
goes along with a loss of some of your initial 200 Pesos. This is dice option ANGOLA. 
[Explain points at dice poster A] 
 
 Throwing a 1, 2 or 3 means no event: 
If you are exposed to no event you do not lose any of your money. You can keep all 
your 200 Pesos. 
                                                 
30
 Depending on whether group formation was endogenous or exogenous, insert either:  
- “You were asked to bring some of your friend or relatives with you to the game. As far as possible we 
tried to consider this and assign you to the same group”. 
or 




 Throwing a 4 or 5 means a medium event: 
If the medium event occurs you lose 100 of your initial 200 Pesos 
 Throwing a 6 means a catastrophic event: 
If the catastrophic event occurs you lose 180 Pesos of your initial 200 Pesos. 
Instead, you have the possibility to purchase dice option BOTSWANA at a price of 45 
Pesos that you can pay from your initial 200 Pesos. So if you decide to purchase this 
option, you have 155 Pesos left before rolling the dice. 
[Show dice poster AB] 
 
With the dice option your catastrophic loss and your medium event loss are only half 
of the losses with dice option ANGOLA. But you have to pay 45 Pesos for sure. 
 E.g. if you roll a 6 and there is a catastrophic event that takes away almost all your 
initial money with dice option ANGOLA, with this dice option you will only loose 
half. Then you finally would have 200 Pesos minus 45 Pesos to buy this dice option 
minus 90 remaining loss, which equals to 65 Pesos. 
 If you roll a 4 or 5 and there is a medium event occurring to you, you would have to 
pay 100 Pesos with option ANGOLA. With dice option BOTSWANA you will only 
lose 50 Pesos. Finally 105 Pesos would remain for you. 
 If you roll a 1, 2 or 3 and no event occurs you finally get 200 Pesos minus 45 Pesos for 





Before rolling the dice you tell the instructor which dice option you prefer. Did you 
understand all this? Can you decide on the options after you roll the dice? With dice option 
ANGOLA what happens if you roll a 1? [Wait for an answer.] And with option 
BOTSWANA what happens if you roll a 1? [Wait for an answer.] With dice option 
ANGOLA what happens if you roll a 4? [Wait for an answer.] And with option 
BOTSWANA? [Wait for an answer.] With dice option ANGOLA what happens if you roll a 
6? [Wait for an answer.] And with option BOTSWANA? [Wait for an answer.] If there are 
any unclear points with regard to the dice options you can ask the instructor. 
So you go to the dice room and he will check your player number. You make the decision on 
the dice option and pay the price if you decide to buy option BOTSWANA. Then you 




After you rolled the dice you meet with your group. When the group is complete you have 
some minutes to talk within your group. Then you individually go to the transfer room where 
the assistant will announce the amount your group members took out of the dice room. 
Afterwards you choose how much you want to transfer to the other group members. 
Remember that you are not the only one who can transfer, each of your group can transfer to 
the others. An assistant will ask you whether and how much of your money you transfer to 
your other group mates. This amount will be collected by the assistant in the transfer room. 
You can freely choose how much of the money you have in your hand you transfer and to 
which person you transfer. The rest of your money is noted and collected.  
These were the instructions of the procedure of this game. Are there any questions or points 





 [Illustrate one example round, use overview poster] 
Are there any questions? [Wait for questions and answer (individually with assistants)] 
Now we start with the game. Please follow the assistant if your number is called. 
 [Call participants and ask test questions] 















[Group by group meets outside. When group is complete, announce that they can talk.] 
Now you have some minutes to talk, before each of you individually decides what to give to 
others. 
[Give at least 3-5 minutes to talk. Assistants note agreements etc. on their sheet. 
Proceed if transfer room is ready for new group.] 
The talking time is over. Please stop talking and follow the assistant if you are called.  
 [Lead individuals who have money to transfer room and play transfer.  
 
Box: Dice option and dice procedure (play individually with each of the participants) 
  [People arrive at dice room, enter and close the door] 
Hello. Please show me your player and group number. 
[Note player/group number.]  
You now can decide whether to purchase the dice option before you roll the dice to 
determine your event according to these charts, depending on whether you take the 
option or not. [Show dice poster AB.] Do you have any questions on this possibility? 
 [Wait for questions and answer them] 
Do you want to purchase the option? [Note option decision, collect premium]  
You can now roll the dice to determine your outcome. [Give participant the dice and 
show how to use it. Note result.] 
So you finally have ____ Pesos in your hand. Please go to the communication area. 






Box: Transfer procedure (play individually with each of the participants) 
  [People arrive at transfer room, enter and close the door] 
Hello. You can now tell me whether you want to give something to your group 
members. I will note this and the money will be redistributed if this round is going to 
be paid out. Can you please show me your player and group number? 
 [Note player/group number.] 
I know that … took ... out of the dice room [read list of money at hand for 3 
members.]  
Do you want to give something to (other1)? 
(if yes) How much do you want to give? [Note and collect amount] 
Do you want to give something to (other2)? 
(if yes) How much do you want to give? [Note and collect amount] 
You have decided to give __ Pesos to (other1) __ Pesos to (other2). Please go back to 
your seat. 





Normal Risk or Insurance 2 Treatment 
Let’s turn to the game. We have formed groups, each consisting of 3 players. [Explain group 
formation
31
] You will get to know your group members later. They are sitting at another table 
and you are not allowed to talk with other tables while you wait here in the welcome room. 
All of you are given 200 Pesos at the beginning of the game. We give you this amount in form 
of play money. It is already in your plastic bag.  
 [Show money] 
Each of you can experience different situations during this game that influence your financial 
outcomes: We will randomly determine whether you are exposed to no event, a medium or a 
catastrophic event. They all occur with different chances. No event happens in 3 out of 6 
cases on average. A medium event happens in 2 out of 6 cases on average. A catastrophic 
event happens once in six times on average. Each of you will roll the dice separately in the 
dice room.  
You go to the dice room by yourself where your player number will be checked. To determine 
whether you face no event, a medium event or a catastrophic event you throw a dice. An event 
goes along with a loss of some of your initial 200 Pesos. This is dice option ANGOLA. 
[Explain points at dice poster A] 
 
 Throwing a 1, 2 or 3 means no event: 
If you are exposed to no event you do not lose any of your money. You can keep all 
your 200 Pesos. 
                                                 
31
 Depending on whether group formation was endogenous or exogenous, insert either:  
- “You were asked to bring some of your friend or relatives with you to the game. As far as possible we 
tried to consider this and assign you to the same group”. 
or 




 Throwing a 4 or 5 means a medium event: 
If the medium event occurs you lose 100 of your initial 200 Pesos 
 Throwing a 6 means a catastrophic event: 
If the catastrophic event occurs you lose 180 Pesos of your initial 200 Pesos. 
 
Instead, you have the possibility to purchase dice option CAMEROON at a price of 
20 Pesos that you can pay from your initial 200 Pesos. So if you decide to purchase 
this option, you have 180 Pesos left before rolling the dice. 
[Show dice poster AC] 
 
With the dice option your catastrophic loss is only half of the catastrophic loss with 
dice option ANGOLA. But you have to pay 20 Pesos for sure. 
 E.g. if you roll a 6 and there is a catastrophic event that takes away almost all your 
initial money with dice option ANGOLA, with this dice option you will only loose 
half. Then you finally would have 200 Pesos minus 20 Pesos to buy this dice option 
minus 90 remaining loss, which equals to 90 Pesos. 
 If you roll a 4 or 5 and there is a medium event occurring to you, you would have to 
pay 100 Pesos with option ANGOLA. With dice option CAMEROON you will also 
lose 100 Pesos. Finally 80 Pesos would remain for you. 
 If you roll a 1, 2 or 3 and no event occurs you finally get 200 Pesos minus 20 Pesos for 





Before rolling the dice you tell the instructor which dice option you prefer. Did you 
understand all this? Can you decide on the options after you roll the dice? With dice option 
ANGOLA what happens if you roll a 1? [Wait for an answer.] And with option 
CAMEROON what happens if you roll a 1? [Wait for an answer.] With dice option 
ANGOLA what happens if you roll a 4? [Wait for an answer.] And with option 
CAMEROON? [Wait for an answer.] With dice option ANGOLA what happens if you roll a 
6? [Wait for an answer.] And with option CAMEROON? [Wait for an answer.] If there are 
any unclear points with regard to the dice options you can ask the instructor. 
So you go to the dice room and he will check your player number. You make the decision on 
the dice option and pay the price if you decide to buy option CAMEROON. Then you 




After you rolled the dice you meet with your group. When the group is complete you have 
some minutes to talk within your group. Then you individually go to the transfer room where 
the assistant will announce the amount your group members took out of the dice room. 
Afterwards you choose how much you want to transfer to the other group members. 
Remember that you are not the only one who can transfer, each of your group can transfer to 
the others. An assistant will ask you whether and how much of your money you transfer to 
your other group mates. This amount will be collected by the assistant in the transfer room. 
You can freely choose how much of the money you have in your hand you transfer and to 
which person you transfer. The rest of your money is noted and collected.  
When everybody is back at the table, new start money is distributed and a new game is 





[Researcher] and his assistant will pay you the amount you had left after giving to others in 
the chosen game plus the amount your group members gave to you in that game. Did you 
understand everything? Will you know after the first game what your group members gave 
you? [Wait for an answer.] Will you know it after the second game? [Wait for an answer.] Do 
you want me to explain this again? 
These were the instructions of the procedure of this game. Are there any questions or points 
that remained unclear and shall be explained in more detail? We will now show the procedure 
again. 
 [Illustrate one example round, use overview poster] 
Are there any questions? [Wait for questions and answer (individually with assistants)] 
Now we start with the game. Please follow the assistant if your number is called. 
 [Call participants and ask test questions] 














[Group by group meets outside. When group is complete, announce that they can talk.] 
Now you have some minutes to talk, before each of you individually decides what to give to 
others. 
[Give at least 3-5 minutes to talk. Assistants note agreements etc. on their sheet. 
Proceed if transfer room is ready for new group.] 
Box: Dice option and dice procedure (play individually with each of the participants) 
  [People arrive at dice room, enter and close the door] 
Hello. Please show me your player and group number. 
[Note player/group number.]  
You now can decide whether to purchase the dice option before you roll the dice to 
determine your event according to these charts, depending on whether you take the 
option or not. [Show dice poster AC.] Do you have any questions on this possibility? 
 [Wait for questions and answer them] 
Do you want to purchase the option? [Note option decision, collect premium]  
You can now roll the dice to determine your outcome. [Give participant the dice and 
show how to use it. Note result.] 
So you finally have ____ Pesos in your hand. Please go to the communication area. 






The talking time is over. Please stop talking and follow the assistant if you are called.  
[Lead individuals who have money to transfer room and play transfer. 
 
 
Box: Transfer procedure (play individually with each of the participants) 
  [People arrive at transfer room, enter and close the door] 
Hello. You can now tell me whether you want to give something to your group 
members. I will note this and the money will be redistributed if this round is going to 
be paid out. Can you please show me your player and group number? 
 [Note player/group number.] 
I know that … took ... out of the dice room [read list of money at hand for 3 
members.]  
Do you want to give something to (other1)? 
(if yes) How much do you want to give? [Note and collect amount] 
Do you want to give something to (other2)? 
(if yes) How much do you want to give? [Note and collect amount] 
You have decided to give __ Pesos to (other1) __ Pesos to (other2). Please go back to 
your seat. 






Questionnaire and Payout 
After having played all the games we will now determine which one to pay out. 
Please recall the payment rules.  
There is a show-up fee of 100 Pesos plus we roll the dice to determine which game is paid out 
to you. We throw the dice: 1 and 2 means that game 1 is paid out, 3 and 4 means game 2 is 
paid out, 5 and 6 means game 3 is paid out.  
So now I throw the dice. The result applies to all of you.  
 [Roll the dice. Alternatively, one of the participants can do it.] 
The result is… So you will later be paid out game … 
Now please fill out the questionnaire that is handed out by the assistants. Then you are 
separately led to a private room where you get your final payments. You give the 
questionnaire to the instructor and sign a receipt to approve your received money and 
participation. The money consists of the show up fee, the money left after you transferred to 












Appendix B.2 Anonymous Experiment 
 
When participants arrive 
[Participants answer the pre-questionnaire.] 
[Each participant arriving gets a random player number.] 
[Participants are assigned a seat according to the player number.] 
Basic instructions 
Thank you all for coming today. My name is [local instructor’s Name] and this is [researcher]. 
[Researcher] is a researcher at a university in Germany. In this game today, we want to play 
some games where you can earn a considerable amount of money that you are permitted to 
keep and take home. In these games you will have to make decisions that will influence your 
personal earning, but each of you will be given a show-up fee of 100 Pesos at the end for sure. 
[Show a 100 Peso bill.] The whole procedure will last around 3 hours. Thank you in advance 
for your effort and time. [Researcher] is working together with other researchers who are 
carrying out similar games all around the world.  
1. If at any time you find that this is something that you do not wish to participate in for any 
reason, you are of course free to leave whether we have started the game or not. But if you 
feel uncomfortable already now, or you already know that you will not be able to stay 
for the three to four hours, then you should tell us now. 
2. It is very important that you understand the games. Therefore we will check your 
understanding by asking each of you test questions about the rules. If you do not understand 
the rules you may always ask the assistants to explain them. But if you cannot answer the 
test questions after explaining them again, we will have to exclude you from the game 
and you receive only the show-up fee of 100 Pesos. But don’t worry, we will do our best to 
help you understand. 
3. Before you get handed out your money at the end of the workshop, you are asked to answer 
a questionnaire. It is very important for our research, that you answer all questions seriously. 
You will receive your payment only after completing the questionnaire. 
After knowing these rules, is there anybody who does not like to participate anymore? 
 [Wait some moments.] 
There will several games that are slightly different. At the beginning of each game, each of 
you will be given 200 Pesos [show money]. You will make your decision on a sheet of paper. 
In each game you might lose some of this 200 Pesos. What you are able to keep from the 
initial 200 Pesos will be important for your final earnings. How much you keep in each game 
depends on your decisions, decisions of others and luck. The 100 Pesos for coming to the 




We will draw a ball at the end to determine which of  the games will be paid out to you.  Just 
one the games is finally paid out. [Show balls with numbers] This is why the outcomes in 
one game have no influence on the other games. So if you play a game, don’t worry what 
happened in the games before. Just take each game seriously on its own, because it 
might be the one that is paid out.  
In the games you have to make decisions about small sums of money. Each decision you 
make is as good – there are no wrong decisions. Your decisions will be kept in private, so just 
choose the option YOU like best! After you played the games and answered your 
questionnaire at the end, one by one will come to [Researcher], who will hand out these 
earnings plus the show-up fee to you and you sign the receipt.  
You all received a plastic bag with player number already. The player number is your 
personal number. You keep this number for all games of the workshop and have to show them 
at the end in order to get paid. So always remember to take the plastic bag with your 
player number with you. After we have read aloud the instructions for the first game of the 
workshop, we will call you by your player number. Please follow the assistant if you are 
called. 
There are some more rules for communication. During the game talking is strictly prohibited. 
You cannot ask questions or talk about the rules of the game to other participants while we are 
in the process of playing. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait until 
someone comes to answer your question in private. If you do not follow the rule you cannot 
participate in the game anymore and get no earnings from the games. 
[Explain and conduct Game 1: Insurance / Lottery Choice] 
Participants had the choice between a risky option A (lose initial endowment of 200 with 
probability 1/3) or a less risky option B (pay 40 Pesos to reduce possible loss to 100). Each 
participant took an individual decision. 
For the rest of the game we have formed groups, each consisting of 3 players. Each of the 
originally invited [point to the left side where originally invited sit] brought along two friends. 
One sits on the right side and will play with you [point to the right side]. The other sits in the 
middle and will not be in the same group. Instead, the third player in your group will be 
someone from the middle, but you will never know who it is exactly. And the ones in the 
middle will never know the two other group members they play with. From now on we will 
call the unknown players “Player X . 
[Explain and conduct Game 2: Solidarity Game  
     (equivalent to Normal Risk Treatment)] 
[Explain and conduct Game 3: Conditional Solidarity Game]  
Elicitation of conditional solidarity types (inspired by the notion of ‘conditional cooperation’ 







[In the following, the instructions vary across the different treatments, as indicated by the 
treatment plan. The relevant parts, shown in Table 2 of the main text, are described below.] 
 
 No Insurance  Insurance 
before 
Insurance / Lottery Choice 
Solidarity Game 
Conditional Solidarity Game 
Round 1 Normal Risk Low Risk Normal Risk or Insurance 3 
 
 
[We present the instructions for each of the three treatment variants shown above 
(Normal Risk / Low Risk / Normal Risk or Insurance 3)  
on the following pages. Note that these treatments are strongly based on the instructions for 
the Solidarity Game, so we initially present the latter in detail, before explaining the different 













Solidarity Game [equivalent to Normal Risk Treatment] 
You have 200 Pesos at the beginning of the game. Whether you can keep your 200 Peso or 
lose money will depend partly on your choices and partly on your luck. For each group we 
now have an opaque bag with 3 balls in it. This means that there are as many balls in the bag 
as we have players in a group. Each player will have to draw one ball. Out of the 3 balls there 
are 2 white and 1 red ball. If you draw a white ball you can keep your 200 pesos. If you draw 
a red ball you lose all 200 pesos. That means that one of the three players in each group will 
lose everything and two out of three will not lose anything. There is no Option B like in the 
last game. 
In this game the two winners can give money to the loser. Before knowing which ball you 
draw, all of you will be asked whether and how much they would like to send to the other two 
players of their group in case they will draw a red ball and lose 200 Peso. Remember that 
exactly one of you three will lose for sure. Remember also that you are not the only one who 
can transfer since there will always be two players with 200 Peso in your group. You can 
transfer between 0 and 70 of your 200 pesos to the loser. We will ask you to write down on a 
worksheet how much you would give to the other players. Amounts are in steps of 10 Peso. 
You can also transfer zero. So transfers are 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70. Each transfer 
decision you make is as good – there are no wrong decisions. Your transfers will be kept in 
private, so just choose the amount YOU like best! Remember it’s real money. 
From now on we will call the group member you know ______ and the unknown group 
member _Player X_. For the players sitting in the middle [point] there will be two unknown 
players Player X and Player Y. So imagine you keep your 200 Peso and _Player X_loses his 
entire 200 Peso. We will ask you to write down on the worksheet how much you give to 
_Player X_in this case (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70). Now imagine you keep your 200 Peso 
and ______ loses his entire 200 Peso. We will ask you to write down on the worksheet how 
much you give to ______ in this case (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70). 
We also want you to think about the transfer of the other winner in your group to the loser. 
Please guess the amounts that will be transferred. If you guessed correctly you will earn 10 
pesos extra for each guess. 
Lastly, it might also be that you draw the red ball and lose. For this case we ask you to guess 
how much ______ and _Player X_would give to you in this case. We will never tell you 
whether you were right. But [Researcher] will look at the choice actually made by ______ and 
_Player X_and compare their choices to your guess. If you guessed correctly you will earn 10 
pesos extra for each guess. The best thing you can do to increase your payoff is to truthfully 
state what you think ______ and _Player X_would do. 
[SHOW AND EXPLAIN PARTICIPANT FORM make sure that the player is 
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no loss 
GUESS TRANSFER OF  
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lose 200 
GUESS TRANSFER OF  
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Your earnings in this game will depend on the colour of the ball you draw, the money you 
transfer or receive and your guess of the other transfers. If you draw a white ball you keep 200 
Peso but might give some of it to the group member who lost. If you draw a red ball you lose 
all money and have nothing but you might get money from both group members. It is very 
important that you understand that we will not tell you in this game or any of the following 
games how much the other players give to you and who the anonymous group members are. 
The two group members that know each other will draw their balls first and then the bags with 
one ball left will be brought to [Researcher]. Only she knows from which bag the people in 
the middle have to draw their ball. Did you understand everything? Will you [point to left and 
right side] know one member of your group? [Wait for an answer.] Will you know the other 
member? [Wait for an answer.] Will you [point to middle] know one member of your group? 
[Wait for an answer.] Will you know after this game what your group members gave you? 
[Wait for an answer.] Will you know it after the third game? [Wait for an answer.] Do you 
want me to explain this again? 
These were the instructions of the procedure of the second game. Are there any questions or 
points that remained unclear and shall be explained in more detail? We will start with the test 
questions now. The assistants will afterwards let you fill in your decision sheet. For the two 




group members, respectively. For the case where you draw a red ball and lose everything, 
guess how much each of the other group members would give you. 
 [Call participants individually, ask test questions and let participants fill out forms] 
 [Let pairs draw balls, bring bags back to [Researcher], call anonymous players and let 






Normal Risk Treatment   
[play and explain game like in Solidarity Game] 
 
Low Risk Treatment   
[play and explain game like in Solidarity Game, but change payoffs: Initial endowment 200-






Normal Risk or Insurance 3 Treatment  
The groups are the same as in the last round and again all of you have 200 Pesos at the 
beginning of the game. 
This game is slightly different from the one before. It combines parts of game 1 and game 2. 
As in game one you can choose between option A and option B and additionally you can also 
make transfers to your group members as in game 2. 
In Option A you can keep your 200 Peso when you draw a white ball; but you receive 0 Peso 
in the unfortunate case you draw a red ball.  
In option B you also have to draw a ball from the same opaque bag with 2 white and 1 red 
balls, but in option B you only lose 100 pesos if you draw a red ball. In return you have to pay 
a price of 40 pesos. 
Example: “For example if you chose option B, then you lose only 100 pesos if 
you draw a red ball and you would be left with 60 pesos, because you 
have to pay the price of 40. If you draw a white ball you lose nothing 
and you are left with 160 pesos, because you also have to pay the price 
of 40 pesos. 
If you chose option A on the other hand you would lose everything 
with a red ball and you would be left with 0 pesos. With a white ball 
you would lose nothing and you would be left with 200 pesos.  
After you have decided whether you prefer option A or option B the decision will be told to 
the other members of the group. As in game 1 the two winners can give money to the loser. 
Therefore, before knowing which ball you draw, all of you will be asked whether and how 
much they would like to send to the other two players of their group in case they will draw a 
red ball and lose 200 or 100 Peso. For example, the loser will lose 200 pesos with option A 
and 100 pesos with option B. How much your group members lose might be important for 
your transfer decision, this is why we tell you the decision. Remember that exactly one of you 
three will lose for sure. Remember also that you are not the only one who can transfer since 
there will always be two players with 200/160 Peso in your group. You can transfer between 0 
and 70 of your 200/160 pesos to the loser. We will ask you to write down on a worksheet how 
much you would give to the other players. Amounts are in steps of 10 Peso. Note that your 
transfer amounts will never be told to the others. 
Example: “So imagine you chose option B and draw a white ball. You keep 160 
Peso and one group member loses his entire 200 Peso. We will ask you 
to write down on the worksheet how much you give to this group 
member in this case (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 70). Now imagine you 
keep 160 Peso and the other group member only loses 100 Peso and 
pays 40 as a price for the option B. We will ask you to write down on 
the worksheet how much you give to this other group member in this 




Lastly, it might also be that you draw the red ball and lose. For this case we ask you to guess 
again how much your two group members would give to you in this case. We will never tell 
you whether you were right. But [Researcher] will look at the choice actually made by the 
other two group member and compare their choices to your guess. If you guessed correctly 
you will earn 10 pesos extra for each guess. The best thing you can do to increase your payoff 
is to truthfully state what you think your group members would do. 
[SHOW AND EXPLAIN PARTICIPANT FORM make sure that the player is 
looking, seeing, and concentrating] 
 
Do you have any questions? These were the instructions of the procedure of the fourth game. 
Are there any questions or points that remained unclear and shall be explained in more detail? 
[Call participants, ask test questions and let them decide about option A/B] 
[Researcher] tells assistants the decisions of the group players, then players decide 
about transfers] 
We will distribute the decision sheets now. For the two cases where you draw a white ball 
please write down how much you would give to the two group members, respectively. For the 
○ 
you pay __ 
GUESS TRANSFER OF   
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you pay __ 
GUESS TRANSFER OF  
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you lose ___ 
and pay __ 
GUESS TRANSFER OF  
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case where you draw a red ball and lose everything, guess how much each of the other group 
members would give you. 








Questionnaire and Payout 
After having played all the games we will now determine which one to pay out. We will put 
numbered balls into the plastic bag and blindly draw one of those balls to determine which 
game everybody will be paid for. 
Please recall the payment rules. There is a show-up fee of 100 Pesos plus we will draw one of 
five balls from the bag to determine the round we will pay out.  
The result applies to all of you.  
 [Draw one ball. Alternatively, one of the participants can do it.] 
The result is… So you will later be paid out game … 
Now please fill out the questionnaire that is handed out by the assistants. Then you are 
separately led to a private room where you get your final payments. You give the 
questionnaire to the instructor and sign a receipt to approve your received money and 
participation. The money consists of the show up fee, the money left after you transferred to 





Appendix B.3 Communication Experiment with Secret Hiding 
 
All the basic instruction, the game order, the treatment plan, and the payout procedures are 
identical to the version without secret hiding.  
We therefore ONLY provide the detailed description of the three treatment variants (Normal 




Normal Risk Treatment 
Let’s turn to the game. We have formed groups, each consisting of 3 players. [Explain group 
formation
32
] You will get to know your group members later. They are sitting at another table 
and you are not allowed to talk with other tables while you wait here in the welcome room  
All of you are given 200 Pesos at the beginning of the game. We give you this amount in form 
of play money. It is already in your plastic bag.  
[Show money] 
Each of you can experience different situations during this game that influence your financial 
outcomes: We will randomly determine whether you are exposed to no event, a medium or a 
catastrophic event. They all occur with different chances. No event happens in 3 out of 6 
cases on average. A medium event happens in 2 out of 6 cases on average. A catastrophic 
event happens once in six times on average. Each of you will roll the dice separately in the 
dice room. 
You go to the dice room by yourself where your player number will be checked. To determine 
whether you face no event, a medium event or a catastrophic event you throw a dice. An event 
goes along with a loss of some of your initial 200 Pesos. This is dice option ANGOLA. 
[Explain points at dice poster A]  
 
 Throwing a 1, 2 or 3 means no event: 
If you are exposed to no event you do not lose any of your money. You can keep all 
your 200 Pesos. 
                                                 
32
 Depending on whether group formation was endogenous or exogenous, insert either:  
- “You were asked to bring some of your friend or relatives with you to the game. As far as possible we 
tried to consider this and assign you to the same group”. 
or 




 Throwing a 4 or 5 means a medium event: 
If the medium event occurs you lose 100 of your initial 200 Pesos 
 Throwing a 6 means a catastrophic event: 
If the catastrophic event occurs you lose 180 Pesos of your initial 200 Pesos. 
If you face an event the amount is taken away according to the severity of the event. Do you 
understand how the loss is determined? What happens if you roll a 2? [Wait for an answer.] 










However if there was no event occurring to you after rolling the dice you are given the 
possibility to keep 100 Pesos in a lockbox in the room before meeting again with your group. 
You can always keep the difference to the medium event in the box. So you take money out of 
the room as if you had a medium event. You should know that this is your private lockbox 
and nobody except [researcher] and his assistant will ever know about the amount you put 
into it. The money will be saved for you for this game. [Researcher] and his assistant are also 
the ones who will give you your earnings of the game that is paid out – including the lockbox 
money of that game – at the end of the workshop in private. The others will only be able to 
see the amount you took with you out of the room. Did you understand this? When can you 
put money in the lockbox? [Wait for an answer.] Can you put money in the lockbox if you roll 









[Overview poster]  
 
After you rolled and decided about the lockbox the dice you meet with your group. When the 
group is complete you have some minutes to talk within your group. Then you individually go 
to the transfer room where the assistant will announce the amount your group members took 
out of the dice room. Afterwards you choose how much you want to transfer to the other 
group members. Remember that you are not the only one who can transfer, each of your 
group can transfer to the others. An assistant will ask you whether and how much of your 
money you transfer to your other group mates. This amount will be collected by the assistant 
in the transfer room. You can freely choose how much of the money you have in your hand 
you transfer and to which person you transfer. The rest of your money is noted and collected.  
When everybody is back at the table, new start money is distributed and a new game is 
played. You will only get to know which game is paid out after we finished playing all games.  
Are there any questions or points that remained unclear and shall be explained in more detail? 
Otherwise I will now show the procedure again. 
[Wait for questions; show overview poster and illustrate one example round] 
Now we start with this game. Please follow the assistant that calls you. 
 [Call participants and ask test questions] 







Box: Dice procedure (play individually with each of the participants) 
  [People arrive at dice room, enter and close the door] 
My name is xxx and you now can roll the dice to determine your outcome according to 
this chart. [Show lottery chart.] Please show me your player and group number. 
[Note player/group number. Give participant the dice and show how to use it. 
Note result.] 
(If no losses, go on. Otherwise, skip lockbox procedure):  
Please decide whether you want to keep 100 Pesos in the lockbox. This is your private box and 
nobody except [researcher] and me will ever know about the amount you put into it. 
[Researcher] and his assistant are also the ones who will give you your earnings at the end of the 
workshop in private.  
  [Let people decide and note result] 
 
So you finally have ____ Pesos in your hand. Please go to the place outside. Do not talk 
with your group members until the group is complete and the assistant allows you to do 
so. 




[Group by group meets outside. When group is complete, announce that they can talk.] 
Now you have some minutes to talk, before each of you individually decides what to give to 
others. 
[Give at least 3-5 minutes to talk. Assistants note agreements etc. on their sheet. 
Proceed if transfer room is ready for new group.] 
The talking time is over. Please stop talking and follow the assistant if you are called.  






 Box: Transfer procedure (play individually with each of the participants) 
  [people arrive at transfer room, enter and close the door] 
Hello. My name is xxx and you can now tell me whether you want to give something 
to your group members. I will note this and the money will be redistributed if this 
round is going to be paid out. Can you please show me your player and group 
number? 
 [Note player/group number.] 
I know that … took ... out of the dice room [read list of money at hand for the 3 
members.]  
Do you want to give something to (other1)? 
(if yes) How much do you want to give? [Note and collect amount] 
Do you want to give something to (other2)? 
(if yes) How much do you want to give? [Note and collect amount] 
You have decided to give __ Pesos to (other1) __ Pesos to (other2). Please go back to 
your seat. 





Normal Risk or Insurance 1 Treatment 
Let’s turn to the Game. We have formed groups, each consisting of 3 players. [Explain group 
formation
33
] You will get to know your group members later. They are sitting at another table 
and you are not allowed to talk with other tables while you wait here in the welcome room  
All of you are given 200 Pesos at the beginning of the game. We give you this amount in form 
of play money. It is already in your plastic bag.  
 [Show money] 
Each of you can experience different situations during this game that influence your financial 
outcomes: We will randomly determine whether you are exposed to no event, a medium or a 
catastrophic event. They all occur with different chances. No event happens in 3 out of 6 
cases on average. A medium event happens in 2 out of 6 cases on average. A catastrophic 
event happens once in six times on average. Each of you will roll the dice separately in the 
dice room.  
You go to the dice room by yourself where your player number will be checked. To determine 
whether you face no event, a medium event or a catastrophic event you throw a dice. An event 
goes along with a loss of some of your initial 200 Pesos. This is dice option ANGOLA. 
[Explain points at dice poster A] 
 
 Throwing a 1, 2 or 3 means no event: 
If you are exposed to no event you do not lose any of your money. You can keep all 
your 200 Pesos. 
                                                 
33
 Depending on whether group formation was endogenous or exogenous, insert either:  
- “You were asked to bring some of your friend or relatives with you to the game. As far as possible we 
tried to consider this and assign you to the same group”. 
or 




 Throwing a 4 or 5 means a medium event: 
If the medium event occurs you lose 100 of your initial 200 Pesos 
 Throwing a 6 means a catastrophic event: 
If the catastrophic event occurs you lose 180 Pesos of your initial 200 Pesos. 
Instead, you have the possibility to purchase dice option BOTSWANA at a price of 45 
Pesos that you can pay from your initial 200 Pesos. So if you decide to purchase this 
option, you have 155 Pesos left before rolling the dice. 
[Show dice poster AB] 
 
With the dice option your catastrophic loss and your medium event loss are only half 
of the losses with dice option ANGOLA. But you have to pay 45 Pesos for sure. 
 E.g. if you roll a 6 and there is a catastrophic event that takes away almost all your 
initial money with dice option ANGOLA, with this dice option you will only loose 
half. Then you finally would have 200 Pesos minus 45 Pesos to buy this dice option 
minus 90 remaining loss, which equals to 65 Pesos. 
 If you roll a 4 or 5 and there is a medium event occurring to you, you would have to 
pay 100 Pesos with option ANGOLA. With dice option BOTSWANA you will only 
lose 50 Pesos. Finally 105 Pesos would remain for you. 
 If you roll a 1, 2 or 3 and no event occurs you finally get 200 Pesos minus 45 Pesos for 





 Before rolling the dice you tell the instructor which dice option you prefer. Did you 
understand all this? Can you decide on the options after you roll the dice? With dice option 
ANGOLA what happens if you roll a 1? [Wait for an answer.] And with option 
BOTSWANA what happens if you roll a 1? [Wait for an answer.] With dice option 
ANGOLA what happens if you roll a 4? [Wait for an answer.] And with option 
BOTSWANA? [Wait for an answer.] With dice option ANGOLA what happens if you roll a 
6? [Wait for an answer.] And with option BOTSWANA? [Wait for an answer.] If there are 
any unclear points with regard to the dice options you can ask the instructor. 
So you go to the dice room and he will check your player number. You make the decision on 
the dice option and pay the price if you decide to buy option BOTSWANA. Then you 












However if there was no event occurring to you after rolling the dice you are given the 
possibility to keep [50/100] Pesos in a lockbox in the room before meeting again with your 
group. You can always keep the difference to the medium event in the box. So you take 
money out of the room as if you had a medium event. You should know that this is your 
private lockbox and nobody except [researcher] and his assistant will ever know about the 
amount you put into it. The money will be saved for you for this game. [Researcher] and his 
assistant are also the ones who will give you your earnings of the game that is paid out – 
including the lockbox money of that game – at the end of the workshop in private. The others 
will only be able to see the amount you took with you out of the room. Did you understand 
this? When can you put money in the lockbox? [Wait for an answer.] Can you put money in 







After you rolled the dice and decided about the lockbox you meet with your group. When the 
group is complete you have some minutes to talk within your group. Then you individually go 
to the transfer room where the assistant will announce the amount your group members took 
out of the dice room. Afterwards you choose how much you want to transfer to the other 
group members. Remember that you are not the only one who can transfer, each of your 
group can transfer to the others. An assistant will ask you whether and how much of your 
money you transfer to your other group mates. This amount will be collected by the assistant 
in the transfer room. You can freely choose how much of the money you have in your hand 
you transfer and to which person you transfer. The rest of your money is noted and collected.  
These were the instructions of the procedure of this game. Are there any questions or points 
that remained unclear and shall be explained in more detail? We will now show the procedure 
again. 
 [Illustrate one example round, use overview poster] 
Are there any questions? [Wait for questions and answer (individually with assistants)] 
Now we start with the game. Please follow the assistant if your number is called. 
 [Call participants and ask test questions] 



































Box: Dice option and dice procedure (play individually with each of the participants) 
  [People arrive at dice room, enter and close the door] 
Hello. Please show me your player and group number. 
[Note player/group number.]  
You now can decide whether to purchase the dice option before you roll the dice to 
determine your event according to these charts, depending on 
whether you take the option or not. [Show dice poster AB.] 
 
Do you have any questions on this possibility? 
 [Wait for questions and answer them] 
Do you want to purchase the option? [Note option decision, collect premium]  
You can now roll the dice to determine your outcome. [Give participant the dice and 
show how to use it. Note result.] 
 (If no shock, go on. Otherwise, skip lockbox procedure):  
Please decide whether you want to keep [100/50] Pesos in the lockbox 
This is your private lockbox and nobody except [researcher] and me will ever know 
about the amount you put into it. [Researcher] and me are also the 
ones who will give you your earnings at the end in private.  
  [Let people decide and note result]  
So you finally have ____ Pesos in your hand. Please go to the communication area. 






 Box: Transfer procedure (play individually with each of the participants) 
  [People arrive at transfer room, enter and close the door] 
Hello. You can now tell me whether you want to give something to your group 
members. I will note this and the money will be redistributed if this round is going to 
be paid out. Can you please show me your player and group number? 
 [Note player/group number.] 
I know that … took ... out of the dice room [read list of money at hand for 3 
members.]  
Do you want to give something to (other1)? 
(if yes) How much do you want to give? [Note and collect amount] 
Do you want to give something to (other2)? 
(if yes) How much do you want to give? [Note and collect amount] 
You have decided to give __ Pesos to (other1) __ Pesos to (other2). Please go back to 
your seat. 
  [Note and collect the rest. Participant is led back to his/her seat.] 
 
[Group by group meets outside. When group is complete, announce that they can talk.] 
Now you have some minutes to talk, before each of you individually decides what to give to 
others. 
[Give at least 3-5 minutes to talk. Assistants note agreements etc. on their sheet. 
Proceed if transfer room is ready for new group.] 
The talking time is over. Please stop talking and follow the assistant if you are called.  






Normal Risk or Insurance 2 Treatment 
Let’s turn to the game. We have formed groups, each consisting of 3 players. [Explain group 
formation
34
] You will get to know your group members later. They are sitting at another table 
and you are not allowed to talk with other tables while you wait here in the welcome room  
All of you are given 200 Pesos at the beginning of the game. We give you this amount in form 
of play money. It is already in your plastic bag.  
 [Show money] 
Each of you can experience different situations during this game that influence your financial 
outcomes: We will randomly determine whether you are exposed to no event, a medium or a 
catastrophic event. They all occur with different chances. No event happens in 3 out of 6 
cases on average. A medium event happens in 2 out of 6 cases on average. A catastrophic 
event happens once in six times on average. Each of you will roll the dice separately in the 
dice room.  
You go to the dice room by yourself where your player number will be checked. To determine 
whether you face no event, a medium event or a catastrophic event you throw a dice. An event 
goes along with a loss of some of your initial 200 Pesos. This is dice option ANGOLA. 
[Explain points at dice poster A] 
 
 Throwing a 1, 2 or 3 means no event: 
If you are exposed to no event you do not lose any of your money. You can keep all 
your 200 Pesos. 
                                                 
34
 Depending on whether group formation was endogenous or exogenous, insert either:  
- “You were asked to bring some of your friend or relatives with you to the game. As far as possible we 
tried to consider this and assign you to the same group”. 
or 




 Throwing a 4 or 5 means a medium event: 
If the medium event occurs you lose 100 of your initial 200 Pesos 
 Throwing a 6 means a catastrophic event: 
If the catastrophic event occurs you lose 180 Pesos of your initial 200 Pesos. 
 
Instead, you have the possibility to purchase dice option CAMEROON at a price of 
20 Pesos that you can pay from your initial 200 Pesos. So if you decide to purchase 
this option, you have 180 Pesos left before rolling the dice. 
[Show dice poster AC] 
 
With the dice option your catastrophic loss is only half of the catastrophic loss with 
dice option ANGOLA. But you have to pay 20 Pesos for sure. 
 E.g. if you roll a 6 and there is a catastrophic event that takes away almost all your 
initial money with dice option ANGOLA, with this dice option you will only loose 
half. Then you finally would have 200 Pesos minus 20 Pesos to buy this dice option 
minus 90 remaining loss, which equals to 90 Pesos. 
 If you roll a 4 or 5 and there is a medium event occurring to you, you would have to 
pay 100 Pesos with option ANGOLA. With dice option CAMEROON you will also 
lose 100 Pesos. Finally 80 Pesos would remain for you. 
 If you roll a 1, 2 or 3 and no event occurs you finally get 200 Pesos minus 20 Pesos for 





Before rolling the dice you tell the instructor which dice option you prefer. Did you 
understand all this? Can you decide on the options after you roll the dice? With dice option 
ANGOLA what happens if you roll a 1? [Wait for an answer.] And with option 
CAMEROON what happens if you roll a 1? [Wait for an answer.] With dice option 
ANGOLA what happens if you roll a 4? [Wait for an answer.] And with option 
CAMEROON? [Wait for an answer.] With dice option ANGOLA what happens if you roll a 
6? [Wait for an answer.] And with option CAMEROON? [Wait for an answer.] If there are 
any unclear points with regard to the dice options you can ask the instructor. 
So you go to the dice room and he will check your player number. You make the decision on 
the dice option and pay the price if you decide to buy option CAMEROON. Then you 












However if there was no event occurring to you after rolling the dice you are given the 
possibility to keep 100 Pesos in a lockbox in the room before meeting again with your group. 
You can always keep the difference to the medium event in the box. So you take money out of 
the room as if you had a medium event. You should know that this is your private lockbox 
and nobody except [researcher] and his assistant will ever know about the amount you put 
into it. The money will be saved for you for this game. [Researcher] and his assistant are also 
the ones who will give you your earnings of the game that is paid out – including the lockbox 
money of that game – at the end of the workshop in private. The others will only be able to 
see the amount you took with you out of the room. Did you understand this? When can you 
put money in the lockbox? [Wait for an answer.] Can you put money in the lockbox if you roll 







After you rolled the dice and decided about the lockbox you meet with your group. When the 
group is complete you have some minutes to talk within your group. Then you individually go 
to the transfer room where the assistant will announce the amount your group members took 
out of the dice room. Afterwards you choose how much you want to transfer to the other 
group members. Remember that you are not the only one who can transfer, each of your 
group can transfer to the others. An assistant will ask you whether and how much of your 
money you transfer to your other group mates. This amount will be collected by the assistant 
in the transfer room. You can freely choose how much of the money you have in your hand 
you transfer and to which person you transfer. The rest of your money is noted and collected.  
When everybody is back at the table, new start money is distributed and a new game is 
played. You will only get to know which game is paid out after we finished playing the three 
games.  
[Researcher] and his assistant will pay you the amount you had left after giving to others in 
the chosen game plus the amount your group members gave to you in that game. Did you 
understand everything? Will you know after the first game what your group members gave 
you? [Wait for an answer.] Will you know it after the second game? [Wait for an answer.] Do 
you want me to explain this again? 
These were the instructions of the procedure of this game. Are there any questions or points 
that remained unclear and shall be explained in more detail? We will now show the procedure 
again. 
 [Illustrate one example round, use overview poster] 
Are there any questions? [Wait for questions and answer (individually with assistants)] 




 [Call participants and ask test questions] 






















[Group by group meets outside. When group is complete, announce that they can talk.] 
Now you have some minutes to talk, before each of you individually decides what to give to 
others. 
[Give at least 3-5 minutes to talk. Assistants note agreements etc. on their sheet. 
Proceed if transfer room is ready for new group.] 
Box: Dice option and dice procedure (play individually with each of the participants) 
  [People arrive at dice room, enter and close the door] 
Hello. Please show me your player and group number. 
[Note player/group number.]  
You now can decide whether to purchase the dice option before you roll the dice to 
determine your event according to these charts, depending on whether you take the option 
or not. [Show dice poster AC.] Do you have any questions on this possibility? 
 [Wait for questions and answer them] 
Do you want to purchase the option? [Note option decision, collect premium]  
You can now roll the dice to determine your outcome. [Give participant the dice and show 
how to use it. Note result.] 
(If no shock, go on. Otherwise, skip lockbox procedure):  
Please decide whether you want to keep 100 Pesos in the lockbox. 
This is your private lockbox and nobody except [researcher] and me will ever know about 
the amount you put into it. [Researcher] and me are also the ones who will 
give you your earnings at the end in private.  
 [Let people decide and note result]  
So you finally have ____ Pesos in your hand. Please go to the communication area. 






Box: Transfer procedure (play individually with each of the participants) 
  [People arrive at transfer room, enter and close the door] 
Hello. You can now tell me whether you want to give something to your group 
members. I will note this and the money will be redistributed if this round is going to 
be paid out. Can you please show me your player and group number? 
 [Note player/group number.] 
I know that … took ... out of the dice room [read list of money at hand for 3 
members.]  
Do you want to give something to (other1)? 
(if yes) How much do you want to give? [Note and collect amount] 
Do you want to give something to (other2)? 
(if yes) How much do you want to give? [Note and collect amount] 
You have decided to give __ Pesos to (other1) __ Pesos to (other2). Please go back to 
your seat. 
  [Note and collect the rest. Participant is led back to his/her seat.] 
 
The talking time is over. Please stop talking and follow the assistant if you are called.  
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Abstract 
This paper provides causal evidence that formal insurance competes with already existing informal 
mechanisms in the form of remittance networks. Given the widespread availability of remittances this 
helps to explain low take-up rates of formal insurance. Our analysis consists of two parts using a four 
wave panel dataset covering 14 years from 1993 until 2007. Data comes from rural Indonesia, 
regularly experiencing disastrous tropical storms and heavy rainfall. In an instrumental variable design 
that allows household income and remittances to be jointly determined, we show that remittances are 
used as informal insurance mechanism and compensate economic losses associated with excessive 
rainfall by about 21%. The second part of the analysis simulates income flows of household with and 
without access to remittances during weather shocks. It is shown that rainfall insurance if plagued by 
basis risk does not yield much benefit to the majority of households because they are already 
informally insured. Exceptions are households headed by widows and unmarried (or divorced) women 
with only limited access to informal insurance.  
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Rainfall insurance is currently being introduced in a growing number of developing countries. 
It is considered effective at mitigating the impact of devastating income losses that weather 
shocks often incur on rural households. Storms and floods are covariate events and affect 
entire communities, which can cause the breakdown of local credit markets and informal 
coping mechanisms, such as borrowing between neighbors and kin. The benefits of a 
functioning and well adapted insurance scheme are quite straightforward and have also been 
proven by several studies in recent years. The provision of index insurance may reduce 
expensive coping strategies, such as consumption smoothing or selling household assets or 
livestock, in the event of a shock (Janzen et al., 2013). In this vein, de Janvry et al. (2016) 
show that payments from a weather insurance scheme enable farmers to cultivate more yields 
land in the year succeeding the weather shock. Despite the theoretical charm, many 
implemented rainfall insurance schemes are plagued by low take-up. (Roth, McCod and 
Liber, 2007; Ito and Kono, 2010). Much has been written about possible reasons for low take-
up. This includes lacking financial literacy among beneficiaries; designs not matching the 
needs of the clients; the ambiguous role of risk aversion; the function of trust, the 
disincentives arising from uncovered basis risks which farmers remain exposed to; the 
relevance of premium price and subsidies; and various other channels (Giné, Townsend and 
Vickery 2007). At the same time, the world has experienced an impressive surge in 
remittances flows to poor countries, which by 2008 were twice the amount of all development 
aid combined (Beck and Martínez-Pería 2011). Remittances are direct income supplements 
and can help poor families to weather income shocks and other adverse events. In fact, it has 
been shown that increases in remittance income serve as insurance substitutes of farm income 
when storms and heavy rainfall hits villages (Yang and Choi 2007).    
 This article combines these two strands of the literature and develops a theoretical 
model that shows how informal insurance through remittances causes a partial crowd-out of 
the demand for formal index-based rainfall insurance. The model is tested using panel data of 
rural households in Indonesia covering 14 years between 1993 and 2007. Indonesia is one of 
the largest developing countries with a rural population of over 110 million. Storms and 
floods are common during the rainy season, which peaks between December and February. 
An archipelago spread across three time zones stretching over 5,000 kilometers from east to 
west, its more than 13,700 islands frequently afflicted by the monsoon. Indonesia is among 
the most natural disaster prone countries in the world and ranks sixth among 162 countries 
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affected by rainfall induced floods. According to natural disaster statistics, Indonesia has been 
affected by 54 floods between 1980 and 2018 (104 including Tsunamis). Recent events 
include floods in February 1996, January 2002, April 2003 December 2006 and January 2007 
(CRED, 2018). Flash floods and mudslides are often the consequence of such heavy rainfall, 
having a highly destructive effect on farmland. Annual lost crop from storms and flooding is 
estimated to cost the country US$ 1.05 billion and causes between 400 and 2000 fatalities 
(Aipa, 2007). In a study on the welfare impacts on Indonesian households, Skoufias, Essama-
Nssah and Katayama (2011) show that the poor are most vulnerable to the impacts of weather 
shocks given the high income-dependence on harvests and the geographical locations of their 
dwellings, in combination with lower human capital, lower asset stocks and limited access to 
credit.             
 The empirical part has three main findings. First, strong deviations from normal 
rainfall are associated with severe income losses of rural households. Second, using an 
instrumental variable design that allows farm income and remittances to be jointly determined 
it is shown that remittances are used as informal insurance mechanism. Third, simulations of 
formal rainfall insurance under different basis risk scenarios shows that low demand persists 
even among households without access to informal insurance. Apparently, households 
without access to remittance income are at the same time particularly badly positioned to 
purchase an insurance contract. These are primarily households headed by widows and 
unmarried (or divorced) women. For those with access to remittances it is shown that index-
based rainfall insurance does not yield much additional benefit over existing informal 
insurance, which crowds-out the demand for formal insurance. The internal and external 
robustness of these results is discussed, which have implications for many developing 
countries that are affected by tropical storms.      
 The article is structured as follows. Section I provides a brief overview on what recent 
research has found regarding the impact of rainfall on farm income, the insurance function of 
remittances, and the low take-up of index-based rainfall insurance. Section II introduces a 
simple model of insurance demand when informal insurance is available, from which the 
main hypotheses are derived. Section III discusses the data and explains the identification 






2. Income Shocks, Remittances and Insurance 
 
2.1. Rainfall Shocks and Farm Income  
For rural households in developing countries rainfall can be a blessing and a curse. With 
rainfall being the dominant source of agricultural production risk, farm income is in great part 
stochastic and exogenously determined. On the positive side, moderately higher precipitation 
has a positive impact on agricultural output, as is shown for Indonesia by Levine and Yang 
(2006). At the same time, the country is prone to tropical storms and flooding, which can have 
devastating effects on household farm income (Fields et al. 2003, Newhouse 2005). Extreme 
weather events not only decimate income of farm households, but also diminish work 
opportunities of many poor landless workers who depend on the harvest season (McCulloch 
and Timmer 2008). Negative income shocks also carry over to subsequent years and are still 
felt by Indonesian households up to four years after a shock occurred (Newhouse 2005). In 
this vein, besides income losses, weather shocks can have long-term consequences on 
investment decisions and risk aversity regarding choices of crop and other inputs affecting 
long term development outcomes and economic growth (Karlan et al., 2014; Barnett et al., 
2008; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). For Indonesia, Maccini and Yang (2009) examine 
the effect of rainfall at time of birth on health outcomes, educational achievements and 
socioeconomic factor as these children become adults. The authors find that initially higher 
levels of precipitation at time of birth are associated with superior socio-economic outcomes 
and improved health, especially for female infants. In the first place, rainfall leads to better 
harvests and increased household income, which leads to more spending on female infants. 
However, the effect is non-linear. Excessive rainfall has strong negative effects on girls and 
reduces their adult income. In addition to the direct consequences of shocks, households that 
are exposed to high risk levels reduce investments because of relatively lower expected 
returns, which is further exacerbated by loss aversions. For a long-term panel of Zimbabwean 
households Elbers, Gunning and Kinsey (2007) demonstrate that without protection against 
farm related risks household reduce long run capital stocks by 46%. Compared to a situation 
without risk, households miss 46 percent of long-term economic growth, two thirds of which 
are due to lowered investments. One may argue that rainfall shocks are exogenous to farm 
income while exposure itself is not, as households could decide to move to less affected areas. 
This, however, requires sufficient economic means to do so.     
 Rural households have developed a wide range of risk management strategies to cope 
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with shocks.  Among the most common is informal borrowing. To smooth essential 
consumption, families enter risk-pooling arrangements and borrow between neighbors and kin 
in times of sudden hardship (see Fafchamps 2010 for a comprehensive literature overview). 
Other risk coping mechanisms include increase in labor supply and a shifting of the focus of 
economic activity to non-agricultural activities (Kochar, 1999)
1
. However, risk pooling 
mechanisms can be ineffective in face of weather shocks, which have spatially covariate risk 
structures and simultaneously affect entire villages and districts (Dercon and Krishnan 2000). 
As a result, local credit markets and other informal arrangements rapidly break down and are 
unable to provide relief (Dercon 2004, Porter 2011). Without protection households begin 
using their savings or liquidizing their assets, including farm tools, which reduces future 
agricultural output and increases exposure to shocks (Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas 1998; 
Paxon 1992). However, also with informal insurance a consequence may be a rather risk 
adverse behavior exhibiting, thus, a rather inefficient economic strategy, due to the low 
predictability and formal safety it offers. In this context, remittances from family members 
and kin, who migrated to different geographical regions and receive income sources that are 
not susceptible to the same shocks offer a different kind of risk coping-strategy.  
2.2. Insurance Function of Remittances 
Remittances are a major income source in many low-income households. Remittance flows to 
developing countries reached a total of USD 429 billion in 2017 (World Bank, 2018), almost 
three times the amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA). The global trend is 
mirrored by the Indonesian economy where remittance flows have drastically increased 
throughout the last decade from approximately USD 1 billion in 1997 to more than USD 8.6 
billion in 2017
2
, accounting for about 1.3% of GDP (ibid, 2018). Given the immense volume 
of transfers received by households in poor countries, remittances have received attention 
from policy makers and researchers alike. Existing research covers a wide range of areas, 
including the impact on economic growth and labor supply decisions of recipient households. 
After instrumenting for endogeneity of remittance flows, Adams and Page (2005) find that a 
10% increase in international remittance inflow leads to a 3.5% decline of poverty headcount 
(people living on less than $1 a day). They analyze a new large cross-country dataset on 
                                                          
1
 In this context, hypothesis two in the following section, thus, tests if households engaging in non-farm 
activities are less vulnerable to variability of total income after tropical storms. Other alternative risk 
management mechanisms are assumed as given, as the focus of this paper is set on remittances as a mechanism 
for risk management.  
2
 The top five destinations from where remittances were sent to Indonesia in 2017 are Saudi Arabia (USD 3.4 
billion); Malaysia (USD 2.1 billion), United Arab Emirates (USD 768 Mio.); Singapore (USD 379 Mio.) and the 
Netherland (USD 309 Mio.). (World Bank, 2018)  
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migration, remittances, inequality and poverty encompassing 71 low-income, middle-income 
and developing countries. In order to instrument for the possible endogeneity of migration, 
three different instrumental variables are identified. The first one is the distance between the 
remittance-sending area and the receiving country, the second instrument is the percentage of 
the population over 25 with completed secondary education and the third instrument is the 
level of political stability in each country. Similar growth effects have been found in a diverse 
set of countries including Ghana, Mexico and El Salvador supporting the argument that 
remittances help to reduce poverty (Acosta et al 2006; Adams, Cuecuecha and Page 2008; 
Lopez-Codorva 2005; Lokshin et al 2010).        
 A steadily growing literature is addressing the many motivations driving remittance 
flows, which include altruism, insurance motives, loan repayment, bequest motives and 
exchange motives (see for example Rapoport and Docquier 2005 for a summary of the 
literature). Notably, remittances have been identified as coinsurance arrangements, intended 
to smooth consumption of rural households through geographical income diversification. 
Numerous studies find evidence that private transfers are highly sensitive to changes in 
income. Clarke and Wallsten (2003) show for Jamaica – an island similarly exposed to 
tropical storms as Indonesia – that remittances partial act as hurricane insurance and on 
average pay for 25% of the damage inflicted on households. Using data on rainfall and 
remittances for the Philippines, Yang and Choi (2007) find even higher compensation rates 
for income which suggest that roughly 60 percent of income losses are replaced by 
remittances. Similarly, using propensity score matching techniques Mohapatra, Joseph and 
Ratha (2009) show that remittances help recipient households to better cope with flooding in 
Bangladesh. For Ghana, Quartey and Blankson (2004) find that households with remittance 
income are better able to deal with large-scale covariate shocks. The insurance function of 
remittances against storms and flooding is also reported for Central America and the 
Caribbean (Attzs and Samuel 2007), Haiti (Weiss-Fagan 2006), Pakistan (Suleri and Savage 
2006), and Thailand (Paulson 2000). At the same time, no insurance effect has been found for 
remittances sent to Guyana (Agarwal and Horotwitz 2002), and for family transfers in 
Ethiopia (Pan 2007).          
 Overall, the empirical evidence shows that during natural disasters remittances possess 
insurance functions and often increase. In this line it appears reasonable to argue, that in the 
presence of formal and well-functioning insurance schemes, the need for remittances may 
diminish. This would, however, imply the assumption of a perfectly functioning and balanced 
insurance market. Alternatively, the results of the studies presented above could also be 
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interpreted in the way that remittances adjust for the basis risk inherent in index insurance, as 
shown by Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2013) for the context of India. Being aware of basis risk, 
may have a considerably deterrent effect on the demand for index insurance as people may 
perceive the worst-case scenario of experiencing a loss without receiving indemnity from the 
insurance they bought as worse than not buying it in the first place (Clarke, 2016).  In this 
light, formal insurance and informal insurance, in this case, remittances can be seen rather as 
complementary elements than a single choice option (de Janvry et al., 2016). A factor that 
should not be neglected considering the insurance choices of individuals and their trust in 
remittances as an informal mechanism is that migrants sending remittance may also be 
exposed to income risk from economic crises or other shocks which can strongly affect their 
ability to support rural households and has recently been shown for Mexico (Amudo-
Donantes and Pozo 2006).
3
 While economic shocks the senders are exposed to are hardly to 
predict, weather related risks for the senders affecting their ability to provide remittances 
depend of course on the geographic location, exposure to extreme weather phenomena and if 
there is a correlation between their income and weather phenomena as well. A restriction of 
the data used for this paper is that there is unfortunately no information about the senders’ 
geographic locations or sources of income. As households often send migrants abroad to 
diversify risk, it is, however, highly likely that remittance senders have different sources of 
income and occupation as their original household (Mallick, 2017; Docquier and Rapoport, 
2006). This assumption is strongly underlined by the fact that approximately 70% of 
remittances sent to Indonesia stem from Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and the United Arab 
Emirates, all countries with different patterns of income generation and weather exposure 
(World Bank, 2018).   
2.3. Low take-up of Formal Rainfall Insurance 
Index-based rainfall insurance has recently been piloted in a large number of countries. 
Unlike traditional crop insurance, these schemes do not insure actual crop loss. Instead they 
make indemnity payouts based on predicted losses using precipitation levels measured in 
nearby weather stations. Using official rainfall measurement instead of monitoring individual 
losses resolves the informational problems associated with traditional crop insurance. In 
addition, reduced costs for the insurance provide could also lead to lower premiums, allowing 
poorer farmers to participate in an expanding insurance market (Burke, de Janvry and 
                                                          
3 The opportunity costs of remitting migrants can be considered as sunk costs embedded in the household 
decision to send a household member to migrate. 
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Quintero 2011).          
 Despite an appealing simplicity, rainfall insurance schemes are met with low demand. 
For example, two prominent studies from India and Malawi find take‐ up of index insurance 
was virtually absent and even after intense marketing with insurance providers approaching 
individual farmers barely reached 20%. In addition, insured households chose to protect only 
very small proportions of their agricultural income (Giné 2009; Cole et al. 2009. Determinants 
of insurance take-up that been identified so far include risk aversion, informal risk-sharing 
networks, willingness to pay and relevance of pricing and premium subsidies; the role of trust 
in insurance providers; lacking financial literacy among beneficiaries; and the influence of 
disincentives arising from uncovered basis risks farmers remain exposed to.
4
   
 First, premium affordability has been studied in randomized controlled trials in India 
and Malawi (Giné 2009; Cole et al. 2009). Farmers were found to be highly price sensitive 
but were also highly willing to invest in insurance with windfall income. This has led to the 
introduction of premium subsidies paid by governments and donor agencies, and insurance 
schemes that collects premiums after harvest when farmers have most disposable income. In 
line with these findings, Cai, et al. (2010) randomize premium prices in rural China and find 
that even small subsidies can dramatically increase take-up. The authors also confirm earlier 
evidence that against insurance theory, more risk-averse household have lower demand for 
rainfall insurance.          
 Second, since farmers pay up front for future payouts, insurance demand is sensitive to 
trust of insurance providers. Cole et al. (2009) finds for India that demand increases by 40% 
when the insurance is encouraged by a trusted person in the village. Trust not only affects 
private providers but can also be limited towards governmental agencies, as shown by Cai, et 
al. (2010) for the Chinese context. In addition, it has been argued that by design index-
insurance schemes will on average not make payouts after storms that are higher than 
premiums. This may leave farmers with the impression that they don’t get much in return for 
their money (Giné, Townsend and Vickery 2007).       
 Third, financial literacy seems crucial and directly moderates the willingness to pay 
for insurance contracts, although evidence is somewhat mixed. Cole et al. (2009) finds no 
impact of increasing education on rainfall insurance products in India, while Giné and Yang 
(2009) found that financial literacy correlated with insurance demand. Successful climate 
simulation games played with farmers in Ethiopia and Malawi offer some indication how 
                                                          
4 Comprehensive literature summaries are available in Dercon and Kirchberger (2009) and Burke, De 
Janvry, and Quintero (2011) 
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demand can be increased by giving farm households the possibility to take informed decisions 
(Patt, Suarez and Hess 2010).         
 Fourth, basis risk plays an important role in low demand, because it implies that 
farmers have no guarantee that rainfall related harvest failure will be compensated. In 
investment lingo, basis risk refers to the situation where a hedging strategy fails and possibly 
exacerbates losses (but can also lead to over-compensation). Since crop yield is not perfectly 
correlated to rainfall but also depends on the timing of rainfall, temperatures, slope of the 
land, and soil quality, farm households insured against bad weather can still suffer income 
shocks from bad harvests. In case of heavy local rainfall, plots can also be destroyed although 
the index threshold at the next rainfall gauge is not triggered. This remaining risk of 
contractual non-performance of index-insurance is a major detrimental factor. Clarke (2011) 
presents a simple theoretical model of basis risk with four states. A household with income 
level w suffers a loss which takes the value L with a probability of p or the value 0 with a 
probability of 1-p. The index for rainfall insurance can take the value I with a probability of q 
or the value of 0 with the probability of 1-q. Four states s of joint realization of index and loss 
are possible since payout of the insurance after a storm might not accurately reflect the loss: 
00; 0I; L0 and LI.
5
 Basis risk r expresses the probability that loss and index are uncorrelated. 
An increase in r without any changes in p or q refers to a change in basis risk. The probability 
 of each state s is 00; 0I; L0; LI = 1-q-r; q+r-p; r; p-r.
6
 For an index realization I 






 that is r < p(1-q). Since actual loss is 
not observable by the insurer, an indemnity-based insurance which makes payout based on the 
observed loss is not feasible. However, households can buy index-insurance which pays a 
proportion  of the total loss L if the index realization is I, or 0 if the index turns out to be 0. 
To cover L, the individual pays a premium of P=qmL. The resulting risk framework can be 
written as shown in table 1, where r is the probability that the client experiences a loss but 
will not receive a payout of the insurance even though he has purchased an index cover. This 
occurs when the loss and the index trigger do not correlate. 
                                                          
5
 00=loss takes value 0 and insurance takes value of 0; 0I=loss takes value of 0 and insurance takes value of I; 
L0=loss takes value of L and insurance takes value of 0; LI=loss takes value of L and insurance takes value of I.  
6
   Probability Structure 
 Index = 0 Index = I  
Loss = 0 1-q-r q+r-p 1-p 
Loss =L r p-r p 




Table 1: Four State Framework of Basis Risk 
State s L0 LI 00 0I 
Probability s r p-r 1-q-r q+r-p 
1. Income, no insurance w-L w-L w w 
2. Income, insured by L w-P-L w-P-L+L w-P w-P+L 
 
To reduce basis risk, some insurance providers recently started using indices of temperature 
and rainfall which helps to better predict actual crop yields but is also less transparent (Burke, 
De Janvry and Quintero 2011). 
A possible way to overcome the major obstacles to higher demand for insurance, which can 
be summarized as a lack of trust, information and financial education, could be the integration 
of pre-existing structures of informal risk-sharing networks. Dercon et al. (2014) show by 
experimental evidence from Ethiopia that demand will be higher among groups of individuals, 
that engage in risk-sharing.   
2.4. Summary of Literature Section 
From the empirical literature on income shocks, remittance motivations and rainfall insurance 
several stylized facts emerge. First, rural households in tropical countries like Indonesia are 
frequently exposed to severe income losses. Second, the motivations for sending remittances 
to rural households are manifold. Importantly, remittances are insurance substitutes and have 
been shown to increase after severe agricultural shocks. Third, piloting of formal rainfall 
insurance is met with low demand which economists have not been able to fully explain even 
when considering risk aversion, uncovered basis risk, and trust in insurance providers. This 
paper argues that these lose ends can be tied together to explain low take-up of rainfall 
insurance. Below, a simple model is developed that helps to explain why rural households 
avoid formal rainfall insurance when informal insurance substitutes exist.  
3. A Simple Model for Formal and Informal Rainfall Insurance Demand 
This section develops a simple model of demand for formal rainfall insurance with basis risk. 
The starting point is a typical village population with three income groups which differ in 
terms of land ownership and access to remittance income. First, farm households with small 
plot sizes have low per capita farm incomes and are more likely to live in poverty. Such 
households are also less likely to send family members to work in urban areas since migration 
is costly and typically not pursued by the poor. The second group consists of farm households 
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with larger plots and higher per capita income. These households are able to afford migration 
of family members. This helps to hedge against rainfall induced income shocks. The third 
group of rural households does not own land and earns its income through temporal farm 
work during the cropping season. Household income of the landless is typically below the 
poverty line and highly exposed to climatic shocks. Migration of individual household 
members is out of reach. In this basic setting, landless households would not be eligible 
for income protection through formal rainfall insurance. In addition, households with large 
plot sizes are able to draw on remittances when facing income fluctuations. The demand for 
formal insurance thus depends on the relative costs and uncertainties of formal and informal 
insurance. The last group, farm households with small plot sizes has no informal protection 
against rainfall shocks and in principle it would seem rational if these households show a high 
demand for formal insurance. However, farm size and the number of plots affect the income 
implication of basis risk. Growing on multiple plots in different locations helps larger farmers 
to hedge against rainfall shocks, since not all plots are equally exposed to storms and floods. 
In turn, households with little land are more likely to lose their entire harvest during a weather 
shock. That also means that uncovered basis risk implies a larger uncertainty for households 
with small plots and is likely to further reduce demand for formal insurance.   
 When allowing risk aversion to vary across households, demand for formal insurance 
is further reduced. Since risk aversion is closely associated with entrepreneurial activity, less 
risk adverse households are more likely to engage in non-farm income activities. By 
diversifying income sources these less risk adverse households also reduce their exposure to 
climate shocks. While such activities may not provide perfect hedging against extreme 
weather shocks that completely devastate local markets, income diversification helps to 
smooth income variability to some degree and in effect further reduces demand for formal 
insurance among households with non-farm income. Since smaller farm sizes require less 
labor input, households with small farms are most likely to engage in non-farm activities to 
supplement household income, unless bound by credit constraints. Nevertheless, with non-
farm incomes only a small proportion of rural households remains that displays demand for 
rainfall insurance. These households have relatively small farm sizes, no income from non-
farm activities, and no access to remittances. This model has several testable 
implications. First, land size is a predictor of farm income variability where households with 
smaller farm land are more likely to lose a larger share of farm income during a weather 
shock. Second, households with more non-farm income display less income variability after 
tropical storms. Third, migration is more pronounced among households with more land. 
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Fourth, rural households with access to remittance income are able to partially compensate for 
shock related losses of farm income. 
 
4. Data and Identification 
 
4.1. Data 
The data used to test these hypotheses comes from the Indonesian Family Life Survey 
(IFLS1-4), a four-wave panel conducted between 1993 and 2008 (Rand, 2011). The panel 
data covers over 30 000 individuals living on the main islands of Java, Sumatra, Bali, West 
Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Overall, the survey and is representative of 83% of 
the Indonesian population and only excludes some of the eastern islands with low population 
density. The questionnaire includes modules on agricultural and non-agricultural income, in-
cash and in-kind remittances, consumption, assets, entrepreneurial activities, migration and 
labor market behavior. In addition, it also contains comprehensive sections education, health 
care, fertility and participation in community activities.      
 Tracking of moved households and individuals has resulted in impressively low 
attrition rates between waves and cumulatively. In IFLS 1 some 7224 households were 
interviewed and individual level data was collected from more than 22000 household 
members, which include the household head and a random selection of up to 4 additional 
members. With respect to the first wave in 1993/94, subsequent surveys were able to 
interview 94% (1997), 95.3% (2000) and 93.6% (2007/2008) of households. Overall, 90.3% 
of households interviewed in the first wave were either re-interviewed in one of the follow-up 
waves or died. 87.6% were interviewed in all four waves (Rand, 2011). Importantly, these lost 
households are largely similar to those remaining in the survey (Thomas, Frankenberg and 
Smith 2001). To underline the internal validity of the sample, robustness analysis below 
includes a segment addressing survey attrition. To operationalize the data, households 
residing in urban areas are removed before analysis, which halves the sample size. In addition, 
to link households to local rainfall only households included in IFLS4 can be used since 
information on the geographic location was not collected in the earlier waves. The effective 
sample size is 3241 rural households. Appendix 1 shows descriptive statistics on the 
distribution of key household variables, including income, remittances, and rainfall. It also 
shows that wave 3 contains some important differences to the other waves. Apparently, a 
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major macro-economic shock just one year before the survey continued to have serious 
implication on wage levels and employment of migrants which led to an overall reduction of 
remittances.            
 The precipitation data comes from the Global Precipitation Climatology Centre 
(GPCC) operated by the German Meteorological Service (DWD) under the auspices of the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO). GPCC data has several advantages over other 
rainfall data currently used by economists. First, GPCC data contains precipitation totals on a 
monthly basis for the period from 1901 to 2009 on a global scale, which allows the estimation 
of long-term rainfall trends and accurate detection of shocks on a monthly basis. Second, 
rainfall is reported on a grid level rather than for weather stations or gauges. This allows an 
improved assignment of rainfall to households. In contrast, Maccini and Yang (2009) match 
households to weather stations are far as 500 km away, which very likely introduces 
measurement error. Third, rainfall between stations is interpolated and therefore also available 
for years when weather stations were not operational. Fourth, the small resolution of the 
GPCC grids adds more variability to analysis which is likely to improve estimates. Analysis 
uses the GPCC Full Data Reanalysis (Version 5) which is available in 0.5° latitude by 0.5° 
longitude on a global grid which approximately corresponds to the average size of rural 
districts in Indonesia (Rudolf, et al. 2010). Rainfall shocks are coded in terms of standard 
deviations above average precipitation of each grid and month, following existing economic 
literature. For robustness, different rainfall codings are used, including two and three standard 
deviations, as well as a continuous measure of standard deviations.  
4.2. Identification 
Although remittances can be seen as informal insurance against income variability, reverse 
causality is possible. Farm income itself may be a function of remittances since remittances 
can increase the scope for investment in farm activities (Karlan et al., 2014; Yang and Choi 
2007). Similarly, households with access to remittances may decrease their work effort (Azam 
and Gubert 2006). Such endogeneity is approached by using exogenous and stochastic rainfall 
shocks as instruments for farm income. Weather shocks are plausible instruments for income 
in contexts that largely rely on rainfed agriculture, and neither dispose of extensive and 
effective irrigation systems nor are substantially industrialized, yet. As shown by the first 
stage regressions in Appendix 2, rural incomes are highly susceptible to precipitation shocks.  
The first stage regression in order to show this correlation can be written as  
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     (1) 
where changes in farm income  are regressed on local precipitation shocks, a vector of 
household controls  , location fixed effects E and time fixed effects T, and where 
unexplained variation is captured by the idiosyncratic error term .  
In addition, unobservable household characteristics could influence both farm income and 
remittances leading to omitted variable bias. For example, unobserved entrepreneurial skills 
or levels of risk aversion might simultaneously drive income and remittance flows. By taking 
first differences in the panel structure time-invariant unobserved household characteristics can 
be controlled for. The lagged model can be expressed as 
    (2) 
where changes in remittance R of household h at time t are determined by predicted changes 
in farm income , while controlling for changes time-variant household 
characteristics .  
Crowding-out of formal insurance is analyzed using out of sample predictions and simulations 
of different levels of basis risk and risk aversion using predicted values of remittance flows 
and farm profit.  
5. Results and Simulations 
The empirical analysis is conducted in two parts. In the first segment, the four hypotheses 
derived from the theoretical model are tested. First, it is shown that land size is negatively 
correlated with normalized farm income variability. In particular, small landowners are more 
susceptible to weather induced income shocks. Second, households working in non-farm 
sectors display less variability of total household income after tropical storms. Third, 
migration is more pronounced among households with more land. Fourth, rural households 
with access to remittance income are able to partially compensate for shock related losses of 
farm income. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of internal and external validity. 
Afterwards, the results from a small simulation exercise are shown which tests the demand 
effect of different insurance designs with varying basis risk and premium.  
 Before embarking with the results, some descriptive information on shocks and 
remittances is useful. The data shows that nearly two thirds of all rural households experience 









a rainfall shock in the survey years. Thus, the demand for risk mitigation mechanisms can be 
expected to be very high. More than half of affected households are recipients of remittances 
that possibly provide partial insurance. The descriptive data suggests that overall, 57% of all 
households in the sample that experienced a shock seem to be informally insured against risk.  
5.1. Regression Results 
This section presents the empirical test results of the derived hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: Land size is negatively correlated with normalized farm income variability 
Table 1 shows the relationship between land size, farm income, and farm income variance. 
The results confirm that in terms of income variability small landowners are relatively more 
affected by weather shocks.  
Table 1: Impact of Rainfall Shocks on Farm Income Variability 
 (1) (2) 
 Changes in Income Changes in Income 
Precipitation Shock
7
 -0.449** -0.350* 
 (0.184) (0.198) 
Migrant Household -0.017 -0.050 
 (0.070) (0.058) 
Head Age -0.106*** -0.084*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) 
Head Age2 2.670 -0.0002* 
 (8.680) (9.150) 
Head Female 0.015 0.117 
 (0.103) (0.080) 
Head Single -0.039 -0.099 
 (0.131) (0.099) 
Head Widow -0.206 -0.114 
 (0.126) (0.122) 
Head Muslim 0.289 0.169 
 (0.224) (0.244) 
Household size 0.007 -0.017 
 (0.020) (0.021) 
Poorest -0.047 0.025 
 (0.112) (0.082) 
Constant 6.688*** 6.258*** 
 (0.597) (0.596) 
Observations 9223 12,349 
Adjusted R2 0.225 0.166 




Panel Years 3 4 
F-Statistic 113.11 103.26 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses  
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                          




Hypothesis 2: Households engaged in non-farm activities are less exposed to variability of 
total income after tropical storms 
Table 2 shows how changes in farm income after excessive rainfall differ for households with 
larger non-farm income. Importantly, households engaged in non-farm activities are better 
able to smooth income after rainfall shocks. 
 
Table 2: Non-Farm Income Activities and Income Variability after Rainfall Shocks 
 (1) (2) 
 Income Change after 
Rainfall Shock (2sd) 
Income Change after Rainfall 
Shock (2sd) 
   
Nonfarm Income (ln) -2.691*** -2.717*** 
 (0.624) (0.635) 
Head Age  0.095 
  (0.213) 
Head Ages2  0.002 
  (0.002) 
Head Female  -0.856 
  (0.826) 
Head Muslim  -0.480 
  (1.125) 
Household Size  0.486 
  (0.625) 
Wealth  -0.168 
  (0.423) 
Constant 19.505*** 6.416 
 (4.310) (4.929) 
   
Observations 3,924 3,924 
Adjusted R-squared 0.170 0.171 
Time Fixed Effects Y Y 
Province Fixed Effects Y Y 
Panel Years 4 4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses  





The table shows virtually identical estimates with and without controls. The results are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the effect between non-farm income 
and income change is very large. Apparently, households engaging in non-farm income 
activities are better able to hedge against rainfall shocks. Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected.  
Hypothesis 3: Households with larger farm land are more likely to send migrants to work in 
urban areas 
Table 3 presents the determinants of migration of household members. Importantly, poor 
households with small farm sized are less likely to send family members to work in urban 
areas. In line with existing evidence arguing that migration is too costly for many poor 
households, migration picks up as household income increases. 
Table 3: Determinants of Migration 
 (1) (2) 
 Migrant Household Migrant Household 
   
Farmland Size ln (ha) 0.011** 0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Head Age  -0.010*** 
  (0.003) 
Head Age2  0.000*** 
  (0.000) 
Head Female  -0.071*** 
  (0.013) 
Head Muslim  0.139*** 
  (0.034) 
Household size  0.082*** 
  (0.006) 
Constant 0.325*** 0.022 
 (0.011) (0.113) 
   
Observations 12,964 12,964 
Adjusted R-squared 0.275 0.320 
Time Fixed Effects Y Y 
Province Fixed Effects Y Y 
Panel Years 4 4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses  





The effect of logged farm size is significant at the 5% level, also when including additional 
controls. The magnitude of the result is relatively modest, given that land size is measured in 
hectares. Nevertheless, the hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected. 
Hypothesis 4: Fourth, rural households use remittances to hedge income against rainfall 
shocks 
Table 4 shows the results of the instrumental variable regressions. Remittances increase in 
response to weather induced farm income shocks. Nevertheless, remittances seem to only 
partially compensate for shock related reductions of farm income. 
Table 4: Impact of Rainfall Induced Income Shocks on Remittances 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 IV IV IV IV 












     
Changes in Farm Income  -0.252** -0.210*** -0.225 -0.200 
 (0.111) (0.075) (0.145) (0.359) 
Migrant Household  -0.070**  -4.371*** 
  (0.028)  (0.004) 
Head Age  -0.009  0.102*** 
  (0.008)  (0.150) 
Head Age2  -0.001***  -0.001** 
  (0.001)  (0.027) 
Head Female  0.012  -0.106 
  (0.045)  (0.273) 
Head Single  -0.116*  -0.195*** 
  (0.060)  (0.033) 
Head Widow  -0.028  -0.086 
  (0.072)  (0.338) 
Head Muslim  0.276***  0.088 
  (0.070)  (0.138) 
Householdsize  0.179***  0.141*** 
  (0.020)  (4.510) 
Poorest Quintile  -0.192***  -0.075 
  (0.040)  (0.201) 
Constant 0.202** 0.472  1.317** 
 (0.092) (0.469)  0.014 
Observations 9,223 9,223 12,349 12,349 
Adjusted R2 0.344 0.173 0.261 0.41 
Household Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Instrument Y Y Y Y 
Panel Years 3 3 4 4 
F- Statistic 1121.37 155.94 310.65 618.65 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by community) 
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Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The outcome variable measures logged changes in per capita remittance income. In line with 
theory, the sign of the instrumented income changes is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The coefficient suggests that on average remittances compensate 21% of rainfall 
induced farm income losses. The large magnitude of the insurance effect helps explain why 
formal insurance is often met by limited demand. The results are also similar to that of Clarke 
and Wallsten (2003) for Jamaica. The authors find that 25% of income losses are 
compensated by increasing remittance receipts. Insurance effects in the Philippines were 
much larger though and amounted to almost double the magnitude (Yang and Choi 2007). 
 Several control variables suggest heterogeneous impacts. For binary variables and 
other un-differenced indicators, positive coefficients indicate more volatile remittances, while 
negative coefficients reflect stable remittance flows below average volatility (including zero 
remittances). First, household size is positive and highly significant at the 1% level. Larger 
households experience larger positive changes in remittance inflows. Second, single and 
widow household heads show a negative coefficient, with a significance level of 10% for 
single households, depicting generally lower changes in remittances over time. This is in line 
with the literature review which showed that such households face more difficulties in getting 
access to informal insurance. Third, Muslim households (the majority religion in Indonesia) 
are more likely to receive remittances (significant at 1%). Fourth, recently migrated 
households receive significantly less responsive remittances (significant at 5%). Fifth, the 
insurance effect of remittances is almost entirely negated for the poorest quintile of 
households, which on average experience 19.2% less in remittance changes. In other words, 
while remittances help to compensate some 21% of income losses for the average household 
(conditional on controls), households in the poorest quintile only receive 1.8% compensation, 
which is not significantly different from zero.       
 Overall, the regressions results confirm the implications of the theoretical model. On 
average, precipitations shocks have negative effects on changes in farm income, which are 
partially compensated by increases in remittances, confirming the hypothesis of an underlying 






5.2. Internal Validity  
This section is devoted to the robustness of the above results. It briefly presents alternative 
specifications of the first and second stage IV regressions, which is followed by a discussion 
of potential confounders. To additionally motivate the instrumental variable approach, table 
A.3 in the appendix presents the results of a least squares regression with endogenous income 
changes. Without instrumenting via rainfall, the standard errors increase and results are 
insignificant. Nevertheless, the coefficient of changes in farm income remains negative, 
although on a smaller magnitude. The change in coefficients is an indication of the 
endogeneity bias the least-squares regression suffers from.     
 Next, the instrumental variable analysis is augmented, beginning by the inclusion of 
the third survey wave collected in 2000 shortly after the Asian financial crisis (column 3). 
Although the 4 wave panels results in a similar coefficient in size and direction, the results are 
insignificant which indicates that informal insurance through remittances is ineffective when 
affected by macro economic shocks. Table A.4 in the appendix presents the IV results when 
only extreme rainfall shocks are used in the first stage (3 standard deviations above of mean 
rainfall). The negative coefficient in column 2 suggests that strong income shocks are 
compensated by 18%, which is very similar to the main results of 21% (using 2 standard 
deviations of mean rainfall). It can also be shown, that the results are not driven by attrition. 
In fact, households which were unable to participate in the interviews of wave 4 experienced 
very similar income changes during earlier periods.      
 In terms of potential confounders, especially farm investments might be problematic 
as they could simultaneously drive farm income and remittances (Dercon and Christiaensen, 
2011). With growing investments, net farm income will be low despite good harvest returns. 
At the same time, families may draw on additional funds for investments from migrated 
household members, thereby pushing up remittance flows.     
   
5.3. External Validity  
This section briefly addresses concerns of external validity. It is primarily concerned with the 
extrapolation of the regression results to other countries with severe tropical storms where 
pilot project for index-rainfall insurance have not been met with much demand. These 
countries include India (Andhra Pradesh), the Philippines and Malawi. In fact, many rural 
populations in developing countries have remittance incomes while being exposed to 
precipitation shocks. While the empirical evidence base is still young, existing work suggests 
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that the amount of remittances sent is able to (partially) insure a large share of the rural 
population against losses of farm income. Yang and Choi (2007) find that 60 percent of 
rainfall induced income losses are substituted by remittances in the Philippines, which is 
worldwide among the three countries most exposed to typhoons and tropical storms while also 
being the fourth largest receiver of remittances (World Bank, 2011). Since even less is known 
about insurance demand in countries without access to sizable remittance income, we are only 
able to speculate whether uptake of rainfall index insurance would be stronger in such 
settings. 
5.4. Simulating Crowding-Out of Formal Insurance Demand 
Demand for rainfall insurance can be simulated by combining information about insurance 
premiums and indemnity payments, shock probabilities, individual basis risk, and remittance 
income. Using information of past precipitation it is possible to design a hypothetical 
insurance contract similar to what actual providers of index based rainfall insurance currently 
offer. It is then possible to quantify the uncovered income loss associated to basis risk for 
different contract designs. Using the benefit of hindsight, these simulations use information 
about income losses and rainfall shocks from the survey years. To factor in existing informal 
insurance schemes, remittance flows are used to simulate existing compensation mechanisms. 
What remains is a hybrid picture of farm households, some of which are fully protected by 
informal arrangements. Among the uninsured, basis risk is prohibitively high for some. In 
addition, landless households have no access to rainfall insurance and are, thus, insurance 
constrained. What remains is a relatively small group of households without access to existing 
informal insurance mechanisms with potential demand for rainfall index insurance which 
should be the target group.          
 The empirical specification of basis risk is straightforward. Using survey information 
on past losses after shocks we design an index insurance that covers up to 100% of average 
loss per hectare. Using long-term precipitation trends the probability of indemnity payouts 
and the total expected annual claim size can be calculated. It is then possible to calculate the 
minimum annual insurance premium for typical a typical insurance contract with graded 
index thresholds (two, three and four standard deviation of mean rainfall) and a modest 
loading factor of 10% of the fair premium in line with Giné, Townsend and Vickery (2007).
8
 
For the derivation of the insurance contract this section largely follows Kapphan (2011) who 
                                                          
8 Index Insurance design comes in very similar flavors in most countries and typically only differs in terms of 




designs hypothetical index-insurance contracts for Swiss maize farmers. In comparison, 
remittances have no direct running cost to the recipient (apart from the sunk cost incurred at 
the time of migration). The potential insurance premium payments act like an additional 
penalty on the index insurance contract which competes against informal insurance 
mechanisms.            
 Table 5 presents the descriptive characteristics of households with and without shocks 
including a hypothetical insurance plan that would cover up to 100% of average income loss 
associated with rainfall. Payouts and basis risk are quantified using the most recent survey 
data from 2008.  
Table 5: Simulation of Insurance Plan with Maximum Coverage and All Land Insured 
 
  Shock   
  YES NO Difference 
    
Intensity of Shock (std.dev.) 2.675 1.331 1.344*** 
   (0.084) 
Income Loss  46.963 9.529 37.433 
   (27.407) 
Remittance Income  169.024 140.153 28.871 
   (35.357) 
Land Size (ha) 0.986 1.131 -0.145** 
   (0.061) 
Premium  5.620 6.445 -0.825** 
   (0.346) 
Net Insurance Payout  14.746 -6.445 21.192*** 
   (1.125) 
Basis Risk 31.407 24.905 6.502 
   (42.221) 
    
Observations 1,443 1,782 3,225 
Data: IFLS 2008    
Note on Rainfall Index Insurance Payouts   
2 std.dev. above mean rainfall: payout of 50% of average loss  
3 std.dev. above mean rainfall: payout of 75% of average loss  
4 std.dev. above mean rainfall: payout of 100% of average loss  
 
 
For the average household, substantial basis risk remains during a shock. The uncovered loss 
associated to basis risk is approximately twice the size of the net insurance payout. In other 
words, even when purchasing full insurance, for the average household two thirds of potential 
weather induced income loss remain uninsured. When looking at relative remittance income 
(i.e. the difference between households with and without rainfall shocks), households 
suffering from shocks receive relatively more. This increase which is (partly) weather induced 
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is larger than the insurance payout for the average household. This is a clear sign that even 
full formal insurance coverage does not necessarily achieve what informal mechanisms 
through remittances are able to in insure.        
 Overall it becomes clear that formal insurance is easily crowded out by existing 
informal insurance schemes or functions at least as a complementary element. Notably, this is 
in contrast to some existing research showing the opposite, namely that crowding out of 
remittances can be a result of rainfall insurance and other transfers (Hintz 2009; Bowles 
2008). Such literature has argued that informal risk management schemes are intrinsically 
motivated and lack sufficient consistency and reliability which people would be willing to pay 
higher premiums for. Bowles (2008) identifies two major causes for this potential crowding 
out effect: the framing effect, meaning that people perceive availability of formal insurance as 
a signal that risk mitigation is an individual responsibility and not a social interaction. 
Secondly, he argues that insurance buyers could invoke a negative response of the solidarity 
network as they might be accused of low commitment and trust in the community relations. 
However, given the premium costs and the uncertainty associated with basis risk, it is unlikely 
that formal rainfall insurance will crowd out informal remittance-based mechanisms anytime 
soon. While this simulation exercise cannot replace carefully designed field experiments and 
randomized pilot studies, it provides powerful evidence on a nationally representative level 
about the limited impact of potential insurance schemes. 
6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks  
Farm income is exposed to different sources of variability. Especially in tropical countries 
with large coast lines such as Indonesia, excessive rainfall can have devastating effects and 
has long been identified as a main threat to reliable farm income. After decades of 
experimenting with yield insurance, attention has recently shifted to rainfall index insurance. 
Although appealing in its simplicity of providing fixed payouts according to independently 
measured rainfall, different pilots have encountered limited uptake.    
 This paper attempts to show why demand for rainfall insurance might be much lower 
than considered as rational when investigating rainfall shocks and losses in farm income 
along. By using rainfall as instrumental variable for income shock, we are able to demonstrate 
that remittances already act as informal insurance mechanism. It is shown that informal 
rainfall insurance compensates about 21% of the income loss associated with excessive 
rainfall. Additional simulations with hypothetical rainfall index insurance suggest that 
remittances largely outweigh potential indemnity payments. In addition, even when 
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purchasing full insurance, excessive basis risk remains which for the average household is 
twice as large as the payout.          
 This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, it unites the 
strands of empirical research separately working on rainfall insurance and remittances. 
Second, it is able to demonstrate the insurance effect of remittances for Indonesia. Third, by 
simulating the effects of a typical rainfall insurance contract it provides country wide 
evidence that formal insurance may be crowded out by existing informal mechanisms. 
However, this partial crowding out effect should not be understood as a recommendation to 
replace formal insurance mechanism. As the crowding out effect has a significant size but is 
only covering about 1/5 of the damage expected, the imperfections of the formal insurance 
market not matching the needs and demands of the target groups should be further analyzed 
by the insurance sector. Another major policy conclusion that derives from this work is 
related to the target group of insurances. Instead of working with medium-sized farms who 
are more likely to have a migrant family member who sends remittances, insurance is 
potentially in highest demand by households without remittance income and should be 
targeted to such groups.         
 Furthermore, the paper reveals that migrants remitting to their family bear a 
considerable financial burden, which is hard to calculate, making them more vulnerable to 
shocks as well. This might imply that insurance demand which can be subscribed by migrants 
for their families is high and this type of family insurance would provide more income 
security for both the migrant and the receivers of the remittances. Future research should have 
more detailed look at how rainfall and farm income are related, since large variability seems 
to exist. In addition, potential insurance schemes for landless workers during years of poor 
harvests should be considered, since these groups are typically left out by existing 
mechanisms. Furthermore, it might be worthwhile to analyze the role of other informal risk 






Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics of the Distribution of Key Household Variables 
 
 1993 
IFLS Wave 1 
1997/1998 
IFLS Wave 2 
2000 
IFLS Wave 3 
2007/2008 
IFLS Wave 4 










Household head is single 
(percentage of total households) 
4.22 3.2 3.48 3.5 
Household head is married 
(percentage of total households) 
84.107 76.86 78.71 71.55 
Household head widow(er) 
(percentage of total households) 
11.69 11.78 13.6 15.51 
Household head female 
(percentage of total households) 
15.73 15.18 16.69 19.28 
Migrant household 76.27 69.57 32.79 22.98 
Household head no education 26.93 23.97 22.92 20.14 
Household head primary 
education 
57.23 55.78 57.35 56.61 
Household head secondary 
education or higher  
15.7 14.68 13.23 14.03 
Mean farm income (in previous 










Mean Remittance Income (in 


















Household Head Religion  
Islam 
88.33 83.8 88.61 88.64 
Protestant 4.99 4.72 5.28 4.94 
Catholic 1.54 1.54 1.48 1.72 











Observations N 3241 3241 3241 3241 
Notes: Total N= 3241 households. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. (Source: Indonesian Family Life 
Survey, waves 1 to 4). Monetary values converted from Indonesian Rupiah to US Dollars by applying exchange 





Table A.2: First Stage Regression – Impact of Rainfall Shock on Farm Income Changes 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Changes in Income Changes in Income 
Precipitation Shock
9
 -0.449** -0.350* 
 (0.184) (0.198) 
Migrant Household -0.017 -0.050 
 (0.070) (0.058) 
Head Age -0.106*** -0.084*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) 
Head Age2 2.670 -0.0002* 
 (8.680) (9.150) 
Head Female 0.015 0.117 
 (0.103) (0.080) 
Head Single -0.039 -0.099 
 (0.131) (0.099) 
Head Widow -0.206 -0.114 
 (0.126) (0.122) 
Head Muslim 0.289 0.169 
 (0.224) (0.244) 
Household size 0.007 -0.017 
 (0.020) (0.021) 
Poorest -0.047 0.025 
 (0.112) (0.082) 
Constant 6.688*** 6.258*** 
 (0.597) (0.596) 
Observations 9223 12,349 
Adjusted R2 0.225 0.166 




Panel Years 3 4 
F-Statistic 113.11 103.26 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses  
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
                                                          




Table A.3: OLS Regression with Endogenous Income Changes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Rainfall Shocks of 2 Std.dev. Rainfall Shocks of 3 Std.dev. 
 Changes in Received  
Remittances 
     
Changes in Farm 
Income  
-0.004 -0.004 -0.015* -0.092* 
 (0.015) (0.046) (0.021) (0.053) 
Migrant Household  -0.007  -0.006 
  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Head Age  0.007     0.017*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Head Age2  3.551  4.090 
  (3.161)  (3.090) 
Head Female  -0.016  -0.018 
  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Head Single  0.014  0.024 
  (0.017)  (0.025) 
Head Widow  -0.012  0.008 
  (0.012)  (0.016) 
Head Muslim  -0.036  -0.064** 
  (0.023)  (0.025) 
Household Size  -0.011  -0.010 
  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Poorest Quintile  0.007  0.011 
  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Constant -0.016*** -0.435 -0.054*** -1.044*** 
 (0.002) (0.306) (0.005) (0.339) 
     
Observations 9,223 9,223 9,223 9,223 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.050 0.028 0,050 
Household Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Instrument N N N N 
Panel Years 3 3 3 3 
F- Statistic 798.91 38.21 678.94 58.71 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses  





Table A.4: IV Results with Shocks of 3 Standard Deviations Above Mean Rainfall 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 IV IV IV IV 












     
Changes in Farm Income -0.114** -0.183* -0.234 -0.252 
 (0.010) (0.103) (0.172) (0.634) 
Migrant Household  -0.069**  -0.052 
  (0.028)  (0.053) 
Head Age  -0.006  -0.014 
  (0.011)  (0.067) 
Head Age_ squared  -0.001***  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Head Female  0.003  0.077 
  (0.045)  (0.111) 
Head Single  -0.110*  -0.254*** 
  (0.060)  (0.095) 
Head Widow  -0.017  -0.172 
  (0.069)  (0.110) 
Head Muslim  0.248***  0.295** 
  (0.060)  (0.139) 
Household Size  0.178***  0.190*** 
  (0.021)  (0.024) 
Poorest Quintile  -0.188***  -0.220*** 
  (0.037)  (0.047) 
Constant 2.660*** 0.291 0.769** 4.281 
 (0.689) (0.716) (0.413) (4.948) 
     
Observations 9,223 9,223 12,305 12,305 
Adjusted R2 0,301 0,173  0.284 
Household Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Instrument Y Y Y Y 
Panel Years 3 3 4 4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses  





A.5.: Geographic Matching of Household and Precipitation Data 
The IFLS contains information on residence and location of birth of all households 
interviewed on a province, Kabupaten, Kecamaten and community level. The Kabupaten 
level is placed one step lower in the hierarchy of Indonesia’s administrative division below 
the provincial government and can be also referred to as regency or district. The second 
lowest level of geographic mapping of the households in the IFLS is the Kecamatan level 
which can be roughly compared to a county in the United States of America (Frankenberg et 
al., 2000). Embedded in these geographic units, numerous communities referring to the 
villages in which the household are situated are represented. Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, the IFLS sample has been restricted to those households of IFLS 4, for which 
information on specific geographical location of communities based on latitude and longitude 
measures is available on specific request. This constitutes a crucial basis for the geographical 
assignment to the gridded precipitation data (RAND-IFLS, 2011).    
 For the purpose of the analysis, the precipitation data for Indonesia has been extracted 
on the smallest scale possible, i.e. 0,5°x 0,5° via a spatial visualization with ArcGIS for the 
time period from 1970 to 2009. For the whole region of Indonesia, 989 Grids were identified. 
As a further step, precipitation data and households’ location were matched based on 
geographic proximity. For this purpose, the households of the adapted IFLS sample were 
assigned to the grid, in which they are located as calculated by ArcGis
10
. The matched data 
contains 84 grids corresponding to the 3241 households in 132 communities analyzed in the 








                                                          
10 ArcGis is a “complete system for designing and managing solutions through the application of 
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